Opinion
CR130143102
02-02-2018
STATE of Connecticut v. Bobby GRIFFIN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Vitale, J.
The defendant, Bobby Griffin, stands charged with inter alia, Felony-Murder, in violation of Connecticut General Statute § 53a-54c, and Murder, in violation of Connecticut General Statute § 53a-54a(a). The charges arise from events that are alleged to have occurred on October 14, 2013 in the area of Ella Grasso Boulevard and Goffe Street in New Haven. On November 6, 2017, the defendant filed a document captioned " Motion to Suppress the Defendant’s Statement." In his motion, the defendant argues that " police interrogated him over the course of five hours after an exhaustive night before the interrogation" and further, that police " made inappropriate promises and threats to him, both directly to him and about his family." The defendant also alleges that police " lied to him and fed him information about the crime" and told him he would " fry" if he didn’t confess to the crime." The defendant submitted a Memorandum of Law in support of the motion. In his motion, memorandum of law, and at oral argument, the defendant argues that his statement was " involuntary" and as a result, lacks " sufficient reliability." The state objects and asserts that it has proved the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement by a preponderance of the evidence. On January 16, 2017, the state offered testimony from Detective David Zaweski of the New Haven Police Department in connection with the Motion. In addition, the state offered State’s Exhibit Three, a copy of the videotaped statement at issue taken on October 20, 2014 by Detective Nicole Natale and Detective David Zaweski. The defendant did not offer any evidence. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 16, 2017.
In reaching its conclusions, the court has fairly and impartially considered all of the evidence received at the hearing, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses; assessed the weight, if any, to be given specific evidence and measured the probative force of conflicting evidence; reviewed all exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law; and has drawn such inferences form the evidence, or facts established by the evidence, that it deems reasonable and logical.
To the extent it is necessary to further amplify, the court’s credibility determinations for each witness was made, inter alia, on the basis of the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses as well as all the other factors relevant for each witness with respect to the credibility evaluation. See Lapointe v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 Conn. 225, 268-71, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). Additionally, any other evidence on the record not specifically mentioned in this decision that would support a contrary conclusion, whether said evidence was contested or uncontested by the parties, was considered and rejected by the court. See State v. Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34 (2016).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is hereby denied.
Although the defendant’s written motion appears to raise a state constitutional claim, he has not presented a separate analysis of his claims under the state constitution. As a result, the court’s analysis is confined to federal constitutional claims. See State v. Faust, 237 Conn. 454, 465 n.10 (1996).
I
Findings of Fact
Based on the evidence and the reasonable and logical inferences therefrom, the court finds the following facts.
Detective Natale was the lead detective assigned to investigate a homicide that occurred on October 14, 2014 near the area of Ella Grasso Boulevard and Goffe Street in New Haven. Detective Zaweski was assigned to assist her in the investigation. The defendant Bobby Griffin was in police custody as the result of his arrest in the late evening hours of October 19, 2017 for the crime of Criminal Possession of a Firearm at the time of the police interview in question. Miranda warnings had been provided to him at that time while at 374 Peck Street by officers on scene. The defendant was brought to the New Haven Police Department following his arrest at 374 Peck Street, and was placed in a holding cell. He arrived at the police department holding cell sometime in the early morning hours of October 20, 2014. Detective Zaweski estimated that the defendant had been in the holding cell for " several hours" prior to his arrival in the interrogation room.
The defendant’s " Motion to Suppress Gun and Ammunition" was heard on the same date as the instant motion. The defendant conceded during the proceedings that the defendant received Miranda warnings on the scene while at 374 Peck Street following his custodial arrest for Criminal Possession of a Firearm.
According to the videotaped statement, the defendant was brought upstairs to an interrogation room at the New Haven Police Department at approximately 10:30 a.m. on October 20, 2014. The video camera was turned on prior to the defendant’s arrival into the interrogation room. The room measured approximately fifteen by fifteen. The defendant was originally handcuffed, but the handcuffs were removed at the start of the interview. The defendant was seated in a chair close to a table, and Detective Natale sat in a chair near the table but across from the defendant. Detective Zaweski sat in a chair located off to the side of the defendant. The defendant once again received Miranda warnings in the interrogation room that were captured on videotape. The defendant indicated he understood the warnings. He did not manifest any outward signs of intoxication. The actual interrogation portion of the videotape lasted approximately three hours and thirty-eight minutes. Although the actual interrogation had been completed, the video camera continued to record as the defendant remained seated and waited for the arrival of food. It continued to record as the defendant ate the food that was ultimately delivered. The defendant at no point asked police to stop the interview, and at no point asked to speak with an attorney. The interview proceeded essentially in several stages. Detective Natale asked the majority of the questions, but Detective Zaweski also participated.
At oral argument, the defendant acknowledged that he was not making any claims with respect to the absence of Miranda warnings, nor any claims relating to any claimed infirmity in the rendering of the warnings or the waiver of same.
The interview began with a series of questions related to the rifle and ammunition seized from the attic of 374 Peck Street. The defendant initially claimed that a third party, " Quan Bezzle," owned the weapon. Nevertheless, he indicated that he would " take" the " charge" because he did not want his mother, sister, or step-father to be arrested as well. The defendant himself first affirmatively raised this issue with Detective Natale. The interview next turned to a discussion of the homicide that had just occurred " on the Boulevard." Natale asked the defendant if he could offer any " help" with respect to " any homicides." As previously noted, the interview proceeded in several phases. At first, the defendant initially denied any knowledge of the homicide, other than from news accounts. The interview next proceeded to the defendant’s admission to being present near the scene, then to being present when " Quan Bezzle" fired shots from the rifle seized from 374 Peck Street, and then finally to his own admission of responsibility for the homicide. As part of their investigative techniques, police confronted the defendant with internal inconsistencies and implausibilities in his various accounts, provided him with false information about the strength of the case against him, and offered him different scenarios as to how the crime could have occurred. The tenor of the questioning ranged from conversational to accusatory over the entire length of the interview, and included references by police to the victim, the defendant " fry[ing]" in " the chair," the victim’s children, the defendant’s mother and sister, potential charges, and the court system. The police remained seated during the entirety of the questioning, as did the defendant. The police did not stand up, display their weapons, or invade the " personal space" of the defendant during their questioning. While police were at some points contentious in their questioning, at no point did the defendant’s demeanor appear to change in response to the aggressive nature of the questioning. The defendant remained largely calm and low key throughout the interview. He characterized himself generally as a " calm" person. At one point he appeared to become emotional when he described his need for " protection" from " Quan Bezzle," who at one point the defendant claimed was responsible for the homicide. Notwithstanding this seemingly melodramatic request, at the end of the interview when the defendant admitted responsibility himself for the homicide, he acknowledged that the entire " Quan Bezzle" account was an artifice. The defendant was already a convicted felon at the time of the interview and inferentially was not a novice to the criminal justice system. Early in the interview, he told Detective Natale he had just " come home" from prison six months earlier. The defendant appeared at ease contesting the accusations being made by police during the interview, and at one point indicated he would be taking the matter " to trial." He asked to see the street camera videos routinely referenced by the police. He had no difficulty jousting with his interrogators. The defendant advised the police that he watched the television crime show " First 48."
There is no evidence before the court demonstrating that the defendant suffered from any mental or psychological infirmity, or was susceptible to coercion on the basis of age or education. The videotaped interview demonstrates that the defendant had the capacity to understand his right against self-incrimination and seemed under control emotionally and psychologically. The defendant, approximately three-quarters into the interview, was asked if he was tired because he closed his eyes. The defendant responded that he was tired, but following that point in the interview, the remainder of the interrogation did not demonstrate any change in his response time to the questions being asked or his ability to logically communicate. His answers throughout the interview, including after the reference to his tiredness, uniformly had a contextual relationship to the questions being asked. He communicated coherently and rationally. He never manifested any confusion in his communications at any point in the interrogation. At the point in time of the interview when the defendant made incriminating statements, which occurred at the end of the interview, the questions by police were generally follow-ups to the defendant’s own incriminating statements. Just prior to the defendant’s incriminating statements, he announced to police " Alright, I’ll tell the truth." This announcement occurred shortly following a statement by Defendant Natale that she didn’t think that the defendant " [had] any idea of how serious this is ... the choice is yours, Murder, Manslaughter." Natale suggested that he was being a " knuckle head" because the police " [had] too much against [him]." The defendant asked " How much time do I get for Manslaughter" ? Natale responded that the defendant should not " be worried about time right now" ... you have to worry about telling the truth right now and coming clean." Additional facts will be provided as needed.
Voluntariness of the Statement to Police Under the Due Process Clause
The state is required to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 177 (2007). The defendant asserts two generally related claims as to the issue of voluntariness for Due Process purposes. First, he argues that the conduct of law enforcement in the interrogation room rendered the defendant’s oral declarations to police involuntary, and secondly, also claims that the defendant’s mental and physical condition was such that he was not in a position to rationally exercise his free will and was thus unduly susceptible to police tactics. The defendant does not appear to argue that he did not understand or that he had any trouble communicating with the officers. See State v. Wright, 79 Conn.App. 91, 108, (2003) (considering totality of circumstances, including that " [a]t no time did the defendant reveal that he did not understand his circumstances or that he had difficulty communicating with the officers" ), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004).
The court’s discussion begins with the recognition that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights immediately prior to his interrogation, and waived these rights in writing. He had also received Miranda warnings hours earlier in connection with the police investigation. " A warning at the time of interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to ensure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time. State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 338 (1997). " Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a statement is not voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause." State v. Finder, 250 Conn. 285, 418-24 (1999). " Ordinarily, a court will deem a statement or confession involuntary only if there is some coercive police conduct that is causally related to it." State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 54 (2003). There is an " essential link between coercive activity of the state, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). The determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it; including both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266 (2014).
" Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education, his intelligence, the lack of any advice as to his constitutional rights, the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food and sleep ... Andrews, at 322.
" We have stated the test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined ... Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process." State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 54-55 (2003). (Internal citations omitted.) The issue before the court is whether the questioning, under the totality of the circumstances, crossed constitutional boundaries that render the defendant’s statement involuntary.
The defendant claims in his motion that police " lied to him and fed him information about the crime," and as a result, his videotaped statement was coerced and lacks " sufficient reliability."
Interrogation methods including trickery and deception are permissible unless the technique is so extreme or inappropriate as to render the confession involuntary. State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, n.17 (2010). For example, statements by police designed to lead a suspect to believe that the case against him is strong are a common investigative technique and would rarely, if ever, be sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will and to bring about a confession to a serious crime that is not freely self-determined. State v. Doyle, 104 Conn.App. 4, 17, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 935 (2007). In State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911 (2004), the court held that " encouraging a suspect to tell the truth ... does not, as a matter of law, overcome a confessor’s will ... neither is a statement that the accused’s cooperation will be made known to the court sufficient inducement so as to render a subsequent incriminating statement involuntary." See also State v. Reyes, 81 Conn.App. 612, 617 (2004) (upholding determination defendant’s statement was voluntary, finding officer’s statement to the defendant that " [he] better tell the truth or [he] was going to do a lot of time in jail" was not coercive); State v. Houghtaling, 155 Conn.App. 794, 828, cert. granted on other grounds; aff’d 326 Conn. 330 (2017) (upholding determination defendant’s statement was voluntary, finding officer’s statements to the defendant " This is what we have here: you’re the homeowner, you denied it, we had to chase you up the street and get you to stop ... one way or another you’re going to jail. You can have your side on paper or not. It’s up to you" was not coercive).
As noted previously, the defendant presented no evidence at the hearing in connection with any of his claims. The court’s careful review of the defendant’s videotaped statement not only revealed the police tactics now complained of during the questioning, but also demonstrated that said tactics were nevertheless ineffectual. The defendant’s responses demonstrated a large degree of self-savvy and assuredness. The defendant was confronted by police with what were claimed to be falsehoods in his account, yet he calmly parried with police in an effort to test their claims. Although he became emotional at one point discussing his claimed fear of " Quan Bezzle" - a claim he later revealed to be a falsehood- the defendant quickly regained his composure. The defendant demanded to see the street videos the police claimed to possess. He told police that despite the evidence they claimed to possess, he would " take [the case] to trial." " The fact that a defendant was ... upset emotionally does not necessarily render his statements inadmissible." State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 44 (1989).
The defendant also asserts that the police " made inappropriate promises and threats to him, both directly to him and about his family."
Although in some cases a promise of leniency may affect the voluntariness of a confession, a confession otherwise freely and voluntarily made is not vitiated by a promise of leniency unless such promise was the motivating cause of the confession. State v. McCall, 74 Conn.App. 545, 565, cert. denied 262 Conn. 953 (2003).
The falsehoods utilized by police as an interrogation tactic have been deemed a permissible technique. See State v. Lockhart, supra .
The various statements made by police that arguably discussed offenses other than Felony-Murder or Murder that could be available in the event of an inculpatory statement do not, in the court’s view, rise to the level of specific promises regarding forms of leniency or penalties. The defendant was given no specific assurances that giving a statement would affect the manner or outcome of the criminal proceedings. See State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, 110, cert. denied 271 Conn. 911 (2004). Addressing a similar claim, the court in State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 424 (1999) stated as follows:
Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth ... does not, as a matter of law, overcome a confessor’s will ... Neither is a statement that the accused’s cooperation will be made known to the court sufficient inducement so as to render a subsequent incriminating statement involuntary. United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1978) ... Several courts have held that remarks of the police far more explicitly indicating a defendant’s willingness to make a statement would be viewed favorably do not render his confession involuntary ... [A] statement [that accused’s cooperation would be to his benefit] by a law enforcement officer falls far short of creating the compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely ... State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis.2d 683, 692, 211 N.W.2d 421 (1973) ... see also State v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1364 (11th Cir. 1983) (agent’s statement that it would be helpful to sign a confession has been held insufficient by itself to render a confession involuntary); United States v. Morris, 491 F.Supp. 226, 230 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (agent’s comment that if you cooperate, it will go easy on you held not coercive)." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perry, 195 Conn. 505, 519-20, 488 A.2d 1256 (1985); see also State v. Chung, supra, 202 Conn. 55 (" police suggestions that a criminal suspect should cooperate do not, alone, render a confession involuntary" ).
See also State v. Davis, 522 S.W.3d 360 (defendant’s confession found voluntary and not coerced although police told defendant difference between murder and manslaughter was whether shooting was intended to hurt or kill or whether it was done to scare someone; police merely described range of legal consequences and no specific promises made).
Further, in general, " to advise a suspect of potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a threat," and " encouraging a suspect to cooperate with police is not coercive conduct." Bossey v. State, 184 So.3 1138 (2015). When the defendant pointedly asked Detective Natale about " how much time do I get for Manslaughter?," Natale did not directly respond to the question or make any promises, but instead told the defendant to focus on " telling the truth." Other courts have indicated that the benefit offered to a defendant must be definite and must overbear his free will in order to render a statement involuntary. State v. Walker, 242 Neb.99 (1992); State v. Ray, 241 Neb. 551 (1992).
Taken as a whole, the isolated police comments regarding the charges did not, under the totality of the circumstances of the interview, constitute conduct such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist, nor was it a motivating cause of his confession.
The court will next address in turn the claims related to the defendant’s family, and the single reference by Detective Natale to " fry[ing] in the chair."
With respect to the plainly ill advised reference to " the chair," the videotape reflects that this reference occurred only one time during the course of an approximately three hour and thirty-eight minute interrogation, during an exchange between the defendant and Detective Natale regarding the implausibility of his accounts of the night of the homicide. The comment occurred a little more than half-way through the interview, and the defendant’s response is somewhat inaudible. This single, isolated comment did not immediately result in an inculpatory statement by the defendant, or an overt reaction by him, and Detective Zaweski immediately changed the tenor and course of the interview by backtracking over some previously discussed areas related to the defendant’s claimed use of a bicycle the night of the homicide. The defendant continued to deny his involvement in the homicide until well after this single comment. Although the court does not condone Detective Natale’s use of a death penalty reference. The court concludes that this single isolated reference does not render the defendant’s subsequent and much later confession involuntary.
Several courts have indicated that a brief reference to the death penalty will not render a statement involuntary when the statement merely illustrates the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s will was not overborne as a result of the statement. See State v. Martinez, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (1999) (reference to seriousness of crime, did not rise to level of misconduct, and did not cause his will to be overborne); Conner v. State, 334 Ark. 457, 982 S.W.2d 655 (1998); State v. Andrus, Nos. 9504004126 and 9504002666, 1996 WL 190031 (Del.SuperJan.16, 1996) (appellant did not demonstrate that officer’s brief comments regarding death penalty constituted governments overreaching or that comments were a factor that caused him to confess); Nelson v. State, 688 So.2d 971 (1997) (officers’ mention of death penalty to murder suspect was not unduly coercive, where interrogators objectionable comment occurred within first 30 minutes of the interview and suspect continued to deny any part in murder for another two hours.); State v. Garner, 260 Neb.41, 614 N.W.2d, 319 (2000) (police references to death penalty during their interview of a 15 year old murder suspect did not, in and of themselves, render confession involuntary; officer mentioned death penalty twice over course of three hour interview). Detective Natale’s single and isolated reference to the death penalty did not occur with an explicit threat or promise of leniency. It appears that the comment was directed in relation to the reaction Detective Natale claimed the defendant’s " silly story" would generate when others read the police reports that she would be submitting.
The court further observes that when the defendant ultimately confessed to the homicide, his voice was calm and deliberate, and he made no reference to this complained of comment by Detective Natale.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that this single comment, did not, under the totality of the circumstances work to overbear the defendant’s will to resist and was not causally related to his ultimate confession. It did not distort his rational choice to, as he put it near the end of the interview, " tell the truth." His capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired.
As to Detective Natale’s comment about the defendant’s mother and sister, the exchange in question occurred very early on in the interview. As previously noted, within the first several minutes of the interview, the defendant himself first affirmately stated to Natale, with respect to the gun found at 374 Peck Street, that " I just took the charge." He did so because " I ain’t want anybody go down for it," and added " I didn’t want my mother to go down or my stepfather or sister." The defendant himself already recognized the potential legal jeopardy the presence of the gun within 374 Peck Street posed to other occupants present. Much later in the interview, approximately one third of the way through, Detective Natale stated to the defendant that " I probably have no say in this, is your mom and sister are probably gonna go down for that gun as well ... they’re probably gonna do warrants for them."
The defendant responded dispassionately that he was " trying to do the best [he] could," while continuing at that point, and well afterward, to deny any involvement in the homicide. In essence, having already told Detective Natale that he was taking responsibility for the presence of the gun inside 374 Peck Street, the defendant simply ignored Natale’s comment. In fact, at no point after confessing to the homicide did the defendant mention this specific comment or ask Natale to then abandon the claimed " warrant" for the gun she claimed might be forthcoming.
The court was provided with a transcript of the interview for its review by the agreement of the parties. Natale’s comment occurred on page 39 of a transcript that totals 151 pages.
Having previously indicated to Detective Natale that " he took the charge" for the gun, a comment made within minutes of the commencement of the interview and well before the discussion turned to the homicide under investigation, the defendant’s non-reaction to the comment regarding his family reasonably suggests that he recognized Natale’s comment as an empty and vacuous ploy. The defendant was not a neophyte with regard to the criminal justice system. The balance of the interview demonstrates that this single comment simply did not register with the defendant as a motivating factor in his decision to ultimately confess. Police did not direct similar comments to the defendant regarding any potential legal jeopardy for family members as to the homicide itself. The defendant himself had earlier broached and resolved what he believed was the potential legal jeopardy of his family with regard to the gun. This subject was not revisited, and it appears that the defendant brushed off Natale’s comment since he had already taken responsibility for the gun. Certainly, the court recognizes that the police tread on dangerous ground when comments such as these are made. The court however, considering the totality of the circumstances of the interview, views this single comment as factually and legally distinct from the type of comments condemned in Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963). See e.g. State v. Grimes, 23 Neb.App. 3004 (2015) (defendant’s confession to possession of gun found in mother’s home not coerced by any threat to arrest his mother, while officer told defendant he did not want " anything going back on mom," officer did not threaten to arrest mother if defendant did not confess, nor did he state that defendant’s mother would not be arrested if defendant confessed); Cum. v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382 (1997) (police officer’s suggestion that suspect’s mother might be charged as an accessory after the fact for lying about whereabouts of her car, which had been used by suspect to pick up victim before she was raped and murdered, was not sufficient coercion to render confession involuntary); Ashcroft v. State, 900 S.W.2d 817 (1995) (in burglary prosecution, defendant’s confession was not involuntary on basis of alleged threat by officer to arrest defendant’s mother, but that she would not be arrested of the defendant cooperated, when officer stated that defendant was told mother could be accountable for stolen property found on the premises, which was a statement of fact not coercion).
The court concludes, therefore, under the totality of the circumstance, this isolated single comment was insufficient to overbear the defendants will to resist and was not causally related to his confession. The defendant’s capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired by this comment. He continued to deny responsibility for the homicide well after the comment was made.
The final claims that are raised by the defendant are somewhat related. The defendant argues that during the course of the interview he was " sleepy," and his mental acuity was thus compromised. He further claims that this circumstance was heightened by the overall length of his detention and interview at the police department. As noted previously, the defendant did not present any evidence in connection with this claim.
Preliminarily, the videotaped statement demonstrates that the defendant had no apparent problem seeing or reading any printed materials he was given. State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 318 (2014). With respect, for example, to claims involving an altered mental status by virtue of alcohol or drug use, " the use of drugs or the ingestion of alcoholic beverages does not, in and of itself, render a subsequent confession inadmissible, but is one factor to be considered in judging the voluntariness of a statement." State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22 (1989).
In the videotaped statement, the defendant was asked " how well he slept" following the homicide. The defendant replied that he " slept good" that entire week, and reiterated that he did not commit the crime. The foregoing exchange occurred more than halfway through interview. A short while later, as the result of the defendant closing his eyes, Detective Natale asked if he was " getting tired." The defendant responded " yeah," and thereafter indicated " I’m tired" after once again closing his eyes. However, he responded quickly to additional inquiries from Detective Zaweski with no apparent confusion or lack of context or coherence. Detective Natale shortly thereafter stated " Bobby; wake up and talk to us" after observing the defendant close his eyes. The defendant appears to point to these exchanges as indicative of " sleep deprivation" that renders the defendant’s confession involuntary.
This series of exchanges occurred on pages 90-91 of a transcript that totals 151 pages.
The court does not find that at any point during the approximately three hour and thirty-eight minute interrogation the defendant manifested any outward signs suggesting he did not understand questions being asked, the purpose of the interview, or that his will was overborne. He never asked the police to terminate the interview because he was too tired or sleepy. The defendant had no problem jousting with police throughout the interview, and characterized himself as a calm person. He definitely manifested the ability to communicate clearly and coherently, and his responses followed a logical sequence and related contextually to the questions asked. In short, the defendant responded rationally to the questions asked. He reacted immediately when Detective Natale provided food after the interrogation concluded. He ate vigorously and without difficulty.
Moreover, as previously discussed, throughout the interview the defendant demonstrated a capacity to resist police accusations regarding the homicide.
The length of the defendant’s detention prior to the commencement is somewhat nebulous, as is the factual basis for the defendant’s apparent claim that he was unable to sleep while in the police holding cell prior to the interview. The defendant appears to rely on the videotaped interview in support of these claims. He did not present any evidence as to this claim. Claimed " sleepiness" is but one factor in the courts voluntariness analysis. Our courts have addressed the mixture of length of detention and length of interview with regard to the voluntariness of a confession. See e.g. State v. Abreu, 106 Conn.App. 278, 293, cert. denied 286 Conn. 919 (2008) (statement voluntary where defendant in police custody for approximately twelve hours interviewed by for approximately one hour before giving his written confession); State v. DeAngelis, 200 Conn. 224 (1986) (ten and one-half hour police interview found voluntary); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631 (1983) (eight-hour period of detention before having given third confession, although substantial, ‘does not remotely approach the length of those interrogations held to be so objectionable on that ground among others as to warrant reversal of a finding by a trial court that a confession was voluntary); State v. Bell, 93 Conn.App. 650 (2015) (detention for six hours before interview lasting one and one-half hours not sufficient to render statement involuntary); State v. Vasquez, 133 Conn.App. 785, 810-11; cert. denied 304 Conn. 921 (three hour interrogation reasonable).
After a careful review at the defendant’s videotaped statement, the court is not persuaded that the defendant suffered from a lack of mental acuity or physical infirmity as the result of a lack of sleep that rendered his statement involuntary. The totality of the circumstances does not disclose that any claimed " sleepiness" caused the conduct of police to result in the defendant’s will to be overborne or caused his capacity for self-determination to be critically impaired.
The court has considered all of the factors described in State v. Andrews, supra at 332. The defendant received Miranda warnings on two separate occasions. There is no evidence of physical punishment with respect to the videotaped statement at issue. The defendant was provided with food at the conclusion of his interview. There is no evidence in the record regarding the defendants lack of education, particular susceptibility to coercion, or his intelligence. According to his statement, the defendant was 22 years old at the time of the interview. The length of his detention and the nature and length of the questioning is not, in the court’s view, appreciably different than time periods previously deemed insufficient to render a statement involuntary. The defendant maintained the ability to maintain his capacity for self-determination throughout the interview as evidenced by his responses to police questions and his capacity to resist the police. The court finds under the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s will was not overborne and that his statement was voluntary and not casually related to any claimed coercive activity by police. The court is not persuaded by the evidence presented that he was so enfeebled by a claimed lack of sleep that his will was overborne.
The court finds that the state has proven the voluntariness at the defendant’s statement by a preponderance of the evidence.
In addition, the court will provide an appropriate instruction that will provide guidance to the jury in their assessment of the reliability defendant’s videotaped statement.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s Motion to Suppress the Defendant’s Statement is denied.