Opinion
No. COA13–143.
2013-07-2
STATE of North Carolina v. Derwin Gerrard HARRIS.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brian D. Rabinovitz, for the State. Brock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments signed 15 August 2012 by Judge Shannon R. Joseph and filed 5 September 2012 in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 June 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brian D. Rabinovitz, for the State. Brock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Background
Derwin Gerrard Harris (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon revocation of his probation. We affirm.
On 13 August 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty in Alamance County Superior Court to two charges of felony breaking and entering and two charges of larceny after breaking and entering. The trial court consolidated the convictions into two judgments, which would run consecutively (“the Alamance County judgments”). In each judgment, the court sentenced Defendant to 6 to 8 months for one count of felony breaking and entering and one count of larceny after breaking and entering. The trial court then suspended each sentence and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 60 months. Probation was transferred to Guilford County.
On 19 July 2010, Defendant pleaded guilty in Guilford County Superior Court to felony possession of controlled substances on jail premises, felony possession with intent to sell or distribute marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. In its judgment (“the Guilford County judgment”), the trial court sentenced Defendant to 6 to 8 months of imprisonment, suspended that sentence, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 36 months.
In July 2010, the trial court determined that Defendant had violated probation as set out in the Alamance County judgments and modified Defendant's probation in each case. One year later, on 6 July 2011, the trial court modified Defendant's probation in all three cases on a finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation.
Approximately seven months later, on 21 February 2012, Defendant's probation officer signed probation violation reports alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation in all three cases by (1) being terminated from the drug treatment court program and (2) receiving new felony charges.
On 15 August 2012, the trial court held a hearing on those probation violation reports. At the start of the hearing, the court was informed that Defendant had since been convicted on the new felony charges set out in the probation violation reports—first-degree burglary and two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon—resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for 120 months. Defendant, through counsel, admitted to having violated the terms of his probation and asked the court to run his 6 to 8 month sentences in the Alamance and Guilford County probation violation cases concurrent with his 120–month sentence for burglary and robbery. The trial court denied this request, stating that it would leave the original judgments intact and that “[t]hey will be served consecutively.” When Defendant's counsel asked the court for clarification on this ruling, it specified that the sentences would run “[c]onsecutively [as] to everything. There is no concurrent.” By judgments signed 15 August 2012, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered the three 6 to 8 month sentences to run consecutive to each other and also consecutive to Defendant's 120–month burglary and robbery sentence. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Defendant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences. He asserts that the sentence for the Guilford County judgment should have run concurrent with the sentences for the Alamance County judgments because the Guilford County judgment did not specify otherwise. In support of that argument, Defendant relies on the principle that “[b]ecause another judge had ruled upon this issue [in the Guilford County judgment], it was error for Judge Joseph to order that judgment to run consecutively with the others.” We are unpersuaded.
Pursuant to statutory authority, trial courts may impose consecutive sentences when defendants receive simultaneous, multiple sentences. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1354(a) (2011). In revocation of probation cases, section 15A–1344(d) has been interpreted to allow a trial court “to impose a consecutive sentence when a suspended sentence is activated upon revocation of a probationary judgment without regard to whether the sentence previously imposed ran concurrently or consecutively.” State v. Paige, 90 N.C.App. 142, 143, 369 S.E.2d 606, 606 (1988). Thus, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 15A–1344 and 15A1354, a trial court may run a sentence activated upon revocation of a defendant's probation either consecutively or concurrently. State v. Hanner, 188 N.C.App. 137, 140–41, 654 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2008). Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences in accordance with the law. Defendant's argument is therefore without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgments.
AFFIRMED. Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).