Opinion
MMXCR04169970
06-10-2016
State of Connecticut v. Alfred Grimes
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE STATE'S MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
ELPEDIO N. VITALE, JUDGE.
Pursuant to P.B. § 43-22 and C.G.S. § 54-252(a), the State of Connecticut requests that the court " correct the defendant's sentence from May 2, 2005." The state claims that the sentence imposed on the defendant " was imposed by the court in an illegal manner." Specifically, the state argues that the defendant pled guilty to the crime of sexual assault, third degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-72(a)(1). Pursuant to C.G.S. § 54-250(11)(A), said crime is designated as a sexually violent offense. At the defendant's sentencing on May 2, 2005, the court (Holzberg, J.) mistakenly informed the defendant that he would be required to register with the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry for only ten (10) years. In fact, his conviction required lifetime registration. At the time of his guilty plea to sexual assault in the third degree on March 7, 2005, the court (Holzberg, J.) advised the defendant that he " would be required to register as a sex offender, " but did not further delineate the length of the registration requirement. Although he was not advised of the specific length of the registration requirement, the defendant acknowledged at the time of his guilty plea his awareness of a registration requirement.
This court has been provided with a transcript of the defendant's guilty plea on March 7, 2005 before Judge Holzberg, as well as a transcript of his sentencing before Judge Holzberg on May 2, 2005. Also provided to the court was a copy of a letter dated June 3, 2015 addressed to the Chief Clerk for the Middlesex Judicial District. The letter is signed by Sgt. Mathew Garcia, Commanding Officer of the State Police Sex Offender Registry Unit. In said letter, Sgt. Garcia indicates " [t]he registry is seeking guidance from the court in making a final determination as to the offender's registry term. That although the offender was given a '10 year' term by the court, state statute mandates a lifetime registry for violating C.G.S. § 53a-72a(a)(1) as defined by C.G.S. § 54-250(11)(A)." Thereafter, prompted by the letter, on July 24, 2015, the state filed a " motion to correct illegal sentence." A hearing on the motion was scheduled for September 1, 2015 and notice of the hearing on the state's motion was sent to the defendant's last known address. On September 22, 2015, the defendant appeared before the court (Gold, J.) without an attorney and the issue was discussed with the defendant and the state. The defendant was advised at that time to consult with an attorney. Eventually, on December 15, 2015, when the defendant again appeared without an attorney, Judge Gold suggested that the defendant complete an application for the services of a public defender. A public defender was appointed to represent the defendant, and the matter was ultimately continued by agreement to April 19, 2016. On that date, the state filed a Memorandum of Law in support of its " motion to correct illegal sentence." The defendant requested a continuance to file a brief in opposition. On May 2, 2016, this court heard oral argument on the motion and objection thereto.
Nature of the Proceedings
According to the facts as alleged by the state at the time of the defendant's guilty pleas on June 4, 2004, the defendant, Alfred Grimes, was working as a member of staff at the Eagle's Landing Rest Home, a care facility for people who are having psychiatric difficulty. While he was employed at the facility, the defendant had forceable sexual contact with a 48-year-old female patient. She was a resident at the facility. The victim stated that the defendant forced her to have sexual contact by both rectal and vaginal intercourse, and refused to stop despite her repeated requests. She was treated at Middlesex Hospital.
Following the defendant's guilty pleas, the court (Holzberg, J.) on May 2, 2005 imposed a sentence of five years, execution suspended after one year, followed by ten years of probation.
The court mistakenly indicated to the defendant at that time that he would be required to register with the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry for a ten-year period. However, due to the nature of the defendant's conviction as defined by C.G.S. § 53a-72(a)(1), the defendant in reality was subject to lifetime registration pursuant to C.G.S. § 54-250(11)(A) as a consequence of his conviction for a " sexually violent offense."
According to the official clerk's file, the defendant violated his probation in 2007 and received 120 days of incarceration as a result. The state by its motion seeks to correct the error made at sentencing on May 2, 2005, which incorrectly limited the defendant's sex offender registry requirement to ten years. The state argues that the statutory requirements regarding sex offender registry are mandatory, and hence the " incorrect" advisement by the trial court as to the required length of time defendant's registration provides this court with jurisdiction to correct the " illegal sentence, " namely, the defendant's registration requirement. The state argues that action by the court is required in order for the defendant's sentence to satisfy the mandate of C.G.S. § 54-252(a).
The defendant opposes the motion, and argues that " a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the proper vehicle for imposing a life registration requirement, " and further, that the motion is " untimely." Consequently, the defendant argues that this court is now without jurisdiction to order him to comply with the lifetime registration requirement. The defendant alleges, and the state does not appear to dispute, that the defendant has completed his sentence as well as his probationary period. The defendant also alleges that the sex offender registration requirement originally imposed expired May 6, 2015, as reflected in the letter forwarded by Sgt. Garcia to the Chief Clerk for the Middlesex Judicial District. Additionally, the defendant contends that the instant motion requesting lifetime registration " is contrary to the original plea bargain."
Discussion
" The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction . . . In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). Under the common law, a trial court's jurisdiction over a criminal case terminates once the defendant has begun serving his or her sentence. State v. Ramos, 306 Conn. 125, 134, 49 A.3d 197 (2012); State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 775, 894 A.2d 963 (2006). An exception to this general principle exists, however, that permits a trial court to retain jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 836, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010); State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 387, 542 A.2d 306, after remand for articulation, 209 Conn. 225, 550 A.2d 885 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 1349, 103 L.Ed.2d 817 (1989).
This exception is embodied in Practice Book § 43-22, which provides that " [t]he judicial authority may at any time (emphasis added) correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner."
" [A]n illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. By contrast . . . [s]entences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant's right . . . to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 150 Conn.App. 623, 635, 92 A.3d 975, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 904, 99 A.3d 1169 (2014). These definitions are not exhaustive, however, and " the parameters of an invalid sentence will evolve "; State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 840; as additional rights and procedures affecting sentencing are subsequently recognized under state and federal law . (Emphasis added.)
Justice Parskey, in State v. Smith, 184 Conn. 366, 439 A.2d 1022 (1981), considered the question of timeliness under P.B. § 935, which was the precursor to P.B. § 43-22. Prior to the enactment of P.B. § 43-22, P.B. § 935 required that a motion to correct an illegal sentence had to be filed within ninety days of the imposition of sentence. P.B. § 43-22 amended that time limitation and said section now imposes no restriction limiting the time within which a motion to correct an illegal sentence must be filed. In State v. Guckian, 27 Conn.App. 225, 605 A.2d 874 (1992), cert. granted, 223 Conn. 907, 612 A.2d 57 (1992), the Appellate Court concluded that the state can raise the question of the illegality of a sentence on appeal even though the question was not properly raised below in the ground that " 'both the trial court and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, (emphasis added) to correct a sentence that is illegal.' State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 387, 542 A.2d 306 (1988)." See also State v. Mollo, 63 Conn.App. 487, 776 A.2d 1176 (2001), which rejected an attempt by a defendant who had been convicted and had completed his sentence to utilize P.B. § 43-22 to vacate his sentence to avoid an enhanced penalty for conviction of a subsequent federal offense. The court did not consider the timeliness of the defendant's motion to be an issue, but rather stressed that " . . . we view the relief allowed by P.B. § 43-22 to require, as a precondition, a valid conviction . . . [its] purpose is not to attack the validity of a conviction by setting it aside, but rather to correct an illegal sentence or disposition, or one imposed in an illegal way." Id. at 491. The court in State v. Constantopolous, 68 Conn.App. 879, 882, 793 A.2d 278, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 927, 798 A.2d 971 (2002), took the identical view (" [b]oth the trial court, and this court on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal"). Further, to the extent the defendant contends that the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence is limited to claims raised by the defendant only, the plain language of P.B. § 43-22 operates to refute said claim. No such limitation is present in P.B. § 43-22, and the defendant has not pointed to any case law in support of such argument.
Further support for the conclusion that the state's claim should not be rejected as untimely is also found in the collateral consequences doctrine. Before discussing that doctrine, however, a brief discussion of C.G.S. § 54-260, Connecticut's " Megan's Law" is needed in order to better place into context the relevance of the collateral consequences doctrine. In enacting C.G.S. § 54-260, Connecticut's Megan's Law, it was the legislature's intent to require sex offender registration as " [a] response to concerns regarding the harm to society caused by sex crimes and the relatively high rate of recidivism among sex offenders . . ." State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 292, 738 A.2d 595 (1999). In Misiorski, the court held that if a probation officer determines that public safety will be advanced by community notification, such notification is not prohibited in cases where a probationer has not been convicted under a provision not enumerated in § [54-260](a). Id. at 294.
Misiorski was further discussed in State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). Megan's Law requires that a sexual offender register with the local chief of police or resident state trooper after establishing residency in the state and notify his or her parole or probation officer whenever he or she changes residence address. In turn, the parole or probation officer is required to notify law enforcement authorities of the change.
The defendant has been convicted of an offense that the legislature has determined requires a lifetime sex offender registration period. As our supreme court articulated in Misiorski and Kelly, the legislature's intent in requiring said registration is reasonably seen as a determination that such individuals pose a particular risk of harm to the general public. The legislature implicitly concluded that the defendant's conviction for sexual assault third degree was significant enough to warrant his lifetime registration as a sex offender. Therefore, the lifetime registration requirement is not only an express recognition that a danger to public safety exists with respect to sex offenders, but also a recognition that it exists to such a degree in some cases that the public is entitled to be kept informed of a sex offender's whereabouts for his lifetime. According to the legislature, the legitimate needs of law enforcement and public safety require that particular attention be paid to the defendant by virtue of his conviction for a sexually violent offense. Connecticut General Statutes § 54-260 was enacted in response to the relatively high rate of recidivism among sex offenders.
Indeed, the defendant in fact violated his probation on at least one occasion and was incarcerated as a result.
Concerning the defendant's argument that the present motion is " untimely, " our supreme court addressed a similar argument made in a different context. In Rowe v. Superior Court, 289 Conn. 649, 960 A.2d 256 (2008), the court discussed the threshold question of mootness where the plaintiff Rowe had already completed his sentence for contempt while his writ of error contesting said contempt finding and resultant sentence were then pending before our Supreme Court. The Rowe court analyzed the issue from the perspective of the collateral consequences doctrine, indicating that " [u]nder this doctrine, the court may retain jurisdiction when a litigant shows that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur . . . [t]he litigant must establish these consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need not demonstrate that these consequences are more probable than not." Id. at 655 (internal citations omitted).
" It is well established that since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even where the sentence has been fully served." Rowe v. Superior Court, supra, at 261, citing Barlow v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 103, 112, 513 A.2d 132 (1986). " The collateral consequences of a conviction are legion: subsequent convictions might, as a result, carry heavier penalties and a wide range of civil rights might be affected . . . " Barlow v. Lopes, supra, at 112-13.
With the foregoing legal principles in mind, the court next turns to the specifics of the state's claim. The court has examined State v. Pentland, 296 Conn. 305, 994 A.2d 147 (2010), and State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 825 A.2d 63 (2003). In Pentland, the trial court at the time of sentencing mistakenly informed the defendant that the offenses of which he had been convicted did not require him to register as a sex offender, and in accordance with the court's advisement, the defendant did not register as a sex offender. Id. at 308. In addition, at the time of his plea, the trial court failed to inform him he was subject to a sex offender registration requirement. Id. at 310. Thereafter, in the aftermath of violation of probation proceeding, the defendant sought relief from the registration requirement. The trial court presiding over his violation of probation hearing ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender as statutorily required. The defendant claimed he was exempt from the requirement because the court had failed to inform him, when he entered his plea, or at sentencing, that he was subject to that requirement. In rejecting the defendant's claim, our Supreme Court concluded that the advisement provision of C.G.S. § 54-251(a) is mandatory, but found that " . . . there is nothing in the language or legislative history of § 54-251(a) to suggest that the court's failure to advise a defendant of the registration requirement renders the defendant exempt from the requirement." Pentland, supra at 313.
The court continued:
[T]he registration provision of § 54-251(a), which provides, inter alia, that a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor victim, as defined in § 54-250(2), or a nonviolent sexual offense, as defined in § 54-250(5), " shall . . . register" with the commissioner of public safety, is itself cast in mandatory terms. Thus, the interpretation of § 54-251(a) that the defendant advances would require us to engraft language onto that provision conditioning the registration requirement on the court's compliance with the advisement requirement, something that we cannot do. See, e.g., Southwick at Milford Condominium Assn., Inc. v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road, Milford, LLC, 294 Conn. 311, 321, 984 A.2d 676 (2009) (court cannot rewrite statute to achieve particular result). Furthermore, although the requirement to register as a sex offender under Megan's Law is regulatory rather than punitive in nature; e.g., State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 489, 825 A.2d 63 (2003); we previously have recognized that the " legislature enacted the law to protect the public from sex offenders." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 590, 953 A.2d 630 (2008). Because the defendant pleaded guilty to an offense the commission of which triggers the registration requirement, it would be manifestly inconsistent with the public safety purpose of the statutory scheme to construe § 54-251(a) as exempting the defendant from that requirement merely because the court did not comply with the mandatory advisement provision. Indeed, the defendant has identified no authority, and our research has revealed none, to support the proposition that this court may uphold a plea agreement that is contrary to a clear statutory mandate. Id. at 314.
The defendant has not identified anything in the language of Pentland, any other case, or P.B. § 43-42, that suggests a time limitation that acts to deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce the mandate of C.G.S. § 54-252(a). This court is persuaded that the defendant's claim that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because the state's motion is " untimely" must be rejected. As in Pentland, the defendant's jurisdictional claim appears to be predicated on the punitive characterization of the registry requirement that has been rejected not only in Pentland , but other cases. See, e.g., State v. Little, 127 Conn.App. 336, 14 A.3d 1036 (2011); State v. Pierce, 69 Conn.App. 516, 794 A.2d 1123 (2002); State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 953 A.2d 630 (2008).
The state appears to implicitly suggest that the imposition of a sex registration requirement on the defendant is itself inherently part of a " sentence" for purposes of P.B. § 43-42. The defendant disagrees and asserts it is an administrative sanction, rather than a sentence. The contention that it is inherently part of a sentence is perhaps consistent with the language in State v. Parker, supra, which posited that the definition of what constitutes an illegal sentence " is not exhaustive, " and that " the parameters of an invalid sentence will evolve as additional rights and procedures affecting sentencing are subsequently recognized under state and federal law." Parker, supra at 840. Although that specific issue does not appear to have been discussed in Pentland, supra, the trial court in Pentland imposed a sentence but did not inform the defendant of his obligation to register as a sex offender. This circumstance can be viewed as the Pentland court sub silentio construing sex offender registration, if applicable, as inherently part of the sentence imposed. As such, therefore, infirmities in the imposition of sex offender registration can be subject to a motion filed pursuant to P.B. § 43-42. Moreover, the broad language of P.B. § 43-42 extends the court's authority beyond not only what are customarily referred to as " illegal sentences, " but also to " other illegal dispositions ." Certainly, the words, illegal disposition encompass more than merely illegal sentences . To conclude otherwise would mean the words " other illegal dispositions " were needlessly included in the provision, and would render that language superfluous. Thus, the court concludes that even if the imposition of a requirement of sex offender registration is not inherently part of a sentence for purposes of P.B. 43-42, such requirement nonetheless falls within the purview of the broad language therein targeting " other illegal dispositions ."
One other point merits discussion. The state in Pentland argued that the obligation to register as a sex offender is automatically triggered by the entry of a judgment of conviction, not by the court's advisement that the law mandates the defendant's compliance with mandatory registration. In other words, the advisement about the requirement of sex offender registration does not form the basis of the defendant's obligation to register as a sex offender, because it is statutorily mandated immediately upon conviction. The Pentland court did not reach that specific argument advanced by the state in reaching its decision, indicating that " we need not decide whether the state's contention might have merit in some other case." Pentland, supra, at 312. Although not reached specifically in Pentland, this court agrees the foregoing state's argument in Pentland has merit. After considering the language in Pentland and the legislature's intent in enacting Megan's Law, the court concludes that the registration requirement is triggered automatically by a judgment of conviction for a predicate offense, irrespective of any court advisement. Therefore, since the incorrect length of the defendant's sex offender registration can be construed as an illegal sentence, or an illegal disposition, this court retains jurisdiction to enter an order that satisfies a statutory mandate that was automatically triggered.
However, this court is concludes, even assuming, arguendo, that P.B. § 43-42 is an inappropriate vehicle by which to order the defendant in this case to comply with the requirement of lifetime sex offender registration, jurisdiction and authority to order such compliance additionally exists as a consequence of the collateral consequences doctrine. The court concludes that by virtue of the fact that a judgment of conviction for a predicate offense has been entered against the defendant, the basis of the defendant's obligation to comply with lifetime sex offender registration was then created. The registration requirement is statutorily mandated, and not triggered by any court advisement, but rather triggered automatically by the judgment of conviction for a predicate offense. Under the collateral consequences doctrine, the court retains jurisdiction when a litigant demonstrates that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. As the foregoing discussion of Megan's Law informed, our legislature determined that those convicted of sexually violent offenses merit particular attention by law enforcement and the public. Lifetime sex offender registration may also be viewed as a collateral consequence of the commission of a sexually violent offense. The court is additionally persuaded that the state has demonstrated that as a consequence of the mistaken advisement of the trial court as to the length of the defendant's registration requirement, the state, and by extension, the public, would suffer prejudicial collateral consequences in that an individual convicted of a sexually violent offense would avoid his statutorily mandated lifetime registration. The state and the public would therefore be deprived of information the legislature has determined important for public safety. State v. Misiorski, supra, and State v. Kelly, supra, discussed the rationale underlying C.G.S. § 54-260. As this court concludes that the defendant's registration requirement was automatically triggered by virtue of his conviction for a sexually violent offense, irrespective of the trial court's mistaken advisement, under the collateral consequence doctrine this court retains the jurisdiction to enforce the statutorily mandated lifetime registration requirement.
Thus, even if P.B. § 43-42 is construed to proscribe jurisdiction to this court under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that the language in State v. Pentland, supra, in conjunction with the collateral consequences doctrine, allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant in this case.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is granted. The defendant is hereby ordered to immediately fulfill his obligation to register as a sex offender and to maintain said registration as required pursuant to C.G.S. § 54-250 through 54-260 for his lifetime.
Parenthetically, the court has addressed only the claims it deems appropriately contemplated in the present motion. That is not to say, however, that the concerns raised by the defendant are not subject to further review in another forum. The defendant's claim that lifetime registration " is contrary to the original plea bargain" would appear to attack the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. Claims related to the propriety of the underlying conviction are not the proper subject of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. St. Louis, 146 Conn.App. 461, 466, 76 A.3d 753 (2013). Whether the defendant's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily under the circumstances presented may be grounds to seek relief by other means.