Opinion
NO. 2016 KA 0903
10-28-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. QUINCY JOSEPH GAUDET
JOSEPH L. WAITZ, JR. DISTRICT ATTORNEY ELLEN DAIGLE DOSKEY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY HOUMA, LA ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA SHERRY WAITERS NEW ORLEANS, LA ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT QUINCY JOSEPH GAUDET
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 32nd Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Terrebonne, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 700,751
Honorable David W. Arceneaux, Judge JOSEPH L. WAITZ, JR.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ELLEN DAIGLE DOSKEY
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
HOUMA, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
STATE OF LOUISIANA SHERRY WAITERS
NEW ORLEANS, LA ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
QUINCY JOSEPH GAUDET BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND DRAKE, JJ. PETTIGREW, J.
The defendant, Quincy Joseph Gaudet, was charged by amended bill of information with simple criminal damage to property valued at $50,000.00 or more, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:56(B)(3) (count one); and two counts of unauthorized use of a movable valued in excess of $500.00, violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:68 (counts two and three). He pled not guilty and filed a motion for a bench trial and waiver of jury, which was granted. Following his bench trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. He filed motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, both of which were denied.
The State filed a habitual offender bill of information, and the defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the bill. The defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill of information, which was denied. After a hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender as to all counts. On count one, the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. On counts two and three, the defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor on each count, without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The district court ordered the sentences on each count to run concurrently. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. He now appeals, alleging four assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudications, and sentences.
The defendant's predicate convictions include: (1) a December 4, 2013 conviction for DWI, third offense, under Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, docket No. 3-12-1075; and (2) a June 24, 2013 conviction for theft over $1,500.00, under Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafourche, docket No. 498,666. --------
FACTS
On May 25, 2015, Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office Deputy Charles Cook was dispatched to 5322 Highway 56, in Chauvin, Louisiana, in response to a report that a bulldozer was in a canal at a Ceres Environmental worksite. Upon arriving at approximately 5 p.m., Deputy Cook observed the bulldozer partially submerged in the canal. He also observed that another machine (to the best of his memory, an excavator) appeared to have been tampered with as well, as its lights had been turned on. The defendant, a heavy equipment operator with Ceres Environmental, was identified as a suspect. Deputy Cook located the defendant at Marty J's Casino (Marty J's) and spoke with him there. According to Deputy Cook, it was apparent that the defendant had been drinking, but he was not intoxicated to a level at which he could not understand his rights. The deputy asked the defendant for his license, and when the defendant retrieved it from his vehicle, the deputy noticed "some form of algae" that looked like it came out of a bayou on the inside of the vehicle. The deputy also noticed that the driver and passenger sides of the vehicle were wet, and there was what appeared to be fresh mud all over the floorboard. According to Deputy Cook, at this point in time, the defendant appeared "fidgety" and "nervous." He told Deputy Cook that he went to the Ceres Environmental worksite after hours with a female and operated a Link-Belt excavator machine. He stated that once he was finished, he parked the machine and left. He denied operating a bulldozer. The defendant was then transported to the detective bureau, arrested, and transported to jail.
Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office Detective Chris Dehart interviewed the defendant at the detective bureau. The defendant initially denied being at the worksite but later said that he was there with a female. The defendant claimed that he was on the Link-Belt excavator, showing the female how it was operated, when he observed teenagers, whom he did not know, arrive on the property, get on the bulldozer, and drive it into the bayou.
The defendant testified at trial. According to his testimony, he had forty-two years of experience as a heavy equipment operator. The defendant explained that on the day of the incident, he went to Marty J's with "Melissa" and then the two of them went to the Piggly Wiggly store. He claimed that while inside of the store, he heard the backup alarm on the bulldozer located at the Ceres Environmental worksite, which he estimated was 1,200 to 1,500 feet away. The defendant and Melissa went to the worksite to check the alarm. Before they arrived, the defendant testified he observed kids jumping off of the equipment. He claimed that the kids rode a blue four-wheeler out of the area, and two boys paddled a pirogue down the bayou. He described everyone "running all kind of ways." He claimed that he also saw one of his Honduran coworkers fishing about a mile south of the location of the incident. Initially, the defendant stated that when he arrived at the worksite, he "jumped" on the back of the bulldozer, noticed a boy heading north, and followed the boy. He later explained that when he arrived at the worksite, the Link-Belt excavator's engine was running and its bucket was off of the ground. He testified that he got inside, put the bucket down, turned off the machine, and left the key on the dashboard. He claimed that he then walked down the levee and talked with Melissa. When he turned around, he saw that the bulldozer was sliding into the canal, and he also saw a four-wheeler heading south. He claimed that he got in the water and got inside of the bulldozer to make sure no one was inside. According to the defendant, he then brought Melissa back to the house, showered, and then he returned to the worksite. He denied operating the bulldozer and claimed that it was "condemned" and sliding in the canal before he approached.
SUFFICIENCY
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to prove that he possessed the criminal intent to damage property or that there was any "use" of the two pieces of construction equipment. He contends the State further failed to prove the identity of the perpetrator who committed the offenses, "if they were offenses."
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see La. Code Crim. P. art. 821B; State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821B, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the fact finder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. See State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051; State v. Davis, 2001-3033 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163-64.
The defendant was charged with unauthorized use of a movable and simple criminal damage to property. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:68A provides:
Unauthorized use of a movable is the intentional taking or use of a movable which belongs to another, either without the other's consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the movable permanently. The fact that the movable so taken or used may be classified as an immovable, according to the law pertaining to civil matters, is immaterial.Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:56A(1) provides, in pertinent part, "Simple criminal damage to property is the intentional damaging of any property of another, without the consent of the owner, and except as provided in [La.] R.S. 14:55, by any means other than fire or explosion." To support a conviction for simple criminal damage to property, the State must prove an intentional damaging of another's property. Simple criminal damage to property is a general intent crime. See State v. Shaw, 37-168 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/03), 850 So.2d 868, 875.
Criminal intent may be specific or general. See La. R.S. 14:11. General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act of failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(2). The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. See State v. Moriarty, 2007-0361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/07), 2007 WL 1828952 *2 (unpublished).
A superintendent for Ceres Environmental, Troy Boudreaux, testified that on May 25, 2015, he and other Ceres employees were at the worksite until 3:30 p.m. The bulldozer was parked approximately fifteen feet from the canal, and no keys were left in the machine. After leaving the worksite, Boudreaux drove to Marty J's to purchase a cup of coffee. While there, he saw the defendant who introduced him to a woman who was with him. The defendant was standing at an ATM machine withdrawing cash. According to Boudreaux, the defendant was dressed casually, wearing jeans and brown "Croc looking" flip-flops, and appeared to be intoxicated. After purchasing his cup of coffee, Boudreaux returned home. He was home less than twenty-five minutes later. Approximately thirty minutes after arriving home, he received a telephone call advising him that a bulldozer was in the canal on the worksite.
He immediately drove back to the worksite, and in route, was able to contact all of his employees by telephone, with the exception of the defendant, to ascertain that they all had possession of their keys to the company equipment, and to ask them to meet him back at the worksite. Boudreaux was unable to locate the defendant, and he did not see him when he first arrived at the worksite. Boudreaux observed only a partial cab of the bulldozer; the rest of it was completely underwater. A tracking device on the bulldozer indicated that it had been started at 4:36 p.m. and stopped two minutes later, at 4:38 p.m. Boudreaux also noticed that another machine (the excavator) had been moved, and there was now a ramp leading to it that was not there when he left for the day earlier that afternoon.
Ultimately, the defendant arrived at the worksite. Boudreaux noticed that the back of the defendant's pants, from his waist down to his knees, was "sopping wet," and it appeared that he had just gotten out of the shower. Boudreaux also noticed that the defendant was wearing different clothes than he had seen him wearing earlier at Marty J's, and he was wearing a brand new pair of boots instead of the brown flip-flops. When Boudreaux realized how intoxicated the defendant was, he asked him to leave the worksite. The men were able to pull the bulldozer out of the canal, and when they did so, Boudreaux saw a pair of brown flip-flops nearby that looked like the ones he had seen the defendant wearing earlier that day. (Ceres Environmental's general superintendent later testified that the flip-flops had come floating up from underneath the bulldozer as it was pulled out of the canal.)
An employee at Marty J's testified that she saw the defendant at the casino on May 25, 2015, a woman met him there, and they left together. According to the employee, the defendant later returned alone and asked if he could exchange four twenty-dollar bills because his cash was wet. He stated the cash was wet because he "went swimming."
Deputy Cook testified that on the evening of the incident, he went to a house owned by Ceres Environmental to house its employees, including the defendant. He observed a recently washed shirt and a pair of jeans inside of the washing machine. He also noticed that the shower inside of the defendant's bathroom had recently been used.
Ceres Environmental general superintendent Huey Deville testified that the Link-Belt excavator was valued at $267,000.00, and the bulldozer was valued at $267,470.00. The excavator had been moved after working hours and had an extra unaccounted for hour of operation on its recording system. According to Deville, he talked to the defendant while he was still at the worksite after the incident, and the defendant told him, "We put them in, and you get them out." Deville explained that one month prior to this incident, another operator's machine slid into the water, and Deville pulled the machine out. When the defendant testified, he claimed he made that statement after he helped Boudreaux hook up the bulldozer to get it ready to be pulled out of the canal. He claimed that after he and Boudreaux attached the hooks, they waited for Deville to arrive to pull the bulldozer out of the canal. According to the defendant, when Deville arrived, he put his arm around Deville and stated, "[w]e put it in; you pull it out" because everything was already hooked up.
In its reasons for judgment, the district court noted that the defendant's own testimony established that he was on the worksite when the bulldozer went into the canal, that he went into the water, and that he used the excavator. The district court concluded, "there's no doubt he was in the water. The bulldozer was in the water. There's no doubt he was on the excavator, and there's no doubt he was using the excavator." The district court noted that the evidence revealed the defendant was seen wearing one set of clothes when he was seen at Marty J's prior to the report that the bulldozer was in the canal, and a different set of clothes thereafter. Additionally, the testimony established that he used wet money at Marty J's, and there was algae on the floorboard of his vehicle. Also, the flip-flops found near the bulldozer matched those that the defendant was seen wearing shortly before the incident.
The district court also addressed the defendant's intent to damage the bulldozer. The district court pointed out that it was possible that the defendant was simply trying to impress a young woman and accidentally drove the bulldozer into the canal. That court stated that had the defendant testified as such, the court might have believed him. As noted by the district court, any testimony of an accidental occurrence would have been a "more [believable] story than [the defendant] watched some Hondurans and other interlopers trespassing, and move it, and that it [slipped] in[to] the canal on its own, and that [the defendant] tried to save the day ... [.]" Additionally, the district court noted that, despite allegedly having seen the bulldozer slide into the canal, the defendant fled the scene and did not report the incident to anyone. The district court concluded:
But I think [the defendant] was intoxicated. He got on two pieces of heavy equipment while intoxicated. One piece of equipment very close to the canal, and that under those circumstances when he wasn't supposed to be there operating the machinery, he caused one machine to go into the canal and then didn't tell anybody. He [fled] and lied about it.
When I add all of those factors up, I think there's more than enough evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of simple criminal damage to [property] and unauthorized use of the equipment.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. Thus, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135.
Any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State could find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of simple criminal damage to property and unauthorized use of a movable. The district court rejected the defendant's hypothesis of innocence. The district court noted that the bulldozer required a key to run, the defendant had a key to the bulldozer, and it was "not likely that interlopers had a key to the bulldozer." When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the fact finder reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). No such hypothesis exists in this case. Additionally, the district court rejected the testimony offered by the defendant and accepted the testimony offered against him. Despite the defendant's contention, Deville testified that there had never been a problem with teenagers, or anyone else, coming into this area of the worksite after hours and operating machinery.
On review, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. When there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Lofton, 96-1429 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1365, 1368, writ denied, 97-1124 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331.
Further, in reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the district court's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented herein. See Ordodi, 946 So.2d at 662. The defendant's own testimony established that he was on the scene at the time the bulldozer went into the canal, that he was wet from being in the canal, and that he used the excavator. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the fact finder. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Therefore, we find no merit to this assignment of error.
MOTION IN LIMINE
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine which sought to exclude evidence that was not provided by the State during discovery. He argues that his rights to due process and to prepare a defense were violated.
On the first day of trial, prior to opening statements, defense counsel noted that she intended to file a motion in limine based on notice it received from the State the day before trial. The notice of intent notified the defendant that the State intended to offer into evidence a statement allegedly made by the defendant to Huey Deville, on May 25, 2015, while Deville was surveying the submerged bulldozer, that the defendant approached Deville, put his arm around his shoulders, and said, "We put 'em in, you pull 'em out." The State responded by noting that disclosure was made within thirty minutes of the receipt of the information by its office. The defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the statement and arguing that it was not disclosed previously through discovery. In his motion, the defendant complained that the notice of intent to introduce the inculpatory statement was not received by him until the day before trial.
At the hearing on the motion, the State again argued that as soon as it was made aware of the statement, it notified the defendant by faxing the notice of intent to defense counsel's office. Additionally, as soon as the State was made aware of the fact that Deputy Cook was wearing a body camera on the scene, it obtained a copy of the video and provided a copy to defense counsel as soon as possible. Defense counsel confirmed that she viewed the video and that it did not reveal any information regarding whether the statement was made by the defendant. The body camera video was not introduced into evidence. Further, defense counsel confirmed that the notice was faxed to her office at 4:52 p.m. the day before trial, but argued that the defendant was prejudiced because she was unable to prepare his case and advise defendant effectively.
The district court denied the motion, noting that the defendant had the opportunity to testify as to the nature and intended meaning of the statement, and there was evidence that the statement was made in front of others who may be able to testify. The district court stated that it did not see how calling witnesses to prove the statement was never made would neither change nor prejudice the defendant's trial strategy in any significant regard. The district court concluded that it would give the statement the weight to which it was entitled depending on the circumstances surrounding the alleged statement.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 768 provides:
Unless the defendant has been granted pretrial discovery, if the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the defendant in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement. If it fails to do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in evidence.The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the mandates of Article 768 are generally unnecessary in bench trials. See State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La. 1983); State v. Ohrberg, 448 So.2d 1316, 1321 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). Therefore, the State was not required to give advance written notice of its intent to use the statement because the instant case was a bench trial. Because the State was under no obligation to file the notice, and because the record reveals that such notice was actually filed prior to the State's opening statement, this assignment of error is without merit. See State v. Robins, 499 So.2d 94, 100 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writs denied, 500 So.2d 411 (La. 1986).
HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION
In his third assignment of error, the defendant contends that the district court erred in finding him to be a third-felony habitual offender because the State failed to prove his identity as the same person who pled guilty to the predicate offenses. Specifically, the defendant argues that the evidence presented by the State failed to establish that he was "properly identified" because the probation officer who testified at his hearing did not meet him until after he was in jail for the instant charges. In the alternative, the defendant argues that DWI, third offense, cannot constitute a predicate felony offense under Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1 because it is an enhanced misdemeanor.
To obtain a multiple-offender adjudication, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). In attempting to do so, the State may present: (1) testimony from witnesses; (2) expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant when compared with those in the prior record; (3) photographs in the duly authenticated record; or (4) evidence of identical driver's license number, sex, race, and date of birth. State v. Payton, 2000-2899 (La. 3/15/02), 810 So.2d 1127, 1130. The Habitual Offender Act does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence in order to carry its burden at the hearing, and the prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence. Id. at 1132.
In this case, the habitual offender bill of information alleged two predicate offenses: a December 4, 2013 conviction for DWI, third offense, under Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, docket No. 3-12-1075, and a June 24, 2013 conviction for theft over $1,500.00, under Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafourche, docket No. 498,666.
The defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill of information. In his motion, the defendant alleged that his two predicate convictions were obtained in violation of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions, because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights when he entered guilty pleas, and that when the pleas were entered, he was not advised of the possibility of future applicability of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1. The defendant also filed a motion for discovery related to the habitual offender proceedings wherein he requested a copy of his arrest and conviction records, guilty plea transcripts, commitment records, conviction records, fingerprint card, mug shots, name and address of individuals who took his fingerprints, and a certified copy of each alleged conviction.
A hearing on the motion to quash was held, and the State submitted certified copies of the court minutes, bill of information, sentencing transcript, and other docket reports in connection with the defendant's December 4, 2013 predicate conviction for DWI (third offense). It also submitted a certified copy of the bill of information, advice of rights form, sentencing sheet, sentencing transcript, and court minutes in connection with the defendant's June 24, 2013 predicate conviction for theft. After reviewing the evidence submitted by the State, the district court denied the motion to quash.
The motion for discovery was also taken up at the hearing on the motion to quash. Defense counsel stated that she had not received all of the documents that she requested in her motion for discovery. In reference to the fingerprint cards, mugshots, and the name of the person who took the defendant's fingerprints, the State responded that it did not intend to introduce those items. According to the State, it was informed that neither East Baton Rouge nor Lafourche Parishes had fingerprints taken in connection with these predicates. The State also did not have possession, nor did it intend to introduce, copies of defendant's mugshots.
Thereafter, the habitual offender adjudication hearing began. In order to establish the defendant's identity as the same person who committed the predicate offenses, the State called Michelle Naquin, with the State of Louisiana, Division of Probation and Parole, to testify. Naquin testified that she works in the Thibodaux district office and supervised the defendant while he was on probation for his East Baton Rouge and Lafourche offenses. Naquin identified the defendant in court and stated that she was unsure whether she met him prior to his incarceration, but that she had been in contact with him several times. Naquin testified that according to her records, the defendant's date of birth was August 1, 1961. She explained that the date of birth was established when the defendant presented himself to the probation and parole office for intake. According to Naquin, when the defendant presented himself to their office for intake, his date of birth was listed on his documents from Lafourche and East Baton Rouge Parishes. Naquin testified that her office double-checks the date of birth by asking the individual or by obtaining a copy of his license. Her office also takes fingerprints of the individual at that time. Additionally, Naquin's office checks the individual's social security number against their "rap sheet" by fingerprinting. The office makes a copy of the individual's social security card and records the individual's height, weight, hair color, and eye color. Naquin testified that the identifying information for the defendant provided by East Baton Rouge Parish and Lafourche Parish matched. Although Naquin was not present at the defendant's revocation hearing in East Baton Rouge, she was present at his revocation proceedings in Lafourche. She testified that the person she identified in the courtroom as the defendant was the same person who was present at those prior proceedings. According to Naquin, while the defendant was on probation under her supervision, at no time did he complain that she was supervising the wrong person. Naquin testified that she was one hundred percent positive that the person she identified in court was the same person that she had been supervising on the East Baton Rouge and Lafourche convictions.
At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel argued that the State failed to introduce any documentary evidence of the defendant's predicate convictions. The district court pointed out that the "real issue" was whether the defendant was the same person who was convicted in East Baton Rouge and Lafourche Parishes on the two predicate convictions. It pointed out that "the probation officer assigned to his case is here to tell me that he is. She has based that on the fact that she has come to know him and has met him and knows that man to be [the defendant]." The district court went on to explain that Naquin testified that she had conversations with the defendant, she believed him, and he never denied that he was on probation for the two predicate offenses. Further, the district court noted that Naquin depended on records that contained identifying information of the offender of the predicate offenses, including date of birth that coincided with "the identification of the same man named Quincy Joseph Gaudet with the same date of birth who is the individual prosecuted in this case." It concluded that considering all of the evidence, it was satisfied that the defendant was the same person who was convicted in East Baton Rouge and Lafourche Parishes. Defense counsel noted that it had no objection to the district court's adjudication of the defendant as a habitual offender.
After a thorough review of the record, we find no reason to disturb the district court's ruling. The trial on the instant offense was heard before the same judge who conducted the habitual offender hearing. At that bench trial, the defendant testified and admitted that he committed both the predicate offenses. The district court could properly take that testimony into account in finding that the State presented sufficient proof at the habitual offender hearing that the defendant was the same person who was guilty of the predicate offenses. See State v. Brown, 2011-1656 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232, 1234 (per curiam), citing State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 461, 462 (La. 1976) (A district court judge may take judicial notice during habitual offender proceedings "of any prior proceeding which was a part of the same case he had previously tried.")(Citation omitted). Considering the defendant's testimony at trial and Naquin's testimony at the habitual offender hearing, the district court did not err in determining that the defendant was the same person who committed the predicate offenses.
In the alternative, the defendant argues that the use of DWI, third offense, as a predicate to enhance the instant felony convictions "really was using a repeat misdemeanor status offense, not a true predicate felony." This issue was not raised by the defendant in his motion to quash the bill of information. Thus, he is precluded from raising a new basis or ground for his motion to quash on appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841. Nevertheless, penalties imposed under the DWI statute are not prohibited from being subsequently enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law. See State v. Lewis, 2012-1835 (La. 11/30/12), 104 So.3d 407, 409 (per curiam). Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
In his last assignment of error, the defendant argues that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive. Specifically, he contends that under his "circumstances, only the minimum sentences are constitutionally supportable." The defendant's "circumstances," as outlined in his brief are that he was fifty-three years old at the time of the offenses; he is a highly skilled and experienced heavy equipment operator; and, he had problems with alcohol that led to his two predicate convictions and the instant offenses.
Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982).
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the district court to consider when imposing sentences. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the district court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 2002-2231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569. A district court judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the district court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Thomas, 98-1144 (La. 10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49, 50 (per curiam).
The defendant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender. Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1A(3)(a) and 15:529.1G, the defendant was subject to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction at hard labor and without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Simple criminal damage to property, where the damage amounts to fifty thousand dollars or more, is punishable by a fine not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not less than one nor more than ten years, or both. Additionally, the person convicted may be ordered to make full restitution to the owner of the property. See La. R.S. 14:56B(3) & (4). Thus, on count one, the defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of six years and eight months to twenty years. On count one (simple criminal damage to property), the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.
Unauthorized use of a movable, valued in excess of $500.00, is punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both. See La. R.S. 14:68B. Thus, on counts two and three, the defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of three years and four months to ten years. On counts two and three, on each count, the defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the district court ordered that the sentences run concurrently with each other and that imposed on count one.
Prior to imposing the sentences, the district court noted that it considered the criteria set forth in Article 894.1. It pointed out that the defendant's instant offenses as well as his predicate offenses were not crimes of violence, but occurred within a short period of time. Finally, the district court noted that the sentences that it would impose would be concurrent.
We find the record adequately supports the sentences imposed. Considering the reasons given by the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentences imposed. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to any of the defendant's assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and the sentences imposed. CONVICTIONS, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATIONS, AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.