{¶ 3} On February 11, 2004, Kelley filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Richland County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his prison warden, Julius Wilson, to release him from confinement. Kelley claimed entitlement to the writ based on State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, and State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556. Kelley claimed that he never waived his right to a jury trial. Kelley further claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the court heard no testimony, failed to determine the appropriateness of the charges, and did not journalize any finding of guilt.
The defense declined to stipulate to assertions that Turner had psychologically abused Jennifer, that she had "sought refuge at the homes of friends and neighbors" when abused, and that her move to Ohio had been motivated by her desire to escape Turner's abuse. {¶ 37} In his second proposition of law, Turner contends that the panel could not properly find him guilty based on State's Exhibit 8 but rather should have required live testimony pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11, as construed in State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556. {¶ 38} In Green, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and two capital specifications.
In support of his argument, Bolin cites R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3); R.C. 2945.06 provides that, when a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder, a three-judge panel shall examine the witnesses, determine whether the accused is guilty of aggravated murder or any other offense, and pronounce sentence accordingly. This issue was recently resolved by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556. In Green, the court held that "when a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder in a capital case, a three-judge panel is required to examine witnesses and to hear any other evidence properly presented by the prosecution in order to make a Crim.R. 11 determination as to the guilt of the defendant."
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently affirmed that a guilty plea conviction supported only by the prosecution's recitation of the facts "does not satisfy the evidence requirements of Crim. R. 11 and R.C. 2945.06." State v. Green, 689 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ohio 1998). In Green, a unanimous court held that during a culpability hearing on a guilty plea, the three-judge panel must examine witnesses, and in that case found that because Green's conviction was not supported by any evidence other than the prosecution's factual recitation, it must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Defendant-appellant HenryPerkins appeals from his convictions after entering guilty pleas to the following offenses: aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, with mass murder and firearm specifications; attempted aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, with a firearm specification; and aggravated robbery, with a firearm specification. Appellant challenges his convictions on the grounds that the three-judge panel failed at his plea hearing to comply with the requirements of either Crim.R. 11(C) or the supreme court's directive in State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100. Since this court determines appellant's challenge is baseless, his convictions are affirmed.
{¶ 66} The state also contends that if this court interprets Crim.R. 11(C)(3)"to require an examination of witnesses as to a capital specification, it would be unconstitutional" under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution. Finally, the state contends that Ketterer should be overruled to the extent that it extended to capital specifications the syllabus law of State v. Green, 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 104, 689 N.E.2d 556 (1998), which held that "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder in a capital case, a three-judge panel is required to examine witnesses and to hear any other evidence properly presented by the prosecution in order to make a Crim.R. 11 determination as to the guilt of the defendant." We reject all of the state's arguments in this vein and decline to overrule Ketterer.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: {¶ 1} Pursuant to App.R. 26, Loc. App.R. 26, and McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ. , 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914, 896 N.E.2d 672, this court determined that a conflict exists between the original panel majority decision in State v. Hunt , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105769, 2018-Ohio-4849, 2018 WL 6433103, and State v. Kelley , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87324, 2006-Ohio-5432, 2006 WL 2977513, on the question of whether the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Green , 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 689 N.E.2d 556 (1998), can be applied retroactively. The panel decision in this case found State v. Burrage , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63824, 1993 WL 398534 (Oct. 7, 1993), to be controlling.
From her judgment of conviction, appellant assigns the following error in her delayed appeal: I. THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED R.C. 2945.06 AND THE DICTATES OF STATE V. GREEN (1998), 81 OHIO ST.3d 100, 102-103, AND FAILED TO DEFINE PRIOR CALCULATION AND DESIGN IN VIOLATION OF OHIO LAW AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. In her sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea without convening a three-judge panel.
(emphasis added). See also State v. Green, 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ohio 1998); Ohio Criminal Rule 11. Under this law, an Ohio trial court must determine whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when accepting his guilty plea.
After taking this plea, the panel held an evidentiary hearing as required by R.C. 2945.06 and a plea hearing as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(3). See also State v. Green, 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 101, 689 N.E.2d 556 (1998). In advance of the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of various items of evidence and agreed that "the rules of evidence will not bar the admission of testimony and/or documentary evidence." At trial, Trooper Stanfield was the lone prosecution witness, recounting what he had learned in his investigation.