State v. Giessinger

15 Citing cases

  1. State v. Ashley W. (In re Ashley W.)

    284 Neb. 424 (Neb. 2012)   Cited 16 times
    Ordering suppression of evidence derived from consent search made during unlawful stop

    State v. Rodgers, 237 Neb. 506, 466 N.W.2d 537 (1991). See State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990).State v. Rodgers, supra note 6.

  2. Murphy v. State

    864 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1993)   Cited 10 times
    Finding appellant lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of roadblock under nearly identical circumstances

    However, an investigative stop of a vehicle is justified where a law enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion founded upon articulable facts which indicate that a crime has been committed or is being committed by occupants of a vehicle. State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289, 292-93 (1990). A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in the light of the facts known to the officer at the time.

  3. State v. McCleery

    251 Neb. 940 (Neb. 1997)   Cited 17 times
    Holding approaching motorist who turns around and drives away rather than pass through a checkpoint does not trigger reasonable suspicion for a stop

    See, State v. Ellington, supra; State v. Hicks, 241 Neb. 357, 488 N.W.2d 359 (1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1000, 113 S. Ct. 1625, 123 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1993). In State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990), we held that there was a sufficiently reasonable suspicion for a stop based on an observation that the vehicle approaching a checkpoint pulled over onto the shoulder and the driver and the passenger then proceeded to switch places. We have, however, not addressed the validity of a stop where the driver stopped her vehicle one-fourth of a block from a sobriety checkpoint and then backed away from the checkpoint.

  4. State v. Skiles

    938 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Skiles, 938 S.W.2d 447 (1997), the Court of Criminal Appeals, en banc, held that a group of police officers were not conducting an illegal roadblock by standing in a highly congested area and observing motorists for traffic violations.

    Green v. State, 530 So.2d 480 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988), rev. denied, 539 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1989) (holding that even though roadblock was illegal, motorist's detention for failing to stop his vehicle when directed to do so was valid); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (App. 1987) (holding that regardless of the constitutionality of the roadblock, officers possessed sufficient articulable facts to seize the driver when the driver proceeded through the roadblock at a high rate of speed without stopping); (2) when the vehicle stops and the driver and passenger change places just before reaching the roadblock. State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990) (regardless of the legality of the roadblock, driver's actions provided a basis independent of the roadblock which justified his stop); (3) or when the vehicle avoids the roadblock in a suspicious manner. Coffman v. State, 26 Ark. App. 45, 759 S.W.2d 573 (1988) (holding that an unlawful roadblock will not infect, because of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, the validity of a motorist's arrest when the motorist reverses direction in order to avoid the roadblock); Tims v. State, 26 Ark. App. 102, 760 S.W.2d 78 (1988), modified on other grounds, 26 Ark. App. 102, 770 S.W.2d 211 (1989) (attempt to avoid roadblock gave officers reasonable suspicion regardless of the constitutionality of the roadblock); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994) (motorist acting to avoid roadblock by itself constitutes reasonable suspicion despite officers not adhering to the regulations for operating the roadblock); Stroud v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 370 S.E.2d 721 (1988) (cons

  5. State v. Stott

    243 Neb. 967 (Neb. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    Holding § 25-1233 does not violate compulsory process clauses of Sixth Amendment to U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 11, of Nebraska Constitution

    With regard to the search of the informant's automobile, we have held that "an occupant of an automobile has a legitimate expectation to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion so as to give the occupant standing to challenge the stop as violative of his or her Fourth Amendment rights." State v. Chavez, 240 Neb. 538, 543, 483 N.W.2d 122, 125 (1992), citing State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990). Accord State v. Harms, 233 Neb. 882, 449 N.W.2d 1 (1989).

  6. State v. Chavez

    240 Neb. 538 (Neb. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    We have often stated that an occupant of an automobile has a legitimate expectation to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion so as to give the occupant standing to challenge the stop as violative of his or her Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990). It has been further held that an investigative stop of a vehicle is justified where a law enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion founded upon articulable facts which indicate that a crime has been committed or is being committed by occupants of the vehicle.

  7. State v. D'Angelo

    605 A.2d 68 (Me. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    Finding reasonable suspicion when defendant's vehicle turned into private driveway 75 yards before checkpoint, officer knew some residents of home but had never seen defendant's vehicle parked there, and occupants of vehicle did not exit after stopping engine and turning off lights but instead turned to observe police activities

    Other states have also concluded that avoidance may, under certain circumstances, give rise to a "reasonable and articulable suspicion." Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. App. 4th Dist. 1989); State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990); Coffman v. State, 26 Ark. App. 45, 759 S.W.2d 573 (1988); Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 149 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987). The entry is:

  8. State v. Kieckhafer

    471 N.W.2d 135 (Neb. 1991)

    To postulate that an officer who has observed a person who emits the odor of alcohol leave a bar, fall getting into his automobile, spend hours in a deep sleep, and later drive his automobile improperly does not have grounds to form the reasonable suspicion needed to stop the person and arrest him after he failed to satisfactorily perform field sobriety tests appears untenable. E.g., State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990). However, we do not reach the question, for at trial Kieckhafer, without in any way preserving his earlier objection, stipulated to the admission of the very evidence he had earlier argued should have been suppressed.

  9. State v. Rodgers

    237 Neb. 506 (Neb. 1991)   Cited 11 times

    Objection to the admission of evidence is not timely unless it is made at the earliest opportunity after the ground for the objection becomes apparent. State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990). Clearly, the defendant failed to timely object to the State's evidence.

  10. State v. Cortis

    237 Neb. 97 (Neb. 1991)   Cited 35 times
    In State v. Cortis, 237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132 (1991), the guest had stayed overnight on prior occasions, but the host had not seen the guest for two or three weeks before the search.

    Olson, supra at 110 S.Ct. at 1687. See, also, State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990) (standing to assert fourth amendment violation premised on person claiming the protection of the amendment having a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place); State v. Harms, 233 Neb. 882, 449 N.W.2d 1 (1989). Applying the foregoing test, the Olson Court held, "We need go no further than to conclude, as we do, that Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."