Opinion
No. 53816-1-I
Filed: December 27, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 03-1-00933-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/26/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Gain Brian D.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
David L. Donnan, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701, Seattle, WA 98101-3635.
T Harris — Informational Only (Appearing Pro Se), 4307 S. Cedar, Tacoma, WA 98409.
Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701, Seattle, WA 98101-3635.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Dana Cashman, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave Ste W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Tausha Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she knowingly attempted to cash a forged check, relying on her explanation that on July 15 a friend-of-a-friend asked whether she would cash his payroll check if he arranged to have his employer issue the check payable to her. But the `payroll' check payable to Harris was dated July 12 and lacked any typical payroll information. And when the bank delayed cashing the check, Harris walked away leaving the check at the bank. Under the applicable viewed-in-a-light-most-favorable-to-the-state standard, there is sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris knew the check was a forgery.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
RCW 9A.60.020(1)(b); State v. Scoby, 117 Wn.2d 55, 61-62, 810 P.2d 1358 (1991). (Bare possession of a forged instrument alone is insufficient to justify a theft or forgery conviction. However, possession together with corroborating evidence of knowledge may be sufficient to justify a theft or forgery conviction.)
In her opening brief, Harris challenged the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial, but the trial court belatedly entered findings prepared by the trial deputy prosecutor who drafted the findings without reviewing the opening appellate brief. The findings mirror the oral ruling by the trial court, Harris has not assigned error to those findings in an amended or reply brief, and there is no showing that the findings were tailored to address issues raised in her opening brief. The delayed entry of the findings does not entitle Harris to any relief on appeal.
State v. Portomene, 79 Wn. App. 863, 905 P.2d 1234 (1995) (delayed entry of findings under CrR 6.1).
Harris also contends RCW 43.43.754 and the portion of her sentence requiring her to provide a biological sample for DNA identification violates both her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and the article I, section 7 restriction on searches without well founded suspicion. These arguments were rejected in, and are controlled by, our decision in State v. Surge. The Ninth Circuit has also recently rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a requirement to provide a biological sample for DNA identification.
122 Wn. App. 448, 94 P.3d 345 (2004) (holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is controlling on the Fourth Amendment issue).
U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
We affirm.
COLEMAN, J., GROSSE, J. and BAKER, J.