Opinion
A180027
06-12-2024
STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARION ALYSSA MARIE GROVE, aka Darion Alyssa Grove, Defendant-Appellant.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services, fled the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted May 14, 2024
Malheur County Circuit Court 21CR07702; Erin K. Landis, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services, fled the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Defendant pleaded guilty to theft in the first degree, ORS 164.055. She appeals a supplemental judgment imposing restitution. In her sole assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred when it imposed restitution for "makeup, jewelry, a ruby and diamond ring, a full propane tank, and 15 bags of cans and bottles."
After the restitution hearing in this case, the trial court imposed $5,291.20 in restitution. That amount included restitution for personal property that was stolen by defendant: $230 for makeup, $1,800 for a ruby and diamond ring, $100 for other jewelry, $49 for the propane tank, and $200 for the bags of bottles and cans.
Defendant's challenge to the restitution award is largely centered on the argument that the victim's testimony was insufficient to establish the value of the stolen personal property identified above. Regarding the makeup and jewelry (other than the ring), defendant argues that the "amount requested for makeup and jewelry is not objectively verifiable" as the victim provided "no information on the specific items taken, the number of items or their estimated cost." Regarding the ring, defendant argues that the victim's testimony "that her grandmother told her that her grandfather paid $3,000 for the ring in the 1930s" is not objectively verifiable as the victim did not have "knowledge of the current value of the ring," that she "never had the ring assessed to provide an accurate value," and that "the victim's testimony is insufficient to establish an objectively verifiable value for the ring." Regarding the propane tank, defendant argues that "although the price of propane and the cost of an empty tank is verifiable, without any information on the volume of the propane in the tank when it was taken" the amount requested "is not objectively verifiable." Finally, regarding the fifteen bags of cans and bottles, defendant argues that the victim provided "no information on the size of the bags or the number of cans and bottles in each bag."
In response, the state contends that in the trial court defendant argued that the charges were not "objectively verifiable," but "on appeal she appears to argue that the charges were not 'reasonable' because they were not shown to reflect current market rates," and that the argument about the legal sufficiency of "the reasonableness of the charges for the missing property" is not preserved. The state also contends that even if defendant's assignment of error is preserved, the evidence is legally sufficient and thus supports the trial court's imposition of restitution.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the imposition of restitution, we view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state and determine, when so viewed, whether a rational factfinder could have found the facts necessary to support the award. State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 367 Or. 614, 620, 482 P.3d 62 (2021). As the parties both note, the "market value of an item can be established through an owner's testimony, 'unless it is shown that he has no knowledge of the market value of his property in spite of his ownership.'" State v. Onishchenko, 249 Or.App. 470, 477, 278 P.3d 63 (2012) (quoting Lewis v. Worldwide Imports, Inc, 238 Or. 580, 587, 395 P.2d 922 (1964)). Furthermore, "'a factfinder's common knowledge can supply the bridge to a factfinder's reasonable inference.'" State v. Tejeda-Serrano, 328 Or.App. 656, 660, 538 P.3d 1239 (2023) (quoting State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or. 724, 734, 452 P.3d 948 (2019)).
Assuming without deciding that defendant's arguments related to whether the charges were reasonable are preserved, we agree with the state that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's imposition of restitution. During the restitution hearing, the victim testified about the missing personal property and its value. We note that the trial court stated that it found the victim's "testimony to be credible with regard to what was taken." We have reviewed the evidence in this case, and conclude that that testimony, as well as common knowledge, provide legally sufficient evidence for the amounts of restitution that defendant challenges on appeal.
Additionally, given defendant's arguments, we note that to be "objec- tively verifiable" within the meaning of ORS 31.710, "'damages must be capable of verification through objective facts.'" State v. Jordan, 249 Or.App. 93, 100, 274 P.3d 289, rev den, 353 Or. 103 (2012) (quoting DeVaux v. Presby, 136 Or.App. 456, 463, 902 P.2d 593 (1995); emphasis in DeVaux). Thus, in determining whether damages are "objectively verifiable" under ORS 31.710, the question is not whether the amount of those damages was actually verified during a restitution hearing. See id. ("[The key is the extent to which damages are capable of verification by objective facts, not the extent to which they are verified at trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). We conclude that the "objectively verifiable" standard was met with regard to the restitution sought in this case.
Affirmed.