Opinion
2015-UP-362
07-15-2015
The State, Respondent, v. Martin Dameon Floyd, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2013-002736
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Submitted May 1, 2015
Appeal From Dorchester County Maité Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Martin Dameon Floyd appeals his conviction for first-degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict when the trial court found the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find (1) Floyd possessed the requisite intent to commit a crime at the time of entry into the subject property and (2) the subject property constituted a dwelling. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Floyd's motion for a directed verdict regarding whether the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Floyd possessed the requisite intent to commit a crime at the time of entry: State v. Phillips, 411 S.C. 124, 132, 767 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."); id. at 133, 767 S.E.2d at 448 ("A trial court must deny a directed verdict motion when the State presents . . . substantial circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant's guilt." (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Lane, 410 S.C. 505, 507, 765 S.E.2d 557, 558 (2014) (stating when there is "any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate c]ourt must find the case was properly submitted to the jury" (quoting State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006))).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Floyd's motion for a directed verdict regarding whether the subject property constituted a dwelling: State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 366, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding when interpreting a statute "[w]ords must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction which limits or expands the statute's operation"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A) (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling [at night] without consent and with intent to commit a crime . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310(2) (2003) (defining "dwelling" as "the living quarters of a building which is . . . normally used for sleeping, living, or lodging by a person"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310(1)(a) (2003) (defining "building" as "any structure . . . [w]here any person . . . lives"); State v. Glenn, 297 S.C. 29, 32, 374 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1988) ("[T]he test of whether a building is a dwelling house turns on whether the occupant has left with the intention to return."); State v. Evans, 376 S.C. 421, 425, 656 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]hile the temporary absence of occupants will not prevent a residence from becoming the subject of a burglary, it [is] required that the occupant leave with the purpose of returning in order for the [property to constitute a dwelling]."); id. (holding factors such as whether utilities are still on, and whether the home is ready to be lived in, are included in the concept of "intention to return").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
SHORT, LOCKEMY, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.