Opinion
23-0998
03-06-2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRYAN MICHAEL HALFHILL, Defendant-Appellant.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard J. Bennett, Special Counsel, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J. Shubatt, Judge.
Bryan Halfhill appeals his convictions of second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard J. Bennett, Special Counsel, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
BOWER, CHIEF JUDGE
Bryan Halfhill appeals his convictions of second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. He challenges the district court's denial of his motion for new trial, claiming the verdicts are contrary to the weight of the evidence. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Halfhill and G.U. were in a romantic relationship for several years, and in 2018, they lived together with their young child and G.U.'s older son, D.U. G.U.'s sexual relationship with Halfhill started out "normal," but then it became "a chore" to satisfy him. Halfhill began asking G.U. "to find a girlfriend, somebody for a threesome." G.U. "tried," but she "didn't find anybody." Around November 2017, D.U. told her Halfhill was "taking pictures of him, his privates." G.U. was initially "mad" when she learned Halfhill was abusing D.U., but she "ended up doing what [Halfhill] wanted" because "he had [her] brainwashed." G.U. observed Halfhill "having [D.U.] touch his penis, stroking it, giving him a hand job." G.U. also participated in sexual acts with D.U., stating she did so because Halfhill "kind of forced [her] to." The abuse continued while they lived together.
On November 16, 2018, G.U.'s niece, E.G., spent the night at the family's home. G.U. asked E.G. to spend the night because Halfhill "had been wanting a young girl for awhile," and he "kept bugging [G.U.] to have [E.G.] over." That night, G.U. took "pictures, videos" of herself participating in sexual acts with E.G. The next morning, the family went to an arcade. Halfhill tried to bribe E.G. to perform oral sex on him outside in the van, and he promised he would give her a toy if she did so. When E.G. refused, Halfhill angrily gave the toy to another child.
The next day, E.G. reported to her mother (G.U.'s sister) "what had happened." E.G.'s mother immediately confronted G.U. about E.G.'s allegations, and G.U. admitted they were true. G.U. then reported to Halfhill that E.G. "had told" her mother. G.U. did not go into "detail" about what E.G. said, but Halfhill told G.U. to "blame it all on [him]." He instructed G.U. to "[c]lear [w]hole phone," which G.U. refused to do because she didn't want to lose sentimental photographs of their child's birth stored on the phone. Halfhill then instructed G.U. to "[g]et rid of" the phone, which G.U. refused to do because it was on her parents' plan. Halfhill said he would buy her a new phone. A few hours later, Halfhill sent a picture of sleeping pills and stated he was going to kill himself. G.U. begged Halfhill not to commit suicide. Halfhill was later found unconscious at his grandparents' house after he had fallen and hit his head.
G.U. explained Halfhill meant for her "[t]o wipe my phone, to factory reset it" so "nothing was on it."
Police investigated E.G.'s allegations, which led to the seizure of G.U.'s phone. G.U. stated Halfhill had "downloaded" two apps on her phone "to hide pictures [so] that they're not in your regular photo album." Although G.U. attempted to "delete[]" texts and photographs containing evidence of sexual abuse, police discovered some images of child pornography involving E.G. and D.U. None of the texts or photographs discovered linked Halfhill to specific instances of sexual abuse; "[t]hey were all deleted." Police also seized three phones from Halfhill. No incriminating evidence was found on the "newest" phone, and the software investigators used to access mobile device data were unable to get through Halfhill's passcodes on the other phones.
Police interviewed D.U. in December 2018, who stated, "Bryan let me touch his pee-pee and my mom's butt." D.U. explained the abuse in more detail in a subsequent deposition. E.G. did not provide any statements regarding abuse by G.U. or Halfhill. Halfhill denied all allegations regarding sexual abuse or lascivious acts. When interviewed, Halfhill said he was unable to "remember things" because he "took 250 extra-strength sleeping pills." He explained he told G.U. to clear her phone because she threatened him "to make it go away or else . . . she was going to put it all on [him]." He explained he tried to commit suicide because he "would rather be dead than have that label."
The State charged Halfhill with second-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and lascivious acts with a child by way of soliciting a person to commit a sex act with a child. Following trial, the jury found Halfhill guilty as charged. On appeal, this court reversed Halfhill's convictions upon finding "backdoor hearsay was improperly admitted and it was prejudicial to Halfhill." See State v. Halfhill, No. 19-2093, 2021 WL 1400761, at *1, *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021). The court remanded the case for a new trial.
Following a second trial, the jury found Halfhill guilty of second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child, and not guilty of lascivious acts with a child by way of soliciting a person to commit a sex act with a child. Halfhill filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied. Halfhill appealed the court's ruling, and this court determined the district court applied the wrong standard in ruling on the motion. See State v. Halfhill, No. 22-0395, 2023 WL 2395869, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023). The court therefore "reverse[d] the district court's ruling on the motion for new trial and remand[ed] to the district court for a ruling on this motion, applying the weight-of-the-evidence standard." See id. at *1, *3.
G.U. was charged and convicted for her participation in the abuse in a separate federal case.
On remand, the district court issued another ruling denying Halfhill's motion for new trial. Halfhill appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds for an abuse of discretion-the most deferential standard of review. See State v. Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d 231, 246 (Iowa 2022); see also State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017). When a claim is made that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, "the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted" if "the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted." State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa 1998)). "A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where 'a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.'" State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658).
III. Analysis
Halfhill claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. He argues the court unreasonably interpreted the witnesses' testimony, claiming "[b]oth of the State's primary witnesses[, G.U. and D.U.,] had severe credibility problems," whereas "Halfhill gave credible testimony denying the allegations against him."
Halfhill also points to the "benefit" G.U. received "in her federal case" in exchange for her testimony, which he claims "further marred" her credibility. At trial, G.U. acknowledged "[t]hey did give me a sentence reduction, but they put my stuff as concurrent, that's my reduction." She testified even with the reduction she would not be released from prison until 2045. G.U. stated her "motivation" for testifying in Halfhill's trial was "to protect [her] kids" from "further abuse."
Unlike the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, the weight-of-the-evidence standard permits the district court to consider the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). This makes sense because deciding a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence requires consideration of "whether more 'credible evidence' supports the verdict rendered than supports the alternative verdict." Id. (citation omitted). "It is up to the district court, who sat through trial, to determine the credibility of the various witnesses." State v. McPeek, No. 22-1961, 2023 WL 8449569, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023). Here, the district court's written ruling noted:
The undersigned was present for the entirety of the trial and saw every witness testify, watched the depositions that were played in lieu of live testimony, and examined every exhibit. Following remand, the undersigned also reviewed the trial transcript. Applying the weight-of-evidence standard, the Court is firmly convinced that the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdicts.
The State's case rested heavily on the testimony of [G.U.], who is the mother of the victim involved in the sexual abuse charge and the aunt of the victim involved in the lascivious act charge. The undersigned found [G.U.] to be a credible witness who provided truthful testimony. Defendant, on the other hand, was not a credible witness. The greater weight of the credible evidence, consisting of [G.U.]'s testimony and the other evidence offered by the State, was consistent with and not contrary to the jury's verdicts in the case. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for new trial based on the weight-of-the-evidence standard.
Halfhill also challenges the court's characterization of E.G. as a "victim," noting "[s]he was not a victim of Halfhill's actions, only [G.U.]'s." Halfhill's explanation of his contention belies any challenge to it. Evidence of abuse to E.G. was introduced at trial, and the district court's generalized reference to E.G. as a victim (in lieu of using her name) to describe G.U.'s relationship to her was not an abuse of discretion.
In our view, this is not one of those "exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict." Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659 (citation omitted). As the court noted, it presided over Halfhill's three-day trial, observed each witness testify, watched the depositions, and examined each exhibit. The court also reviewed the trial transcript. Based on its review, the court found "[t]he greater weight of the credible evidence . . . was consistent with and not contrary to the jury's verdicts in the case." We find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. See Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d at 246 ("Our review is not to determine whether the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence but only to determine whether the district court abused its considerable discretion in denying the motion."); State v. Agan, No. 21-1703, 2023 WL 3092504, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023) ("Although the evidence supporting the other statements could have been interpreted in a manner weighing less heavily in favor of conviction, they were drawn directly from the evidence presented, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its reasoning or credibility determinations."). We affirm.
AFFIRMED.