Opinion
No. 108,454.
2013-08-30
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ethyn Paul HAFNER, Appellant.
Appeal from Dickinson District Court; Benjamin J. Sexton, Judge. Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Daryl E. Hawkins, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Dickinson District Court; Benjamin J. Sexton, Judge.
Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Daryl E. Hawkins, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C J., POWELL and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Ethyn Paul Hafner appeals the district court's order that he pay fees to the Dickinson County Jail associated with his participation in a work-release program. Hafner argues that the district court lacked statutory authority to order him to pay the county jail fees as a condition of his probation. We disagree with Hafher's claim and affirm the district court's judgment.
In September 2011, Hafner pled guilty to four counts of felony theft. The district court imposed a controlling sentence of 16 months' imprisonment and placed Hafner on probation for 12 months. As a condition of probation, the district court ordered Hafner to serve 30 days in the county jail and granted work release so that Hafner could keep his job. The district court ordered Hafner to pay “change-out fees” while on work release in order to defray the cost of processing him in and out of the jail for work. Hafner timely appealed from this order.
Hafner argues that the district court lacked the statutory authority to order him to pay the county jail fees associated with the work-release program. Specifically, Hafner contends that neither K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4603d, which establishes authorized dispositions for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993, nor K.S.A. 21–4610(c), which sets forth authorized conditions of probation, expressly grant the district court authority to impose the change-out fees associated with work release.
The State contends that the district court acted within its authority in ordering Hafner to pay the required jail fees associated with work release. The State also contends that Hafner has acquiesced in the district court's order by serving his jail time on work release and paying the required fees. But the State's claim that Hafner has paid the jail fees is not supported by the record, so this argument fails. See State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 999, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (party making claim on appeal has the burden of designating record to support the claim).
Resolution of the issue on appeal requires statutory interpretation. Interpretation of a statute is question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 1126, 1132, 289 P.3d 76 (2012).
K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4603d(3), which was in effect at the time of Hafner's crimes, authorized the district court to place Hafner on probation for his conviction of felony theft. K.S.A. 21–4610(c) authorized the district court to impose any conditions of probation that the court deems proper, “including but not limited to” any of the 14 enumerated conditions set forth in the statute. As the State points out, the enumerated conditions of probation contained in K.S.A. 21–4610(c) is not an exclusive list. For this reason alone, Hafner's argument that the district court lacked statutory authority to order him to pay the change-out fees as a condition of probation is without merit.
Furthermore, the State accurately notes that K.S.A. 19–1930(d) authorizes the board of county commissioners to provide by resolution that an inmate in a county jail who participates in work release shall pay fees (not exceeding $20 per day) to defray the costs of maintaining the program unless waived due to hardship for an inmate. Hafner does not dispute the State's assertion that the Dickinson County Board of County Commissioners has adopted such a resolution and that Hafher never applied for a waiver of the fees due to hardship.
“ ‘The trial court has broad powers to impose probation conditions designed to serve the accused and the community. [Citation omitted.]’ “ State v. Calhoun, 28 Kan.App.2d 340, 342, 19 P.3d 179,rev. denied 269 Kan. 935 (2000) (quoting State v. Mosburg, 13 Kan.App.2d 257, 258, 768 P.2d 313 [1989] ). Hafner's only argument on appeal is that the district court lacked the authority to impose the change-out fees. For the reasons stated above, we disagree. The district court was within the authority granted by K.S.A. 21–4610(c) to impose the change-out fees as a condition of Hafner's probation.
Affirmed.