Opinion
No. 2-360 / 01-1240
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison (motion to suppress) and Douglas Staskal (trial and sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and failure to possess a drug tax stamp. AFFIRMED.
Maggi Moss and Jennifer Larson of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn, Montgomery, Boles Gribble, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie L. Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Charles Harris appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and failure to possess a drug tax stamp. He contends his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by an unreasonable search. We affirm.
Harris also asserts his right against unreasonable searches guaranteed by the Iowa Constitution has been violated. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. We generally interpret this provision of the Iowa Constitution to have the same scope and purpose as the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998). Our discussion in this case of the Fourth Amendment applies equally to the state constitutional claim.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS.
Shortly before midnight on June 8, 2000, police officer Garth House was sent by dispatch to an alley in a high-crime area of Des Moines to investigate a report of a fight in progress. Jeffrey Blaine, a civilian who later became a reserve officer, accompanied him. House was in uniform and driving a marked patrol car.
When House arrived in the alley, he observed a small group of people standing nearby. Officer House did not observe anyone fighting. As House got out of his patrol car to investigate, he saw Charles Harris and a female walking away from the group toward a nearby residence. House described Harris as walking hurriedly, "almost at a run." House ordered Harris to return to the alley to talk to him. Harris did not comply. Instead, he continued walking toward the house. House pursued him. When Harris came to the back door of the house he could not open it. He began knocking on the door of the house and rattling the doorknob, telling the officer that, "It's okay, I live here." House again ordered Harris to come back, but a young girl opened the door and Harris ran inside.
House gave chase and followed Harris into the home. Harris went into the front room, where he turned and threw a paper bag across the room. House took Harris into custody and retrieved the bag, which contained approximately sixty bags of individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine and one larger bag.
The State ultimately charged Harris with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(3) (1999) and failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of sections 453B.3 and 453B.12. Harris filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress. Our supreme court denied his application for discretionary review. The trial court then found Harris guilty of the charged offenses following a bench trial. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate, twenty-five year term of imprisonment for possession with intent to deliver and an indeterminate, five-year term for failure to affix a drug tax stamp, to be served concurrently. Harris appeals.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review this constitutional claim de novo. State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Iowa 2001).
III. MERITS.
Harris contends the trial court should have sustained his motion to suppress evidence because his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. Harris makes several claims on appeal. He argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the residence which Officer House entered without a warrant. He maintains House lacked probable cause to enter the residence for the purpose of conducting a search. He asserts House failed to articulate reasonable grounds to conduct a Terry pat down, and that the trial court erroneously held House was permitted to enter the residence to perform the pat down. He also contends that House lacked exigent circumstances to enter the residence.
As a preliminary matter, we address the issue of the alleged untimeliness of Harris's motion to suppress. Harris filed his motion to suppress fifty-six days after his arraignment. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(3) and (4) provides that such motion must be filed no later than forty days after arraignment, unless the court finds good cause shown for the delay. The State did not resist the motion as untimely, nor did the trial court address the untimeliness issue. The State now argues that Harris has waived his constitutional claim by the untimely filing.
The trial court entered an order providing that all defense motions were to be filed by September 15, 2000. Harris filed his motion to suppress on September 15, thereby complying with the court order. While the court did not specifically discuss the issue of good cause in its order extending the deadlines, we conclude that based on the circumstances of this case, Harris did not waive his constitutional claims. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the defendant's claims on appeal.
To protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government must obtain a warrant prior to searching or entering an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1998). Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, unless the government action falls within one of a few, well-recognized exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967). "These exceptions include searches based on consent, plain view, exigent circumstances, and searches incident to arrest." Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 45.
In determining whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation, we utilize a two-step approach. First, we decide whether the person challenging the search has shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. If so, we then "consider whether the State unreasonably invaded that protected interest." Id. Our evaluation of the reasonableness of a search is made using an objective standard. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280-81 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). "Consequently, the legality of a search and seizure . . . 'does not depend on the actual motivation of the individual officers involved.'" Id. at 281 (quoting State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996)).
The State contends Harris failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home he entered at 1145 21st Street in Des Moines. Harris and a friend testified Harris was staying at the house where he was arrested. Harris testified his permanent address is in Kansas City, Kansas. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that Harris had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence searched, such that he may challenge the constitutionality of the search. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 379 (1998) (citations omitted) (stating that in order to claim Fourth Amendment protection, defendant must demonstrate that he personally has reasonable expectation of privacy in place searched).
We next turn to the issue of whether the search in this case fits within an exception to the warrant requirement. First, we conclude House had reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been committed by Harris based on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed where defendant engaged in headlong flight upon noticing the police in area of high crime). House went to the scene because the police department had received a report that a crime had occurred or was occurring. When House got out of his car to investigate, Harris immediately left the group of people gathered there, and hurried, almost at a run, toward a nearby residence. House testified this was a high crime area. It was late at night. House was justified in trying to briefly detain Harris to investigate further.
Once an officer has reasonable suspicion, he can perform a brief investigative stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) (holding that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigative stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot). House attempted to do that, but Harris ignored him. Harris continued walking hurriedly away and entered a nearby house. When Harris refused to follow House's directives, House had grounds to arrest him for interference with official acts, a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1 (Supp. 1999). The inquiry, then, is whether House could pursue Harris into the residence without a warrant based on Harris's commission of the crime of interference with official acts.
We conclude that this case is controlled by our supreme court's recent decision in State v. Pink, 648 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2002). In that case, as here, the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant for the crime of interference with official acts. Pink, 648 N.W.2d at 109. Pink ignored the officer's demands to stop and entered his home. Id. at 108. The officer then followed Pink into his home and waited for twenty minutes for Pink to come out of a bathroom. Id. Our supreme court determined that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 109. See also State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 2001) (holding a warrantless search of a garage attached to defendant's home by an officer in hot pursuit of a defendant, who speeded up while her car was being pursued by an officer who observed a traffic violation, did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
Based on our reading of Pink and Legg, we conclude that House did not violate Harris's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. House was justified in attempting to stop Harris as he fled to the house. House had probable cause to arrest Harris for interference with official acts after Harris ignored his orders to stop, and House was in hot pursuit of Harris when Harris retreated into the residence. House left the residence as soon as he handcuffed Harris and retrieved the bag of illegal drugs that Harris discarded. Officer House was also concerned that Harris might be entering a home where he did not reside. Under the circumstances, he had reason to be concerned about the safety of any persons inside. In light of these circumstances, the officer's warrantless entry into the house was reasonable. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider Harris's remaining arguments on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We affirm the trial court's ruling overruling Harris's motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.