Opinion
No. 4-119 / 03-1187
April 28, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, Charles L. Smith, Judge.
The State appeals from the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal charge against her because trial was not held within ninety days as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b). AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Marci Prier, County Attorney, and Eric Hansen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
DeShawne L. Bird-Sell, of DeShawne L. Bird-Sell, P.L.C., Glenwood, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller, J. and Nelson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
The State appeals from the district court's grant of defendant Marla Kay Hansen's motion to dismiss the criminal charge against her because trial was not held within ninety days as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b). The State contends the court erred in dismissing the case because the State demonstrated good cause to continue trial beyond the ninety-day time limit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
A February 10, 2003 trial information charged Hansen with child endangerment resulting in bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1)(b) and 726.6(5) (2003). She was accused of spanking a child with her hand, leaving a mark or marks on his buttocks. The district court initially set arraignment for February 25, pre-trial hearing for March 17, and trial for April 1, 2003. Hansen, who is hearing-impaired, filed a written arraignment and plea of not guilty through counsel on February 21 stating "I have been informed of the implications of this arraignment signing by an interpreter and understand the implications herein."
Hansen filed a motion to suppress any and all statements she had allegedly made to police during questioning, contending she was legally deaf, the statements were made without a knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right to an interpreter, and the use of such statements would prejudice her. Although Hansen filed her motion to suppress on March 11, the hearing was delayed until April 17 so the court could secure the services of an interpreter. On April 21 the district court granted Hansen's motion to suppress, finding her statements had not been made or elicited through a qualified interpreter and she had not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waived in writing her right to an interpreter before she was questioned. The court further found the State had not met the threshold requirements of Iowa Code section 804.31 for admission of the statements and had not established substantial compliance with such statute. The court concluded that under section 804.31 Hansen's statements were not admissible, could not be used against her, and must be suppressed.
Because the suppression hearing had to be continued past the time originally set for trial on the matter (April 1), the trial accordingly also had to be moved back and was reset for April 29. This date was within the ninety-day speedy trial deadline provided by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b), May 11 in this case. On April 28 the State filed a motion to again continue trial to a later date. It asserted that the court administrator could not find an interpreter for the April 29 trial date, and that "[t]he next scheduled trial date is May 13, 2003." The State sought to have the trial continued to "the next scheduled trial date," May 13, two days past the speedy-trial deadline. The State asserted that failure to have an interpreter was good cause to continue the trial beyond that deadline. The district court held a hearing on the motion to continue on May 5, 2003. It overruled the State's motion to continue and ordered that a trial date be set by the court administrator.
The State was apparently referring to the failure to have an interpreter for the trial scheduled for April 29, as nothing in the motion suggests that an interpreter or interpreters would not thereafter be available before May 13.
Trial was not held on or before May 11, 2003. On June 12, 2003 Hansen filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the criminal charge against her pursuant to rule 2.33(2)( b) because the ninety-day deadline for speedy trial had passed and she had not waived her right to speedy trial. The court sustained her motion to dismiss. The State appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by dismissing the case because good cause existed to continue the trial beyond the ninety-day speedy-trial deadline.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
Hansen brought her motion to dismiss based only on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2) (b); thus our review of the court's ruling on this motion is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). The trial court's discretion to avoid dismissal under rule 2.33(2)( b) is circumscribed by the limited exceptions to the rule's mandate. Id. "So the question, ultimately, is whether the trial court properly exercised — or abused — its limited discretion under the rule." Id. (citing State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983)). To show an abuse of discretion, one must show the court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1999).
III. MERITS.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b) states that if a criminal defendant has not waived his or her right to speedy trial, "the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown." The Iowa rule is more stringent than the constitutionally-based right to speedy trial recognized in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999). Under our rule, if trial does not commence within ninety days from indictment, dismissal is compelled unless the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) "good cause" for the delay. Id. Here, the State concedes in its brief that the first and second reasons do not apply and thus our analysis focuses solely on the third possible reason for continuance beyond the ninety-day limit, the existence of "good cause" for the delay.
It is the State's burden to demonstrate good cause in order to be excused from the ninety-day trial requirement. State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Iowa 1980). "Good cause, under our rule, focuses on only one factor: the reason for the delay." Id. at 335. It is axiomatic that defendants have no duty to bring themselves to trial. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. Surrounding circumstances bear on the good cause inquiry only to the extent they relate directly to the sufficiency of the reason itself. Id. "The shortness of the period, the failure of the defendant to demand a speedy trial, and the absence of prejudice are legitimate considerations only insofar as they affect the strength of the reason for delay." Id.
A statute applicable to the facts of this case provides:
If a deaf or hard-of-hearing person is a party to, a witness at, or a participant in a proceeding before a grand jury, court, or administrative agency of this state, the court or administrative agency shall appoint an interpreter without expense to the deaf or hard-of-hearing person to interpret or translate the proceedings to the deaf or hard-of-hearing person and to interpret or translate the person's testimony unless the deaf or hard-of-hearing person waives the right to an interpreter.
Iowa Code § 622B.2. Thus, under the clear language of the statute Hansen, as a hearing-impaired person, had the right to have an interpreter appointed for trial and the record shows she did not waive that right. Language in Hansen's February 21 written arraignment at least suggested she needed an interpreter. Hansen's March 11 motion to suppress forcibly asserted she was legally deaf, and more formally notified the court of her need for an interpreter. Even the latter of these two dates was a full two months before the ninety-day speedy-trial deadline. The court's April 21 ruling on the motion made abundantly clear that an interpreter would be required for trial. The ruling was filed when some three weeks still remained before the ninety-day deadline would arrive.
The State argues that the court's inability to secure two interpreters until May 13 for a trial in a small, rural county with limited resources presented exceptional circumstances, constituted "good cause," and justified the requested continuance to two days beyond the speedy-trial deadline. This argument ignores, however, the facts that substantially after Hansen's need for an interpreter had been made known to the court it had reset trial for April 29, it had apparently done so without determining whether an interpreter would be available for that date, and no interpreter had in fact been available for that date. Further, the record indicates only that interpreters were not available for the April 29 trial date and that as of May 5 interpreters were not available until May 13.
Although the record is very unclear on the point, it appears that having a second interpreter available was either desirable or necessary, either to have interpreters available for both Hansen and a witness or to allow interpreters to alternate during the day.
The prosecutor stated at the May 5 hearing that the State sought continuance "to the May 13 trial date" and that "from speaking to the court administrator . . . no interpreter would be available for the defendant until . . . May 13." Nothing in the record indicates that when the State filed its motion to continue on April 28 interpreters were not available for one or more of the dates of April 30 through May 11. The State's motion apparently sought continuance to May 13 rather than to some earlier date solely because May 13 was "[t]he next scheduled trial date."
"Prior cases teach that the general press of court business is insufficient to avoid dismissal under a speedy-trial rule, even for a busy judge sitting in a high-volume court." Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 602. See also State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Iowa 1976) (complexity of case and general docket congestion not good cause for continuance); State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 158-59 (Iowa 1975) (failure to staff courtroom with sufficient jurors not good cause for continuance). Furthermore, although this case may involve somewhat unusual circumstances, having a hearing-impaired person either as a defendant or witness in a criminal case is certainly not a unique or highly unusual circumstance, but instead is and will continue to be a recurring event. Compare Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 206 (stating that while chronic court congestion does not justify departure from the speedy trial rule, specific, unique, non-recurring events do.)
An Iowa statute provides that hearing-impaired persons have the right to interpreters to ensure meaningful participation in court proceedings. Iowa Code § 622B.2. A defendant in a criminal case has a co-existing right to a speedy trial. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)( b). The legislature has assigned to the courts the duty to effectuate the first of these two rights. See Iowa Code § 622B.2 (stating that in a proceeding before a court the court shall appoint an interpreter without expense to the deaf or hard-of-hearing person). The State has the duty to effectuate the second of these rights. See Leonard, 240 N.W.2d at 692 (stating it is the State's duty to effectuate the public policy of providing speedy trials); see also State v. Lybarger, 263 N.W.2d 545, 546 (Iowa 1978) (holding the State, not the defendant, must see that prosecution is timely). We conclude the courts and prosecution must cooperate to effectuate these two co-existing rights of a defendant in a criminal case. Clearly it was not Hansen's duty to secure an interpreter or interpreters, or to ensure she was brought to trial in a timely manner. Further, she could not and should not be forced to choose between these two rights.
All parties were aware well before April 29 that an interpreter was needed for trial. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case we cannot conclude that the court's inability to secure an interpreter or interpreters for trial on April 29 or for trial between May 5 and May 12 constitutes good cause to continue the trial past the speedy-trial deadline and deny Hansen her right to a speedy trial. The trial court did not abuse its limited discretion in finding no good cause to continue the trial beyond the speedy-trial deadline and later sustaining Hansen's motion to dismiss because trial was not timely held.
Our supreme court has noted that most cases justifying reversal based on speedy-trial violations involve delays numbering weeks or months, not days. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. However, our cases also make clear that "a procedural deadline cannot be escaped merely by showing it has been violated `only a little bit,'" and that "the question is not whether the delay was great or small, but whether the reason given justifies departure from the rule at all." Id. In Miller the court found that a delay of just one day did not allow for a continuance of trial beyond the ninety-day deadline. Id. at 206. The court there emphasized that the length of the delay past the deadline is not determinative. Id. What is important is whether the State met its burden to prove "good cause" for missing the deadline. Id. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the State did not meet its burden to prove "good cause" for delaying Hansen's trial beyond the speedy-trial deadline.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its limited discretion in sustaining Hansen's motion to dismiss the charge against her because trial was not held within ninety days as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b). Under the facts and circumstances of this case the court's inability to secure an interpreter or interpreters was not "good cause" to continue trial beyond the speedy-trial deadline and deny Hansen's right to a speedy trial under the rule. The trial court did not err in dismissing the charge against Hansen.
AFFIRMED.