Importantly, there is also Tennessee case law (albeit unpublished) that implicitly recognizes the applicability of § 55-4-110 to temporary license plates. See State v. Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov. 29, 2006); see also Shadoan, 340 F.3d at 407-08 (applying § 55-4-110 to temporary tag). Given that Simpson has failed to present any compelling reason why such an interpretation is in error, we need consider this argument no further. In yet another interpretive twist on the statute, Simpson further argues that section 110 does not specifically require that the expiration date of the tag be legible. He contends that the requirement that the license plate be "clearly legible" means only the actual tag number, and not the expiration date.
"When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, as well as the rational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts known by the officer." State v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2006) (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)).
"When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, as well as the rational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts known by the officer." State v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2006) (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)). In its brief, the State cites Knights and the requirement of reasonable suspicion for a probationer search, but then proceeds to engage in a general totality of the circumstances pursuant to the Sixth Circuit case of United States v. Tessier. 814 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2016).
We conclude that these several factors, when taken together, suffice to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to warrant expanding the scope of the traffic stop to investigate further.See, e.g., State v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 29, 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion where the officer knew defendant's reputation as a drug user in addition to the defendant's nervousness, presence in a high crime area, and lack of candor regarding his criminal history). Because the Defendant was not unreasonably detained, his consent to search was not preceded by an illegal seizure.
Our research has revealed situations in Tennessee where an officer verbally inquired into an offender's criminal history during the course of a traffic stop.See, e.g., State v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2006);State v. Orson Wendell Hudson, No. M2004-00077-CCA-R3CD, 2005 WL 639129, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2005). Other jurisdictions also allow the inquiry into an offender's criminal history during the course of a traffic stop.
This court has held that an officer's prior knowledge of a defendant's criminal history or reputation, in addition to other factors, would give rise to reasonable suspicion to further detain a defendant.See e.g. State v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *9 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, Nov. 29, 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion where the officer knew defendant's reputation as a drug user in addition to the defendant's nervousness, presence in a high crime area, and lack of candor regarding his criminal history). In State v. Westbrooks, this court examined the initial stop of a defendant rather than the subsequent detention.