Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5633-13T3
06-09-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SIMMIE J. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.
Martin, Kane & Kuper, L.L.C. attorneys for appellant (Todd Drayton, on the brief). Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nathan C. Howe, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale and Hoffman. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Municipal Appeal No. 15-14-R. Martin, Kane & Kuper, L.L.C. attorneys for appellant (Todd Drayton, on the brief). Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nathan C. Howe, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from his de novo conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. We affirm.
At approximately 1:16 a.m., a State Trooper (the "Trooper") was patrolling on Route 22 East when he observed a vehicle with its emergency lights on, parked in the right shoulder. The Trooper pulled over to render assistance. He approached the vehicle and observed defendant sitting in the driver's seat. No one else was in the vehicle. The Trooper attempted to get defendant's attention and then detected an odor of alcohol from defendant's breath.
The Trooper, who had believed that the car engine was running, asked defendant to exit the vehicle and give him the car keys. As defendant opened the door, the Trooper heard a "chime" sound indicating that the keys remained in the ignition. Defendant exited the car stumbling. The Trooper noticed that defendant's speech was slurred and that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. The Trooper was unable to conduct a walk-and-turn test because defendant's inability to remain steady on his feet made the test unsafe. Defendant admitted to consuming wine at a bar.
Defendant submitted to an Alcotest showing that his blood alcohol content was .22.
A Municipal Court judge conducted a trial. The main issue during the hearing was whether defendant operated the vehicle. The Municipal Court judge took testimony from the Trooper, concluded that the Trooper was credible, and found defendant guilty of DWI based on observation evidence. Defendant's counsel indicated that this DWI conviction was defendant's third conviction for DWI.
The Municipal Court judge did not immediately sentence defendant.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division, where the judge conducted a de novo review of the record. The judge found defendant guilty of DWI based on the evidence presented to the Municipal Court. The judge rendered a lengthy opinion concluding that defendant operated the vehicle.
We are unable to determine whether the judge sentenced defendant.
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On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT [I]
[DEFENDANT'S] CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
POINT [II]
[DEFENDANT'S] CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS SAME RUNS AFOUL OF DECADES OF CONTROLLING LAW BY OUR HIGHEST COURTS.
(A) State v. Daly[, 64 N.J. 122 (1973),] Supports Reversal Of [Defendant's] Conviction.
(B) Daly's Progeny Supports Reversal Of [Defendant's] Conviction.
(C) The Present State Of The Law Supports Reversal Of [Defendant's] Conviction.
(D) The Interests Of Justice Support Reversal Of [Defendant's] Conviction.
After carefully considering the record and the briefs, we conclude that defendant's arguments are "without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion," R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge. We add the following brief remarks.
When a defendant appeals a decision made by a municipal court to the Law Division, the court is required to conduct a de novo review of the record, giving "due regard to the municipal judge's opportunity to view the witnesses and assess credibility." State v. Golin, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 481 (App. Div. 2003) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). On appeal from the Law Division's decision, we must determine whether the Law Division judge's findings "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162). Applying this standard, we see no error.
The term "operate" contained within N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is broadly construed and may be proven by competent direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2005). A vehicle may be operated for the purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 even when there is no "actual operation." State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 513 (1987). Moreover, it is well-established that an officer's subjective observation of a defendant is a sufficient ground to sustain a DWI conviction. See State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251-52 (App. Div. 2001) (sustaining DWI conviction based on officer's observations of watery eyes, slurred and slow speech, staggering, inability to perform field sobriety tests, and the defendant's admission to drinking alcohol earlier in the day).
Here, defendant admitted to the Trooper that he drank wine that evening; the Trooper detected an odor of alcohol coming from defendant's breath; no one else was in the car; it was approximately 1:16 in the morning; the car was parked on the shoulder of a highway with its emergency lights activated; the car was pointed in the direction of defendant's home; defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery; the keys were in the ignition; he stumbled as he exited the vehicle; and defendant was unstable on his feet, to the point where the Trooper did not conduct a walk-and-turn test for defendant's safety.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION