4. Where the accused is not definitely identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged and the circumstances tend to show that the crime charged and another offense were committed by the same person, evidence that the accused committed the other offense is admissible to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime charged. S. v. Summerlin, supra; S. v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352; S. v. Tate, 210 N.C. 613, 188 S.E. 91; S. v. Flowers, 211 N.C. 721, 192 S.E. 110; S. v. Ferrell, supra; S. v. Miller, supra; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709, 97 S.E. 155; S. v. Hullen, supra; S. v. Weaver, supra; S. v. Thompson, supra; Stansbury on North Carolina Evidence, section 92; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 312; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 684. 5. Where evidence tends to prove a motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime charged, it is admissible, even though it discloses the commission of another offense by the accused.

In the nature of things, evidence of shoeprints has no legitimate or logical tendency to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime unless the attendant circumstances support this triple inference: (1) That the shoeprints were found at or near the place of the crime; (2) that the shoeprints were made at the time of the crime; and (3) that the shoeprints correspond to shoes worn by the accused at the time of the crime. S. v. Ragland, 227 N.C. 162, 41 S.E.2d 285; S. v. Walker, 226 N.C. 458, 38 S.E.2d 531; S. v. Mays, 225 N.C. 486, 35 S.E.2d 494; S. v. Cromer, 222 N.C. 35, 21 S.E.2d 811; S. v. Jones, 215 N.C. 660, 2 S.E.2d 867; S. v. McLeod, supra; S. v. Weston, 197 N.C. 25, 147 S.E. 618; S. v. Young, 187 N.C. 698, 122 S.E. 667; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Fain, 177 N.C. 120, 97 S.E. 716; S. v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709, 97 S.E. 155; S. v. Martin, 173 N.C. 808, 92 S.E. 597; S. v. Lowry, 170 N.C. 730, 87 S.E. 62; S. v. Thompson, 161 N.C. 238, 76 S.E. 249; S. v. Taylor, 159 N.C. 465, 74 S.E. 914; S. v. Freeman, 146 N.C. 615, 60 S.E. 986; S. v. Hunter, 143 N.C. 607, 56 S.E. 547; S. v. Adams, 138 N.C. 688, 50 S.E. 765; S. v. Daniels, 134 N.C. 641, 46 S.E. 743; S. v. Morris, 84 N.C. 756; S. v. Reitz, 83 N.C. 634; S. v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646. Similar criteria apply to evidence of automobile tracks offered to identify the owner of a motor vehicle as the perpetrator of an offense. S. v. Young, supra.

The court also defined reasonable doubt substantially as stated in numerous decisions of this Court. S. v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146; S. v. Boswell, 194 N.C. 260, 139 S.E. 374; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Schoolfield, 184 N.C. 721, 114 S.E. 466. In the absence of request, it was not incumbent upon the trial judge to charge specifically as to the effect of evidence of the good character of the defendant.

The challenged passage from the charge is entirely consistent with the opinions of this Court giving definitions, illustrations, and analyses of circumstantial evidence, and cannot be held for error. S. v. Ewing, 227 N.C. 535, 42 S.E.2d 676; S. v. Gardner, 226 N.C. 310, 37 S.E.2d 913; S. v. Kiger, 115 N.C. 746, 751, 20 S.E. 456; S. v. Carmon, 145 N.C. 481, 483, 59 S.E. 657; S. v. Vaughn, 129 N.C. 502, 39 S.E. 629; Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. 9, sec. 2497, p. 316; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, sec. 922, p. 1608; S. v. McLeod, 196 N.C. 542, 544, 146 S.E. 409; S. v. Lee, 213 N.C. 319, 195 S.E. 785; S. v. King, 162 N.C. 580, 77 S.E. 301; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Casey, 201 N.C. 185, 159 S.E. 337. We can only reiterate the often repeated statement that the language used by the Court, varied as it may be in phraseology, to illustrate the force and effect of circumstantial evidence as an instrument of proof, is not intended to modify the degree or intensity of proof necessary to conviction.

In the instant case, however, the evidence is amply sufficient to require its submission to the jury. Indeed, it is fully as strong, if not stronger, than the evidence which was held sufficient to require its submission to the jury in some of the following cases: S. v. Satterfield, 207 N.C. 118, 176 S.E. 466; S. v. Ammons, 204 N.C. 753, 169 S.E. 631; S. v. McLeod, 198 N.C. 649, 152 S.E. 895; S. v. Allen, 197 N.C. 684, 150 S.E. 337; S. v. McKinnon, 197 N.C. 576, 150 S.E. 25; S. v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395; S. v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17; S. v. Young, 187 N.C. 698, 122 S.E. 667; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Bynum, 175 N.C. 777, 95 S.E. 101; S. v. Matthews, 162 N.C. 542, 77 S.E. 302; S. v. Taylor, 159 N.C. 465, 74 S.E. 914; S. v. Wilcox, 132 N.C. 1120, 44 S.E. 625. Circumstantial evidence is not only a recognized and accepted instrumentality in the ascertainment of truth, but, in many instances, quite essential to its establishment.

This evidence was competent also as tending to show that the third man in the party which stopped in front of the filling station knew the unlawful purpose of A. G. Ferguson and Bill Sawyer when they got out of the automobile and went into the filling station. The evidence comes within the exceptions to rule of law which excludes evidence of the commission by the defendant in a criminal action of crimes other than for which he is on trial. S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. McCall, 131 N.C. 798, 42 S.E. 894; S. v. Frazier, 118 N.C. 1257, 24 S.E. 520. In S. v. Frazier, it is said: "This Court in S. v. Jeffries, 117 N.C. 727, said: `There are some few exceptions to the almost universal rule of law that evidence of a distinct substantive offense cannot be admitted in support of another offense.' The exceptions to the rule are to be found in those cases in which testimony concerning independent offenses has been admitted because of the necessity of proving the quo animo, or the guilty knowledge of the defendant and also for purposes of identification of the defendant."

The State's showing in the instant case is fully as strong, if not stronger, than that in S. v. Wilcox, 132 N.C. 1120, 44 S.E. 625, where a conviction was sustained. The following authorities may also be cited in support of the court's action in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the evidence: S. v. Allen, 197 N.C. 684; S. v. McKinnon, 197 N.C. 576; S. v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395; S. v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17; S. v. Young, 187 N.C. 698, 122 S.E. 667; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Bynum, 175 N.C. 777, 95 S.E. 101; S. v. Matthews, 162 N.C. 542, 77 S.E. 302; S. v. Taylor, 159 N.C. 465, 74 S.E. 914. The following excerpt, taken from the charge, forms the basis of one of defendant's exceptive assignments of error, which he stressfully contends entitles him to a new trial.

It is stronger on the present record than it was on the first appeal, 196 N.C. 542. And it would seem that the evidence in the instant case is fully as strong as that which was submitted to the jury in the following cases: S. v. Allen, 197 N.C. 684; S. v. McKinnon, 197 N.C. 576; S. v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395; S. v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17; S. v. Young, 187 N.C. 698, 122 S.E. 667; S. v. Griffith, 185 N.C. 756, 117 S.E. 586; S. v. Bynum, 175 N.C. 777, 95 S.E. 101; S. v. Matthews, 162 N.C. 542, 77 S.E. 302; S. v. Taylor, 159 N.C. 465, 74 S.E. 914; S. v. Wilcox, 132 N.C. 1120, 44 S.E. 625. True, the evidence is circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is, not only a recognized and accepted instrumentality in the ascertainment of truth, but in many cases quite essential to its establishment.