Summary
In Freemont, our court noted that providing alcohol to the runaway and commiting a sex crime against her did not provide the requisite intent under section 710.8(3), but that conclusion was coupled with a factual scenario under which the defendant did not provide aid, support, or shelter to the runaway.
Summary of this case from State v. Sierra-RojasOpinion
No. 4-290 / 03-0139.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.
Royce Freemont appeals from the district court order convicting him of harboring a runaway in violation of Iowa Code section 710.8(3) (2001). REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Drew Bockenstedt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Eisenhauer, J., and Snell, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
Defendant, Royce Lamont Freemont, appeals from his conviction for harboring a runaway person in violation of Iowa Code section 710.8(3) (2001). He claims there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support this conviction. Upon our review we now reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on this charge.
Defendant was also convicted of one count of sexual abuse in the third degree and providing alcohol to an underage person pursuant to sections 709.4(2)(c) (4) and 123.47(4). Those convictions have not been appealed. Defendant also claims that his trial was prejudiced due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. Factual Background.
The runaway person, K.T., had been living in the Winnebago Youth Facility, a juvenile detention center. She was fifteen years old. She tried twice to run away from the facility and succeeded on the second try. Also running away from the detention center with K.T. was T.F., a fourteen-year-old girl. After eluding capture for a day, she and T.F. began staying at a house in Sioux City, Iowa. The house was occupied by T.F.'s mother and T.F.'s older brothers Letto Freemont and Royce Freemont, the defendant. Royce was twenty-seven years old at the time.
K.T. ate meals at the house, was given shelter there and spent several nights. K.T. claimed that everyone except the person who owned the house knew the girls were runaways; a total of thirteen people were living there. She slept in the same room as T.F. and T.F.'s mother, Patricia Freeman. While T.F. was staying at the house, defendant slept on the couch in the living room.
On the third night, defendant and another male brought alcoholic beverages to the girls' room. They shared these beverages with the girls. K.T. recalled she drank a lot. The defendant made sexual advances to K.T. that were initially rebuffed. Eventually, however, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with K.T.
K.T. testified to having a second sexual encountered with defendant. It happened in a similar manner. After these events, K.T. continued to stay at the house another thirteen days. No further sexual incidents occurred with defendant during this time.
K.T. was returned to the juvenile detention center in Winnebago County. While there she told her counselor of the sexual intercourse with defendant, who was subsequently arrested and charged.
II. Error Preservation Scope of Review.
The State agrees that error was preserved on this issue by the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, arguments and the court's adverse ruling. See State v. Walker, 573 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1998).
Our supreme court has explained the scope of review for challenges to the sufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict. It said:
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict for corrections of errors of law. We will uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational fact-finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record, not just the evidence that supports the verdict.
The State must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.
State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 75-6 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion.
The crime defendant was charged with committing states:
Harboring a runaway child prohibited:
1.(b) "Harbor" means to provide aid, support, or shelter.
3. A person shall not harbor a runaway child with the intent of allowing the runaway child to remain away from home against the wishes of the child's parents, guardian or custodian.
The State argues that the ordinary dictionary definitions of aid, support or shelter supply the meaning of "harbor" and apply to convict defendant. It cites Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged 1993). Aid is defined as to give help, further, facilitate, assist, contribute or give assistance. Support is defined as to endure, to uphold by aid, countenance or adherence. Shelter incorporates the concept of providing a home or temporary accommodation or protection. The State claims that defendant was obligated to report K.T. to authorities as a runaway and when he failed to do so and gave her alcohol, he facilitated and encouraged her to remain away. This satisfies, the State argues, the generally accepted meaning of providing shelter, aid or support, i.e., "harboring."
This construction vastly broadens the import of the statute and is without support from the statutory wording. There is no reference in the statute to reporting runaways to authorities. Criminal statues are to be narrowly construed. See State v. Koplin, 402 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1987). Moreover, the evidence is clear that defendant had no ownership of the house nor control over the actions of others in the house where he stayed. He was merely a guest at the house, which defendant argued at trial. There is insufficient evidence that defendant provided "aid, support, or shelter"; or assisted her in remaining a runaway. Further, there is no evidence of defendant's intent to allow K.T. to remain away from home against the wishes of her parent, guardian, or custodian. Supplying K.T. with alcohol and committing a sex crime upon her does not supply that intent. The record also shows that after the assault was committed, K.T. remained in the home for almost two weeks without further assaults by defendant.
The evidence is not sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the charge against defendant at issue here. Defendant's motion at the end of the trial for acquittal on this charge should have been sustained.
Because of our disposition, we do not address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Reversed and remanded for entry of an acquittal on the charge appealed.