Opinion
No. 29112-0-III.
April 12, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Douglas County, No. 10-1-00023-6, John Hotchkiss, J., entered June 1, 2010.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Korsmo, A.C.J., and Siddoway, J.
Travis Garaas appeals his convictions for illegally possessing a controlled substance and a dangerous weapon. He contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion, arguing the police exceeded Terry stop limits. We disagree, and affirm.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
FACTS
On February 1, 2010, Douglas County Sheriffs Deputy Michael Baker ran a Department of Licensing (DOL) check through his mobile computer for the license plate on a vehicle in front of him. Deputy Baker learned the vehicle's registered owner, Nicholas Malmberg, had a suspended license. The deputy followed the vehicle, pulled into a lot behind the parked car and activated his lights. Deputy Baker contacted the driver and asked if he was Nicholas Malmberg. The driver said he was not Mr. Malmberg. Deputy Baker asked the driver for his driver's license to identify the driver and dispel his suspicions. The driver, Travis Garaas, identified himself by handing the deputy an old, tattered, and partially broken Washington state photo identification card. Deputy Baker visually confirmed the picture on the card matched Mr. Garaas.
Concerned Mr. Garaas did not have a valid driver's license, the deputy again asked for a driver's license. Mr. Garaas responded he thought his license was suspended. Deputy Baker ran Mr. Garaas' name through dispatch and learned he had no driver's license and multiple warrants existed for his arrest. Deputy Baker arrested Mr. Garaas on the warrants. Searching incident to arrest, Deputy Baker located brass knuckles and a baggie of marijuana in Mr. Garaas' jacket pocket. Searching the area around the vehicle, the deputy discovered a baggie of methamphetamine. After the deputy gave Miranda warnings, Mr. Garaas acknowledged ownership and possession of the brass knuckles and marijuana, but denied knowledge of the methamphetamine.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The State charged Mr. Garaas with possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine, possession of a dangerous weapon — brass knuckles, and possession of marijuana, less than 40 grams. Mr. Garaas unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence found on his person and outside the vehicle. The court entered written suppression findings. Following a stipulated facts bench trial, the court found Mr. Garaas guilty as charged. Mr. Garaas appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Travis Garaas' suppression motion. Mr. Garaas contends Deputy Baker exceeded Terry stop limits, but does not challenge the trial court's findings.
We review a trial court's denial of a suppression motion to determine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and whether these findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999), overruled on other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007). When the appellant does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact, they are considered verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). We review the court's suppression hearing conclusions de novo. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).
A seizure occurs when an officer's display of authority restrains a person's freedom of movement. State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). The parties agree Deputy Baker seized Mr. Garaas under these facts. But whether a seizure occurred and whether that seizure was valid are separate inquiries. See O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 575-76.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution protect the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 736, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). A warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls into a narrow exception to the rule. Id. These exceptions are "`jealously and carefully drawn.'" Id. (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979). One warrant exception is a brief investigatory stop. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889. A Terry stop first requires a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that a person is engaged in criminal conduct. Id. at 21-22; State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). A Terry stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference. Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 739.
Under RCW 46.20.349 a deputy may stop a vehicle registered to a person whose driver's license has been suspended. A report of a suspended license from the DOL provides reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct sufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Phillips, 126 Wn. App. 584, 588, 109 P.3d 470 (2005). Mr. Garaas argues the seizure became unreasonable because Deputy Baker exceeded the permissible Terry stop limits under State v. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 22 P.3d 293 (2001).
In Penfield, the officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle whose registered owner, a woman, had a suspended license. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. at 159. The officer found the driver was a man. Id. Although the officer knew the driver could not be the registered owner, he nevertheless asked for the man's driver's license. Id. The driver, Mr. Penfield, told the officer his license was suspended. Id. Mr. Penfield was arrested and methamphetamine was seized in a subsequent vehicle search. Id. This court held that once the officer determined the driver was not the registered owner of the vehicle, he had no other articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the request for Mr. Penfield's driver's license. Id. at 162. This court called its Penfield holding "an exception" in Phillips. Phillips, 126 Wn. App. at 588. Normally, an officer is allowed to dispel his suspicion that a registered owner of a vehicle with a suspended license is operating their vehicle by identifying the driver of that vehicle. Id. RCW 46.20.349 specifically allows an officer to request the driver's license of any person operating a vehicle that is registered to a person with a suspended license.
Mr. Garaas argues his case is like Penfield because "[i]t [is] quite possible that once Deputy Baker observed Mr. Garaas he would have known he was not Nicholas Malmberg." Br. of Appellant at 8. He argues since Deputy Baker "had a description of the registered owner readily available to him[,] . . . [i]t was incumbent on him to avail himself of that information before he made contact and required Mr. Garaas to produce identification." Br. of Appellant at 8. We disagree. Unlike Penfield, Deputy Baker initially observed a male was driving the stopped vehicle, the same gender as the registered owner. Thus, it was reasonable for Deputy Baker to request Mr. Garaas' driver's license to clarify the male's identity.
Mr. Garaas next argues once Deputy Baker learned Mr. Garaas' identity, the validity of the stop ceased; if the results of the initial stop dispel an officer's suspicions, the investigation should cease. Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 739-40. But, Mr. Garaas presented his identification card to Deputy Baker instead of a driver's license, causing the deputy to suspect Mr. Garaas did not have a valid driver's license. The Penfield court noted that "[o]ther facts may exist to create a suspicion that the driver may not have the owner's permission to use the automobile or that the driver is engaged in some other criminal activity." Penfield, 106 Wn. App. at 162. Deputy Baker acted reasonably in requesting Mr. Garaas' driver's license a second time, even after recognizing that he was not the registered owner of the vehicle. And, the deputy was further justified in detaining Mr. Garaas to investigate his suspended-license statement via dispatch and check for warrants. RCW 46.61.021.
In sum, Deputy Baker's investigation was reasonable. The trial court properly denied Mr. Garaas' suppression motion.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Siddoway, J. and Korsmo, A.C.J., concur.