Opinion
Case No. 20041094-CA.
Filed March 9, 2006. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041901780, The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve.
Lori Seppi, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Billings.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant Bryce Robert Hall asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever and by imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm.
"Section 77-8a-1 of the Utah Code governs both when a trial court may allow a defendant to be tried for more than one offense in the same trial and when a trial court must order separate trials for different offenses." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 384 (Utah Ct.App. 1997); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1 (2003). "[A] trial court may order that a defendant be tried for different offenses in a single trial if the offenses either are (1) `based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission,' or (2) `alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.'" Scales, 946 P.2d at 385 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1(1)(a), (b) (1995)). However, "if a single trial would result in prejudice to the defendant, the trial court would be required to order separate trials" pursuant to section 77-8a-1(4)(a). Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a1-(4)(a).
The evidence in the present case indicates that in the hours after Defendant attempted to murder his ex-wife's friend (the violence charges), Defendant left his vehicle at a grocery store parking lot and stole a South Jordan public works vehicle in an effort to evade or flee from police searching for him and his vehicle (the theft charges). In Scales, the Utah Supreme Court held that because subsequent thefts enabled the defendant's flight from the murder scene, there was a direct relationship between the theft charges and the murder charges and both "were sufficiently `connected together in their commission' to allow the trial court to order a single trial of the different offenses." 946 P.2d at 385 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1(1)(a)). Similarly, in this matter, we are convinced that the theft charges are sufficiently connected to the violence charges to be tried together. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1(1).
Furthermore, we conclude that Defendant was not prejudiced by the single trial because overwhelming evidence was presented that supported both the violence and theft charges. See Scales, 946 P.2d at 385-86. As a result, while the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a single trial of the violence and theft charges, any error resulting from the single trial would be harmless.
In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court is required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for each of the three violence charges without considering his history, character, or rehabilitative needs.
"Although the trial court did not explicitly address the enumerated factors in section [ 76-3-401(2)], there is ample evidence in the record that the court considered these factors at the time of Defendant's sentencing." State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ¶ 30, 82 P.3d 1167. The trial court here received evidence concerning Defendant's acceptance of responsibility for his crimes, his remorse, his interest in improving himself, his absence of criminal history, his family and community support, his lack of alcohol and drug problems, and the possibility that prescription medications affected his behavior. The trial court also considered the presentence report, letters submitted on behalf of Defendant, and the victims' impact statements. We hold that the trial court sufficiently considered all of the sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge, Judith M. Billings, Judge.