Opinion
ID NO. 9805006798 9806011006 9804001029
April 11, 2001
Marsha Epstein, Esquire, and Daniel Miller, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State.
Joseph A. Gabay, Esquire and Sheryl Rush-Milstead, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Defendant, Sharon Hamilton.
Jerome M. Capone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware for the Defendant, Terri Walston.
Anthony A. Fighola, Jr., Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware for the Defendant, Kelcee Jackson.
Opinion After Trial
This case involves charges of Murder Second Degree and Assault Second Degree against three defendants: Sharon Hamilton, Kelcee Jackson and Terri Walston. The defendants and State, after jury selection had begun, waived their rights to a jury and the case was tried to the Court.
The case arises from a fight that occurred on March 27, 1998 and which involved the named defendants, as well as 3 additional defendants: Shyniece Moore, Kelene Thomas and Keesha Watson as well as the alleged victim Brandi Coleman. At the time of the incident Brandi Coleman was pregnant. It is undisputed that during the course of the altercation Ms. Coleman was in some manner thrown to the ground and thereafter beaten and kicked. After the incident Ms. Coleman was taken to Christiana Care and admitted to the high risk delivery unit because of the trauma she had suffered. She was experiencing contractions. The course of treatment decided upon due to the fetus' age of 22 weeks was to attempt to stop the contractions and maintain the fetus in-utero. This treatment initially appeared to be successful and the contractions had virtually ceased. On the afternoon of March 30th vaginal bleeding began to occur. The contractions resumed and Ms. Coleman dilated. It was noted that blood was accumulating within her uterus. It was then decided that the best course of treatment was to promote a birth at this time. This was done in the interest of the mother's safety. She was bleeding vaginally and would likely continue to do so unless a birth was induced.
This course of treatment was effective and a birth ensued. Ms. Coleman had suffered an abruption or separation of the placenta from the uterus. The state expert testified this was due to the trauma. The State's expert concluded that an abruption without treatment "could be life threatening."
Discussion
The two charges of Murder in the Second Degree against all defendants require that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or defendants caused the death of "another person." In this case the State alleges this person to be Tyriek Coleman, the child born to Brandi Coleman on March 30, 1998.
The Delaware Criminal law defines a person as "a human being who has been born and is alive." This Court in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment set forth the burden the State must meet to prove that Tyriek Coleman was a person under the definition provided in the Delaware Criminal Code:
1) A human fetus that is born, i.e., completely expelled or extracted from the Mother, and 2) is alive, i.e., after such separation, breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart, pulsations of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles. It is also clear that "beating of the heart' means more than spontaneous cardiac contractions that are transient in nature."
Whether this definition continues to make sense in the light of today's medical technology is not a matter to be decided by a trial Court. It is certainly a matter subject to legislative enactment; or, modification or modernization of common law by the Supreme Court.
State v. Jackson, Nos., 9804001029, 980611006, 9805006798, Del. Supr., Gebelein, J. (November 27, 2000), p. 2.
At trial the State and defense offered testimony from expert witnesses. Both the state and the defendants offered testimony from physicians present at the birth as part of their cases.
Based upon that testimony there is little conflict as to the facts. There is a strong dispute as to the interpretation of those facts. It is undisputed:
1) That immediately prior to delivery Tyriek Coleman's heart was beating.
2) After the birth, Tyriek Coleman had a slow and diminishing heartbeat for approximately 17 minutes.
3) Tyriek Coleman had a APGAR of 1 and was not considered by any of the experts as "viable."
4) Tyriek Coleman showed no voluntary movement and had no respiration.
5) Tyriek Coleman was pronounced dead at 17:10 eighteen minutes after birth.
Under the definition of born alive, adopted by the Delaware Courts, it is clear that Tyriek Coleman was in fact born alive. The State through Dr. Muench, the treating physician, offered testimony that in addition to the recorded heartbeat he had palpated the umbilical cord, and found a pulsation. There is no evidence to contradict that. Indeed, defendants' experts concede a heartbeat but argue it was transitory in nature. They describe the beating as a battery running down, regular in nature.
There is a clear dispute over whether circulation was actually occurring after Tyriek's separation from his Mother. On this point the Court would be inclined to accept defense experts testimony and opinion. But circulation is not the sole test. See State v. Jackson, Supra., at p. 2.
The Court is mindful that the common law in accepting a heartbeat as proof of life was in fact looking for proof of circulation. But the common law has accepted a heartbeat or a pulsating umbilical cord as evidence of life ex utero. The Court accepts this definition. The State has therefore proved that Tyriek Coleman was a person who could be the subject of a Murder prosecution.
Stout v. Killen, Del., Super., 10 Del. 14 (1875).
Count I
As to the Count I of the indictment the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions of the defendants caused the death of Tyriek Coleman, those acts were reckless and those acts "manifest a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to human life." The Court cannot conclude that the State has proven these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
In particular, what distinguishes Murder Second Degree from Manslaughter is that the reckless conduct causing death must demonstrate "a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference" to human life. In this case, the evidence demonstrates a street fight. At that fight some of the defendants were under the influence. At that fight it is undisputed that the victim assumed the fighting stance and had provocative words with defendants. The fact that Brandi Coleman was pregnant at the time could raise the level of recklessness to that required by the statute if it was clear that the defendants knew she was pregnant and assumed an "I don't care" attitude. There is however much confusion in the record of evidence produced at trial as to when assailants knew Ms. Coleman was pregnant and even if they knew that fact. Clearly, Ms. Hamilton did know; but, Ms. Hamilton was not initially at the location of Brandi Coleman's beating. She apparently had chased Patty Samuels, her target, for the night, and was up the street several doors from the fight. What was stated in the car about Brandi's condition was unclear and in dispute. It is impossible to state beyond a reasonable doubt what each defendant knew, and at what time they knew it, about her condition.
Failure to prove a state of mind on the part of the defendants that manifests a cruel wicked and depraved indifference to human life causes this count of Murder Second Degree to fail as to all three defendants.
The Court must then consider the lesser included offense of Manslaughter.
In order to convict one or more of the defendants of Manslaughter the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) recklessly caused the death of Tyriek Coleman. As to the first element of this offense it is absolutely clear from the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Muench that the trauma inflicted upon Brandi Coleman caused an abruption which inexorably caused the premature birth of Tyriek Coleman after only 22 weeks gestation. Tyriek Coleman had no possibility of survival and died as a direct result of his premature birth. The State has established causation.
As to Kelcee Jackson, it is clear that she exited the car at Eastlawn Avenue, after stating she would "take care" of Brandi Coleman. She immediately advanced toward Brandi Coleman in a threatening fashion. Ms. Coleman did not retreat. Rather she said something to the effect of "who wants Brandi" and assumed a fighting stance. It is disputed as to who threw the first punch. The more believable testimony is to the effect that Kelcee Jackson struck Brandi Coleman first. But this is of no real moment. It is undisputed that Ms. Coleman was out numbered and thrown to the ground. She was crying "help me." During this period when Ms. Coleman was defenseless Kelcee Jackson continued to pummel her in the face and head. Her actions contributed directly to Brandi Coleman's miscarriage and the death of Tyriek Coleman.
Finally, it must be said that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Jackson's acts were done with a reckless state of mind. Beating a defenseless woman on the ground constitutes a gross deviation of the standard of conduct of a reasonable person. Continually striking the head and face of a person who has been thrown to the ground creates an unjustified risk of death, to the assault victim, that risk was disregarded consciously by Kelcee Jackson. The State has met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kelcee Jackson recklessly caused the death of Tyriek Coleman.
With respect to Tern Walston, the evidence is even more compelling. Ms. Walston was identified by the victim and victim's relatives as the individual in a lime green shirt. That person waited until Brandi Coleman was on the ground and then kicked Ms. Coleman numerous times in the back and side with timberland boots. Her participation in this assault was gratuitous and reckless. Kicking repeatedly a defenseless woman on the ground clearly is a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of death to the victim of the assault. The State has clearly proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Walston's reckless acts caused the death of Tyriek Coleman.
With respect to Sharon Hamilton, it can be said that she threw no punches or kicks. Her responsibility, if any, would be under the theory of accomplice liability. Under 11 Del. C. § 271, a party can be liable for the acts of another if they intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, solicits . . . importunes . . . the other person to commit the offense or aids . . . the other person in . . . committing it. Under 11 Del. C. § 271 the person charged must have the requisite state of mind as set forth in the offense.
In this case to find Ms. Hamilton guilty of Manslaughter the State must prove that with a reckless state of mind she solicited or importuned Ms. Jackson and/or Ms. Walston to commit this offense or that she aided one or both of them in committing the offense. Despite considerable confusion as to the exact nature of Ms. Hamilton's solicitation it is clear that it included "taking care" of Brandi Coleman if she became involved. That would include an assault upon her if necessary. There is no doubt that but for her solicitation this event never would have taken place. In addition to procuring the help of these other defendants, Ms. Hamilton aided the commission of the offense by arranging their transportation to the scene. She never tried to withdraw from the action. She knew that the co-defendants had extreme personal animosity toward Brandi Coleman. Ms. Hamilton also was fully aware of Brandi Coleman's pregnancy. She, more than the others knew of the risks of an assault. She consciously disregarded that risk. The State has proven that Ms. Hamilton, was liable for the actions of her crew, did nothing to disassociate herself from the actions, observed the actions in progress and recklessly disregarded the risk of the death to Brandi Coleman and her unborn child Tyriek. The State has met its burden by proving beyond a reasonable doubt Ms. Hamilton's reckless state of mind, and that she aided Kelcee Jackson and Tern Walston in recklessly causing the death of Tyriek Coleman.
As to Count III of the indictment, Count III the charge of Assault Second Degree, one element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the victim suffered "serious physical injury." Delaware law defines serious physical injury as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious or prolonged loss or impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." In this case the operative burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the physical injury suffered by Brandi Coleman actually "created a substantial risk of death" to her.
The testimony on this issue is basically that of the State's expert who treated Ms. Coleman. His testimony was to the effect that an abruption without treatment "could" result in death due to loss of blood, etc. The Court can not conclude that the possibility that an untreated abruption could result in death is sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault in this case in fact actually "created a substantial risk of death" to Brandi Coleman. Ms. Coleman was under treatment from the time shortly after the assault until the delivery. At no time was she diagnosed as being in "substantial risk" of dying. The Court notes that the legislature has acted to make assault upon a pregnant woman that results in a miscarriage a serious felony unfortunately, that law was not in effect at the time of this incident. See 11 Del. C. § 605, 606.
Thus, this element of Assault Second Degree not being proven, the Court must consider the crime of Assault Third Degree.
This finding however, causes the State's charge of Felony Murder Second Degree to fail as to all three defendants as the State cannot prove that the Murder took place in furtherance of the Felony of Assault 2nd Degree.
In reviewing Assault Third Degree the Court finds that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Brandi Coleman suffered physical injury, in that she suffered pain and impairment of physical condition.
With respect to Tern Walston, the Court concludes that the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that she kicked Brandi Coleman while she was lying on the ground. This is supported by Ms. Coleman's testimony with respect to identification. She saw the lady in the green shirt kick her and recognized Terri Walston as the woman in the green shirt. This identification was supported by Kelene Thomas' statement and Shirley Coleman's testimony as well. That this intentional act caused Brandi Coleman's physical injury was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to Kelcee Jackson, the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that she repeatedly punched Brandi Coleman in the face, and participated in causing her to fall to the ground. This beating in conjunction with that administered by Terri Walston caused Brandi Coleman's physical injury. The testimony from Ms. Coleman and Shirley Coleman, was that Kelcee attacked Brandi without provocation. Even if the Court accepted defendant's statement, supported by some other witnesses, that Brandi Coleman threw the first punch, it is not self defense to continually punch a woman on the ground with no means to defend herself. There is no question whatsoever that after Brandi Coleman was on the ground Kelcee Jackson continued to hit her, contributing to her injuries and miscarriage.
Finally, with respect to Sharon Hamilton, there is no doubt that she procured the services of Kelcee Jackson, Terri Walston and the other co-defendants whose cases pled earlier to participate with her in a fight on Eastlawn Avenue. The exact nature of her solicitation is in some doubt as there are varying versions of exactly what was said, in a crowded car, with a number of vocal women who had been drinking and in some cases using marijuana. It is clear however that the substance of her importuning was for the "girls" to take care of Brandi Coleman if she became involved in her dispute with Patti Samuels. It is also clear that the scope of that assignment was altered by the personal findings of Ms. Jackson and perhaps others who had their own grudges with Brandi Coleman. Ms. Jackson vocalized her feelings in agreeing to "take care of that b____." Ms Hamilton clearly knew that if she continued to bring those individuals to Eastlawn Avenue there was going to be a fight and that they were focusing on Brandi Coleman. She did not terminate this endeavor at that point nor did she withdraw from the enterprise. Rather upon arrival at Eastlawn Avenue she, as planned, sought out the woman she wanted to fight, as her "girls" sought out Brandi Coleman. Under 11 Del. C. § 271, Ms. Hamilton aided Ms. Jackson and Ms. Walston in their assault and indeed was the causative factor in them being transported to Eastlawn Avenue to encounter Brandi Coleman. The State has met its burden of proof that Ms. Hamilton solicited the co-defendants who had been drinking to engage in the activity of assault and aided them by arranging to bring them to the scene. She therefore is liable for their assault upon Brandi Coleman.
Conclusion
It is the verdict of the Court that as to Sharon Hamilton, as to Count I, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Manslaughter; as to Count II, Not Guilty; as to Count III, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Assault 3rd Degree.
As to Kelcee Jackson, it is the verdict of the Court that as to Count I, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Manslaughter; as to Count II, Not Guilty; as to Count III, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Assault 3rd Degree.
As to Terri Walston, it is the verdict of the Court that as to Count I, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Manslaughter, as to Count II, Not Guilty, as to Count III, Guilty of the lesser included offense of Assault 3rd Degree.
The verdicts are to be entered, Presentence investigations are Ordered and Sentencing will be on Friday, June 8, 2001 at 9:00 a.m.