As said by the State trial judge: "It seems entirely reasonable to this Court that the Jury Commission in noting its error of failing to have any Negroes on a Grand Jury did attempt to remedy this error by placing more Negroes on the subsequent Grand Jury." The Louisiana Supreme Court held that this method of selecting a grand jury did not offend the Constitution of the United States, and quoted from its previous holding in State v. Green, 1952, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208, 212, as follows: "'It would be fallacious, we think, to hold that, because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving consideration to members of the colored race, as well as those of other races, in the selection of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel, their forthright action constitutes discrimination in the absence of a showing that there was a planned limitation upon the number of Negroes to be chosen.'
A planned limitation of the number of negroes selected to serve on the grand jury imposed on the basis of race is prohibited. Cassell v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839; State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208; State v. Perkins, 211 La. 993, 31 So.2d 188. The question of whether racial or other discrimination has been practiced in the formation of the jury bodies is one of fact.
Under the command of the law prohibiting racial discrimination in the selection of juries, a planned limitation of the number selected to serve on a jury body imposed on the basis of race is forbidden. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839: State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208; State v. Perkins, 211 La. 993, 31 So.2d 188. In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839, the Supreme Court of the United States declared:
made part of the Bill, reveals that when they were first selected and appointed to those positions some years previously by the District Judge, they were given general instructions to always be sure there was adequate representation of the races on both the petit and grand jury venires; that these instructions had been renewed from time to time and generally had been conscientiously followed; that the oversight in the case of the previous grand jury venire, and the customary caution from their Secretary to be careful of a representative selection, resulted in the placing of six members of the Negro race on the venire of twenty names from which was drawn the grand jury of October 5, 1960. We are impressed with the Jury Commissioners' straightforward answers and conscientious attention to their duties; it is evident that there was simply an honest attempt on the part of each member to insure that he was complying with instructions given by the District Judge. As stated by this Court in State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208, "It would be fallacious, we think, to hold that, because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving consideration to members of the colored race, as well as those of other races, in the selection of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel, their forthright action constitutes discrimination in the absence of a showing that there was a planned limitation upon the number of Negroes to be chosen." (221 La. at 726, 60 So.2d at 212.)
LSA-R.S. 15:451; Article I, Section 11 of the LSA-Constitution; State v. Richard, 223 La. 674, 66 So.2d 589; State v. Hilliard, 227 La. 208, 78 So.2d 835; State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910; State v. Allen, 200 La. 687, 8 So.2d 643; State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249; State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181; State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842; State v. Wilson, 214 La. 317, 37 So.2d 804; State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848; State v. Honeycutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So.2d 313; State v. Joseph, 217 La. 175, 46 So.2d 118; State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208; State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207; State v. Johnson, 229 La. 476, 86 So.2d 108; State v. Savell, 238 La. 758, 116 So.2d 513; State v. Ferguson, 240 La. 593, 124 So.2d 558. According to the evidence attached to this bill, defendant, Thomas, made a statement to Detective J. D. Paul, which was written down by Detective E. T. Starkey.
Kentucky: Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 297 Ky. 172, 178 S.W.2d 928 (1943); Curtis v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 205, 226 S.W.2d 753 (1949); Reed v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 214, 226 S.W.2d 513 (1949); Milam v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W. 921 (Ky. 1955); Karl v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1956). Louisiana: State v. Holmes, 205 La. 730, 18 So.2d 40 (1944); State v. Joseph, 217 La. 175, 46 So.2d 118 (1950); State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481 (1952); State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d 305 (1957); and see State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208 (1952). Maine: State v. Priest, 117 Me. 223, 103 A. 359 (1918).
See Jackson v. Denno, supra note 7, at 378, 84 S.Ct. at 1781 in footnote 8. State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208, 213 (1952); State v. Barker, 56 Wn. 510, 106 P. 133 (1910); Harrold v. Territory, 18 Okla. 395, 89 P. 202, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 604 (1907). The actual reasoning or purpose behind the holding of Jackson does not require the removal of the jury during such a hearing.
Under such a system, knowledge of a prospective juror's race on the part of the Jury Commission is inevitable. "As we stated in State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208: "'* * * It would be fallacious, we think, to hold that, because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving consideration to members of the colored race, as well as those of other races, in the selection of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel, their forthright action constitutes discrimination in the absence of a showing that there was a planned limitation upon the number of Negroes to be chosen.'
As a matter of fact, it was interesting during the argument of this case to hear the response of petitioner's counsel to the question of whether or not there would have been objection raised had petitioner's case been presented to the prior grand jury, which was regularly empaneled, but which contained no Negroes. Counsel informed the Court that an objection most certainly would have been raised on the grounds that there were no Negroes on that jury. As was stated by the court in State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So.2d 208, "It would be fallacious, we think, to hold that, because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving consideration to members of the colored race, as well as those of other races, in the selection of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel, their forthright action constitutes discrimination in the absence of a showing that there was a planned limitation upon the number of Negroes to be chosen." It is obvious, of course, that this petitioner can have no valid complaint concerning the composition of the prior grand jury since it did not investigate his case.
Further, even had the plea been properly qualified, nothing in either version of Art. 557 requires a court to accept a qualified plea of guilty in a given case; rather, the decision is left to the judge's discretion. See Jett, 419 So.2d at 851; State v. Green, 60 So.2d 208, 213 (La. 1952). As to the 1995 amendment to Art. 557, defendant does not argue that it should apply retroactively to his trial, but rather cites the revised statute for the proposition that its predecessor should be read to allow unqualified pleas of guilty.