Opinion
WD 84093
12-14-2021
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. David HALEY, Appellant.
Clark Jones, Columbia, for appellant. Eric Phelps, Moberly, for respondent.
Clark Jones, Columbia, for appellant.
Eric Phelps, Moberly, for respondent.
Before Division Three: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges
Lisa White Hardwick, Judge David Haley Bail Bonds ("Surety") appeals from the circuit court's denial of its motion for relief from final judgment. Surety contends the circuit court erred in finding that it was not equitably entitled to relief from the court's judgment on a bond forfeiture after the defendant was arrested in Texas. For reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lamar Collier was charged with forgery, counterfeiting, and two counts of possession of a forging instrument in Cooper County. The circuit court set Collier's bond at $25,000, which was posted by Surety on May 18, 2018. While released on bond, Collier failed to appear at a hearing before the circuit court on September 10, 2018, and the bond was declared to be in forfeiture status. After granting multiple continuances to allow Surety more time to produce Collier, the circuit court entered its final judgment of bond forfeiture on November 8, 2019.
On March 6, 2020, the circuit court was advised that Collier had been arrested in Texas on February 29, 2020. Surety filed a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 74.06(b) on March 12, 2020. The court denied the motion on May 13, 2020. Surety filed an appeal with this court, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the circuit court's order was not denominated a judgment. The circuit court subsequently amended its denial order on October 2, 2020, and properly denominated it as a judgment for appeal purposes. Surety appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(5) for abuse of discretion." State ex rel. Koster v. Wadlow , 398 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Mo. App. 2013).
ANALYSIS
In its sole point on appeal, Surety contends the circuit court erred in denying its motion for relief from judgment because Collier was eventually arrested in Texas and "it was no longer equitable that the final judgment of bond forfeiture ... remain in effect upon [Collier's] apprehension."
In relevant part, Rule 74.06(b)(5) allows a circuit court to grant relief from a final judgment if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment remain in force." Surety argues that the judgment against it is a prospective judgment that may be modified due to a change in circumstances. Surety cites to courts in various jurisdictions that have rules similar to Rule 74.06 and find that prospective judgments may be reopened as circumstances change. See Rudd v. Rudd , 105 Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639, 645 (1983) ; Harding v. Harding , 620 N.W.2d 920, 920-21 syl. (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Surety concludes that the judgment against it is prospective, and therefore subject to changing circumstances, because "even ordinary money judgments can prospectively affect the litigants by reducing their available assets," and, accordingly, the $25,000 bond forfeiture reduces its available assets. Meyers v. Hansen , 148 Idaho 283, 221 P.3d 81, 88 (2009). Surety further argues that the circumstances have changed from the time the judgment was entered because Collier was arrested in Texas and now "will answer to the charges brought against him." Additionally, Surety contends, the purpose of the bond has been satisfied and there is no equitable reason not to grant relief.
Surety supports its argument with a written stipulation in which the State agreed that Collier's abscondence did not result in prejudice to its case. We note, however, that the stipulation was filed with the circuit court on February 15, 2021, roughly four months after the circuit court issued its amended final judgment and Surety filed this appeal. Thus, the signed stipulation was not available for the circuit court's consideration at the time it rendered its judgment. Consequently, any argument that the court abused its discretion for failing to consider that the State was not prejudiced is unpersuasive.
Surety argues that the signed stipulation contained facts agreed to during a May 11, 2020 hearing on Surety's motion to reconsider. Surety acknowledges that there is no record of the hearing's content, and nothing in the stipulation, or elsewhere in the record, indicates that the parties agreed to the facts in the stipulation at any particular time. Thus, Surety's argument is not supported by the record.
Surety acknowledges that our decision in State v. Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co. , 408 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Mo. App. 2013), is contrary to its position. In that case, we held that Rule 74.06 did not mandate that a court must set aside a judgment of bond forfeiture "when a surety produces a defendant after the final judgment of forfeiture has been entered." Id. ; see also State v. Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co. , 367 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. App. 2012) (declining to grant relief under Rule 74.06 and describing that part of the equity exchange in the bond forfeiture process is that a surety is released from its duty to produce the defendant once the bond has been forfeited). Surety attempts to distinguish the facts before us from those in the Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co . cases by noting that the bond amount there was only $1,000, while the bond before us is $25,000. Therefore, Surety argues, the inequity upon it is greater than the inequity in the Michael R. Thomas Bond Co . cases, and the circuit court should have granted it relief from the judgment.
Surety's argument does not alter our prior, on-point analysis that Rule 74.06 does not mandate relief under these circumstances and that the forfeiture of a bond releases a surety from a duty to produce the defendant, which is a benefit gained in equity. Further, Surety's argument ignores that it failed to produce Collier over a far greater period of time than the surety in the Michael R. Thomas Bond Co . cases. Because the circuit court could not have considered the State's subsequently filed stipulation denying prejudice therefrom, the great length of Collier's abscondence weighs in favor of denying Surety's motion.
When it denied Surety's motion, the circuit court could consider the facts that Collier had been in abscondence for over a year; that it gratuitously granted Surety roughly one year to produce Collier after he absconded; that it had issued a final judgment on bond forfeiture; and that Surety was still unable to produce Collier until approximately four months after the judgment was entered. Surety's motions for relief from final judgment and for reconsideration of the circuit court's denial included additional allegations that granting relief would not burden the parties, that Collier's apprehension was directly caused by Surety's efforts, and that a separate circuit court granted similar relief under Rule 74.06 in a different case and county. None of these facts require the circuit court to grant relief under the circumstances, however. See Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co. , 408 S.W.3d at 797. Further, neither Surety's motion to set aside the judgment nor its motion for reconsideration cited relevant law for the circuit court's consideration.
We acknowledge the decision to grant relief in State v. Williams , Case No. 14BA-CR00834-01, and note that Surety does not reference the decision or argue its applicability on appeal.
Given the sparsity of the facts and arguments before the circuit court, and given the precedent that strongly supports the circuit court's exercise of discretion to deny relief under the circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Surety's motion to set aside the judgment. Point denied.
CONCLUSION
The judgment is affirmed.
All Concur.