Opinion
No. 61098-8-I.
February 2, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-8-00427-2, Philip G. Hubbard, Jr., J., entered December 21, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, A.C.J., concurred in by Becker and Appelwick, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
G.M.N. appeals from his second degree criminal trespass conviction for unlawfully entering a Bellevue city park, in violation of RCW 9A.52.080. G.M.N. first argues that, under the "general-specific" rule of statutory interpretation, the State wrongly prosecuted him under the state criminal trespass statute because the Bellevue City Code specifically addresses unlawful entry into city parks. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that he was unlawfully in the park. Because this case involves overlapping laws enacted by different legislative bodies, the general-specific rule does not apply. Further, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support G.M.N.'s trespass conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
At 7:50 p.m. on September 30, 2006, Bellevue Police Officers Will Hallifax and Will Kliewer arrested G.M.N. for being present in Wildwood Park after dark, in violation of Bellevue City Code (B.C.C.) 3.43.330. Under that code provision, city parks close one-half hour after sunset, unless the city establishes another closing time. G.M.N. apparently liked to frequent the park after dark because Officer Hallifax had encountered him in the park at night on at least three occasions prior to the night of his arrest. On those occasions, Officer Hallifax explained to G.M.N. that it was illegal for him to be in the park after dark and asked him to leave the park.
The King County Prosecutor subsequently charged G.M.N. with second degree criminal trespass. See RCW 9A.52.080. Because G.M.N. was less than 18 years of age at the time of his arrest, he was tried as a juvenile. During G.M.N.'s fact-finding hearing, Officers Hallifax and Kliewer testified that the park's closing time was sunset, and that it was dark when they encountered G.M.N. The trial court also took judicial notice that sunset on the night of the arrest was 5:51 p.m. It then found G.M.N. guilty of second degree criminal trespass.
II
G.M.N. first asserts that, under the "general-specific" rule of statutory interpretation, the State should not have charged him under Washington's general criminal trespass statute. The general-specific rule provides that "when a legislative body creates a specific law as a subset of a general law, the legislature intended that persons who commit the more specific act should be punished under the specific law or not at all." City of Seattle v. Hammon, 131 Wn. App. 801, 807, 130 P.3d 385 (2006) (citing State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d 576, 583, 681 P.2d 237 (1984)). However, the general-specific rule applies only to cases involving laws passed by the same legislative body. Hammon, 131 Wn. App. at 807-08. "Where two separate legislative bodies . . . create overlapping but not conflicting laws to address the same issue, the legislative intent supporting the general and specific rule is not applicable." Hammon, 131 Wn. App. at 807-08 (citing City of Seattle v. Barrett, 58 Wn. App. 698, 794 P.2d 862 (1990)). Thus, G.M.N.'s present claim is unavailing. There was no error.
III
G.M.N. next argues that insufficient evidence was introduced at trial to support the trial court's determination that the park closed one-half hour after sunset. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006). We must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d at 8. "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence" and all reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only when no rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 155 Wn.2d 496, 501, 120 P.3d 559 (2005). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004).
Courts interpret municipal ordinances in the same manner as they interpret statutes. Ford Motor Co. v. City of Seattle, Exec. Servs. Dep't, 160 Wn.2d 32, 41, 156 P.3d 185 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1224, 170 L.Ed.2d 61 (2008). Issues of statutory interpretation, including a law's application and meaning, are reviewed de novo. Woods v. Kittitas County, 162 Wn.2d 597, 607, 174 P.3d 25 (2007). When a statute is clear on its face, its plain meaning should "be derived from the language of the statute alone." Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wn.2d 16, 20-21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). An undefined statutory term "should be given its 'usual and ordinary meaning.'" Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422-23, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005) (quoting State v. Hahn, 83 Wn. App. 825, 832, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)). We avoid constructions that would render a portion of a statute "meaningless or superfluous." State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 277, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001).
The parks ordinance provides that "[u]nless another closing time has been established for a particular park by the city manager or his or her designee, parks shall close one-half hour after sunset." B.C.C. 3.43.330. It does not assign a special meaning to the term "shall." When a statute uses the term "shall" it ordinarily means that some action is mandatory. See, e.g., Kabbae v. Dep't of Social Health Servs., 144 Wn. App. 432, 443, 192 P.3d 903 (2008). Despite this language, G.M.N. asserts that no closing time was proved because the city manager may establish "another closing time," at variance with the ordinance's presumptive closing time. However, the trial record is devoid of any evidence of such an action being taken. The testimony as to the closing time was to the contrary. The evidence in the record supports the trial court's factual determination.
Officer Hallifax's testimony supports the conclusion that Wildwood Park's closing time was one-half hour after sunset. He testified that it was a violation of the parks ordinance to be in a park after "dusk" or "sundown." Further, he was not aware of any exceptions to the mandatory closing time, and he testified there is a sign at Wildwood Park that states "the park is closed after dark." Contrary to G.M.N.'s argument, the absence of direct evidence that the city manager had not established another closing time for the park does not create reasonable doubt about the park's closing time. Based on the ordinance's plain meaning and Officer Hallifax's uncontroverted testimony, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Wildwood Park was closed one-half hour after sunset.
IV
Finally, G.M.N. contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that he was in the park one-half hour after sunset. He specifically argues that the court improperly took judicial notice that the sun set on the evening of G.M.N.'s arrest at 5:51 p.m. because the court neither cited the source on which it relied nor gave him an opportunity to be heard on the matter, as required by ER 201(e). G.M.N. contends that the time of sunset was actually an hour later, at 6:51 p.m. In its briefing, but not in the trial record, the State agrees with G.M.N.'s factual recitation but urges us to take judicial notice of the correct time of sunset on appeal. We decline to do so.
Indeed, we need not resolve this dispute over judicial notice because the record evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that G.M.N. was in the park one-half hour after sunset. A trier of fact is expected to bring to bear common sense and everyday life experiences in determining whether the prosecution has proved an essential element of the charged offense. State v. Briggs, 55 Wn. App. 44, 58, 776 P.2d 1347 (1989) (citing United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1975)). Although neither Officer Hallifax nor Officer Kliewer testified as to the precise time of sunset, both testified that the sun had set and that it was "dark" when they arrested G.M.N. at 10 minutes before 8:00 p.m. on the last day in September. Nothing indicates that the trial court relied on its taking of judicial notice, to the exclusion of the other evidence in the record, in making its factual determinations. Viewing the officers' testimony in the light in which we are compelled to do, and in light of common sense and experience, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that when G.M.N. was arrested it was at least one-half hour after sunset in Bellevue, Washington on the day in question. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that G.M.N. had entered and remained in the park unlawfully.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: