October 26, 1956.Edward D. Buckley, Esq., of Charleston, for Appellant, cites: As to the admission of hearsay testimony over timelyobjection being a violation of the Constitutional rights of theaccused to cross examination and confrontation: 12 S.C. 89; 133 S.C. 491, 131 S.E. 603; 226 S.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 873; 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 48 S.C. 1, 25 S.E. 43; 83 S.C. 478, 65 S.E. 634; 114 S.C. 389, 103 S.E. 755. As to one accused of driving under the influenceof intoxicating liquor not being compelled to participate in achemical test designed to measure the alcoholic content ofhis blood: 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 817, 35 A.L.R. 1227; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289, 16 A.L.R.2d 1317. As to the State having no right to introduce evidence concerning,or comment upon, the refusal of an accused to participatein a test when the accused has a constitutional rightto refuse participation: 61 S.C. 22, 39 S.E. 184; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 817; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289; 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d 880; 217 S.C. 105, 59 S.E.2d 853; 227 S.C. 138, 87 S.E.2d 287; 181 S.C. 540, 88 S.E. 192. As to where there is a serious doubt as to theadmissibility of evidence, that doubt should always be resolvedin the defendant's favor: 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803; 217 S.C. 489, 61 S.E.2d 53; 194 S.C. 533, 9 S.E.2d 222; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E. 289; 61 S.C. 22, 39 S.E. 184; 221 S.C. 1, 68 S.E.2d 624; 227 S.C. 138, 87 S.E.2d 287. Messrs. Gedney M. Howe, Jr., Solicitor, and Charles JBaker, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of Charleston, forRespondent.

"The exceptions raise the following questions, which, alone, we deem it necessary to consider: (1) Was the testimony of the sheriff admissible, to the effect that he compared the shoe of the defendant with the tracks in the potato patch, and that it fitted, when it appeared that he had forced the defendant to remove her shoe, and made the adjustment himself? (2) Was the testimony of the sheriff admissible, to the effect that he compelled the defendant to put her foot in the track, and that she would not do it in the right way?" State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81, 35 A.L.R. 1227, 1228. As to the first question, the court held that the testimony of the sheriff, to effect that he compared the shoe with the tracks and that the shoe fitted the tracks, was properly admitted and did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. With respect to the privilege, the court said among other things:

Messrs. Charles Charles and A.R. McElhaney, of Greenwood, for Appellant, cite: As to motive becoming"most material" and the law of circumstantial evidence becomesapposite: 204 S.C. 140, 28 S.E.2d 679. As towhat constitutes next best evidence: 20 Am. Jur. 365, Evidence, Sec. 404; 186 S.C. 394, 195 S.E. 649. As to thelaw of circumstantial evidence: 214 S.C. 99, 51 S.E.2d 370; 215 S.C. 434, 55 S.E.2d 696; 196 S.C. 373, 13 S.E.2d 915; 208 S.C. 195, 37 S.E.2d 525. As to state's demand for possession of incriminating documentsamounting to compelling accused to testify againsthimself: 74 S.C. 466, 55 S.E. 122; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81; 187 S.C. 2, 196 S.E. 164; 14 Am. Jur. 872, Sec. 149; 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433; 97 F. 208, 209; 115 F. 972; 122 F. 926; 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 535, 29 L.Ed. 746; 191 N.C. 595, 132 S.E. 667; 115 P. 620, 5 Okla. Cr. 546, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171, Ann. Cas. 1912-D, 259; 110 A.L.R. 102-105; 122 F. 926, 61 C.C.A. 112; 148 S.C. 64, 145 S.E. 632. As to courtszealously protecting the constitutional rights of one accused: 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43; 104 S.C. 357, 89 S.E. 153; 117 S.C. 76, 108 S.E. 290; 120 S.C. 214, 112 S.E. 926; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81; 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43; 120 S.C. 214, 112 S.E. 926; 262 F. 664, 666; 115 F. 972, 54 C.C.A. 358. As to the trial judge abusing hisdiscretion in refusing the defendant's motion that the trialjury be kept together during the course of the trial: 203 S.C. 167, 26 S.E.2d 506. As to the trial judge erringin requiring the defendant's counsel to testify, over objection,as state's witness: 203 S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402. As to the rules of statutory const

State v. Harrison, 120 S.C. 214; 112 S.E., 926. State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200; 124 S.E., 81; 35 A.L.R., 1227. State v. Barker, 128 S.C. 372; 122 S.E., 494.

10, 5 L.Ed.2d 828, 81 S.Ct. 776; 338 U.S. 74, 93 L.Ed. 1819, 69 S.Ct. 1372; 342 U.S. 48, 96 L.Ed. 59, 72 S.Ct. 93; 335 U.S. 451, 93 L.Ed. 153, 69 S.Ct. 191; 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441; 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829; 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744. As to the Trial Judge'serring in requiring Appellant to make a voice recordinginto a telephone being recorded by a Charleston Police Departmentdictaphone in violation of the Appellant's privilegeagainst self-incrimination and right to due process by virtueof the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United StatesConstitution: 35 S.C. 197, 14 S.E. 481; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E. 289, 16 A.L.R.2d 1317; 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320; 250 S.C. 6, 156 S.E.2d 341; 361 F.2d 365; 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021; 359 F.2d 199; 227 S.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 598; 220 S.C. 301, 67 S.E.2d 506; 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. St. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; 87 S.Ct. 1926, at 1942; 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908; 115 PA 369, 9 A. 78; 16 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1328 and 171 A.L.R. 1144; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81; 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81; 378 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489. As to a lack of substantialcompetent evidence produced at trial to prove Appellant'sguilt: 202 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637; 202 S.C. 432, 25 S.E.2d 479; 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924; 14 S.C.L.Q. 57; 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96. Messrs. Robert B. Wallace, Sol., and A. Arthur Rosenblum,Asst. Sol., of Charleston, for Respondent, cite: As tothe Trial Judge's properly allowing evidence, both testimonialand demonstrative: 387 U.S. 294, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 87 S.Ct. 1642; 335 U.S. 451, 456, 93 L.Ed. 153, 69 S.Ct. 191. As to the Trial Judge's properly admittinginto evidence a dictaphone recording of the Defendant'svoice, made over the telephone: 250 S.C. 6, 156 S.E.2d 341; 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; 42 S.E.2d 523, 525; 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168. As to sufficientsubstantial competent evidence produced at trial which reasonablytended to prove Appellant's guilt:

Messrs. Harold R. Boulware and Lincoln C. Jenkins,Jr., of Columbia, and Herbert O. Reid, Counsel, for Appellant, cite: As to the Trial Court erring in admitting testimonyas to the results of the compulsory physical examinationof the accused: 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81, 35 A.L. R.; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289, 291; 210 S.C. 305, 42 S.E.2d 523; 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506; 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935, 95 L.R.A. 437; 67 Ga. 76; 10 S.W.2d 370; 153 Mo. 457, 55 S.W. 80; 7 Wn. 506, 35 P. 382; 28 Journal of American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 261, 269; 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183; 332 U.S. 596, 92 L.Ed. 224, 68 S. Ct. 302; 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801. Asto the Court erring in admitting in evidence the alleged confessionof the appellant and allowing testimony relating tothe contents thereof: 212 S.C. 124; 327 U.S. 274, 66 S. Ct. 540, 90 L.Ed. 667; 342 U.S. 55, 63, 72 S.Ct. 141; 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347; 209 S.C. 61, 38 S.E.2d 902, 903; 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682, 692; 50 Mich. L. Rev. 567-576; 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280; 16 Tex. Law Review 447; 261 U.S. 86; 338 U.S. 68; 249 U.S. 103; 287 U.S. 45; 329 U.S. 663; 316 U.S. 547, 62 S. Ct. 1139; 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed.

Court erring in trying appellant after his presence in thejurisdiction had allegedly been obtained by fraud, force orviolence practiced upon him by state officers: 12 S.C. 89; 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509; 37 Minn. L.R. 91; 127 U.S. 700, 8 S.Ct. 1204, 32 L.Ed. 283; 148 U.S. 537, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549; 167 U.S. 120, 17 S.Ct. 735, 42 L.Ed. 103; 119 U.S. 407; 203 U.S. 192; 61 Harv. L. Rev. 567; 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809; 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836; 24 How. (U.S.) 66; 144 F.2d 656; 154 A.L.R. 1160; 1 Bailey, S.C. Law, 283; 188 U.S. 691; 261 U.S. 86; 338 U.S. 68; 287 U.S. 45; 329 U.S. 663. As toLower Court erring in admitting into evidence alleged confessionof appellant and allowing testimony relating to thecontents thereof: 212 S.C. 124; 327 U.S. 274, 66 S.Ct. 540, 90 L.Ed. 667; 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347; 209 S.C. 61, 38 S.E.2d 902; 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23; 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682; 332 U.S. 596; 68 S.Ct. 302, 91 L.Ed. 224; 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280; 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289; 129 S.C. 200, 123 S.E. 81; 16 Texas Law Review 447; 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354; 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139; 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224; 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192; 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139, 86 L.Ed. 1663; 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347; 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352; 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029. J. Reuben Long, Solicitor, of Conway, for Respondent.

Messrs. Murchison West and J. Clator Arrants, of Camden, for Appellant, cite: As to trial judge having nopower to order compulsory mental examination of accusedprior to his trial: 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289; 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81; 14 Am. Jur., Sec. 160. Mr. T.P. Taylor, Solicitor, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Missouri courts have held inadmissible testimony adverse to an accused covering the results of a physical examination of an accused under arrest where the accused stood mute and did not object to the examination, upon the ground such extrajudicial transactions amounted to compelling the accused to testify against himself. [State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 663(II), 153 S.W. 1051, 1053[2]; State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 65(IV), 119 S.W. 405, 409. Consult State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100; and cases like South Carolina v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 203[5, 6], 124 S.E. 81, 82[5, 6], 35 A.L.R. 1227, Annotations, p. 1236.] Answers, equivalent to silence, have been held admissible or not admissible according to whether the circumstances are such as to make evidence of silence admissible. [16 C.J. 634, nn. 11, 12; 22 C.J.S. 1266, nn. 89, 90; People v. Swaile, 12 Cal.App. 192, 198, 107 P. 134, 137 (held admissible); People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 448-450, 104 N.E. 804, 819[9, 12], Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1171 (held not admissible).] Appellant's point is well taken.

Messrs. John M. Daniel, Attorney General, J. Ivey Humphrey and M.J. Hough, Assistant Attorneys General, and W.P. Donelan, for appellant, cite: Power of General Assemblyto obtain information: 74 S.C. 470; 120 S.C. 181; 115 S.E., 300. Privilege of witness: 1 Speer, 129; 2 Nott McCord, 13; 103 S.C. 184; 88 S.E., 128; 94 S.C. 409; 78 S.E., 327; 4 Strob., 311; 2 Bail., 66; 7 Rich., 327; 121 S.C. 231; 113 S.E., 317; 142 U.S. 547; 36 L.Ed., 110; 142 U.S. 560; 35 L.Ed., 1113; 87 A.L.R., 420; 28 R. C.L., 429; 273 U.S. 135; 71 L.Ed., 566. Mr. John P. Grace, for respondent, cites: As to answerof witness: 2 Nott McCord, 13; 142 U.S. 547. Constitutionalguarantee before any tribunal: 74 S.C. 466; 129 S.C. 200; 124 S.E., 81; 40 Cyc., 2539; 116 U.S. 616; 29 L.Ed., 746. Immunity: 17 S.W. 753; 57 A.S.R., 378; 14 A.L.R., 407; 75 A.S.R., 345; 1 L.R.A. (N.S.), 167; 2 Ann. Cas., 177. March 28, 1938.