Opinion
No. C8-03-394.
Filed: September 23, 2003.
Appeal from Hennepin County District Court, File No. 01033130.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael K. Walz, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Michael F. Cromett, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Minge, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Georgia Ruth Furr challenges the revocation of her probation for an underlying second-degree assault conviction, alleging that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the rehabilitative policies favoring probation outweigh the need for confinement. Because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that appellant required a more structured setting, such as prison, in order to successfully complete rehabilitative therapies, we affirm.
DECISION
The district court's decision in a probation revocation matter will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hamilton, 646 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn.App. 2002), review denied, (Minn. Sept. 25, 2002). When revoking probation, the district court must (1) specify the condition or conditions that were violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the rehabilitative policies favoring probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. "The decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender's behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity." Id. at 251 (quotations omitted).
The district court here revoked probation after finding that appellant (1) accumulated three probation violations in little more than one year; (2) failed to complete an anger management class, despite repeated orders to do so; and (3) required a more structured setting, such as prison, in order to complete the various rehabilitative therapies.
Appellant argues that her most recent psychological evaluation, which discusses serious mental health issues that could prevent her from being successful on probation, suggests that treatment for these mental health issues would permit her to complete community-based alternatives to prison. That evaluation, however, also recommends highly structured, intense individual therapy, chemical dependency support, and court supervision to assure compliance. In addition, the evaluator does not state a preference for community-based options over prison-based therapies. Given this, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by determining that appellant required a more structured setting, such as prison.
Because there is sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision, the court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant's probation.