Opinion
No. 08-14-00013-CR
01-13-2016
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SILVIA FLORES, Appellee.
Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 4 of El Paso County, Texas (TC# 20120C05196) OPINION
Appellee Silvia Flores was charged with one count of assault causing bodily injury to a family member. Appellee moved to suppress two statements she made to a law enforcement officer shortly after the alleged offense occurred. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Appellee was in custody and should have been advised of her Miranda rights prior to questioning. The State appealed. We conclude the statements did not stem from a custodial interrogation and that no Miranda warnings were required. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
Appellee's assault charge arose from an incident that occurred at the El Paso County Courthouse when Appellee allegedly struck her ex-husband. At the hearing on Appellee's motion to suppress, El Paso County Deputy Sheriff Patrick Reyes testified that while on duty as a security officer at the entrance to the courthouse, he was approached by the alleged victim, who informed him that he had been assaulted by his ex-wife. The victim pointed out Appellee, who was standing nearby with their two children, and advised Reyes that he wanted to file charges for the assault. The victim informed Reyes that he and his family were at the courthouse to obtain a passport for one of their children, and that Appellee struck him in the face when he refused to pay for the passport.
Reyes testified Appellee then approached the security checkpoint, along with her two children, and appeared to be visibly upset. While Appellee was taking items from her purse and placing them on the x-ray machine's conveyer belt, Reyes twice asked Appellee "what happened," but Appellee ignored his questions. Reyes then asked Appellee if she "actually did assault the victim," and whether she had "hit" him. According to Reyes, Appellee responded: "I'm not going to lie. I did slap him."
While he was speaking with Appellee, Reyes noted that she had left money on the x-ray conveyer belt. Reyes picked up the money because people were continuing to enter through the checkpoint and he did not want the money to get lost or picked up by mistake. Reyes testified that when he attempted to give the money back to Appellee, she told him not to pick up what did not belong to him and to mind his own business. Reyes explained to Appellee that he had only picked up the money to return it to her, that he could not be responsible for the money, and that she needed to take control of the money. Appellee refused to take the money, advising Reyes that the money was intended for the victim, presumably to pay for their child's passport. Reyes testified that when he informed Appellee that she would need to give the money to the victim herself, Appellee grabbed the money out of his hand.
Reyes recalled that during the encounter, Appellee was becoming "irate" and was raising her voice. Because he believed Appellee's conduct was becoming disruptive, he attempted to escort Appellee to the courthouse security office. But, as he reached for her arm, Appellee pulled away, and told him to leave her alone and not to touch her. As Appellee continually attempted to push him away, Reyes informed Appellee that she was under arrest for assault family violence and escorted her to the courthouse security office. While in the office, Reyes again informed Appellee that she was under arrest and read Appellee her Miranda rights. According to Reyes, Appellee made no further statements after that time.
In his police report, Reyes stated that while he was attempting to escort Appellee to the courthouse security office, she was yelling and screaming, and swinging her elbows at him. Reyes' report stated that he initially informed Appellee that he was placing her under arrest for both the assault on her ex-husband and for resisting arrest. However, it does not appear that Appellee was ever charged with resisting arrest. At the suppression hearing, Appellee denied that she resisted arrest, contending that she turned away from Reyes when he took her arm simply because she wanted to check on the welfare of her children, who were standing nearby and were visibly upset.
On cross-examination, Reyes testified that he did not read Appellee her Miranda rights before she made her inculpatory statements because he did not believe that Appellee was under arrest when he initially questioned her at the security checkpoint. He characterized his questioning of Appellee as an "investigation," and explained that he was attempting to obtain information about what had occurred, primarily to ensure that there was no additional immediate danger to the victim. Reyes also testified on cross-examination that he believed Appellee was being detained and was not free to leave when he was questioning her. On redirect, Reyes stated that he did not believe Appellee was being detained until after she made her two inculpatory statements. Reyes therefore expressed his opinion that Appellee was free to ignore his questions and to leave before he formally arrested her.
Appellee also testified at the suppression hearing. Appellee stated that she was at the courthouse, along with her two children and ex-husband, to get a passport for her ten-year-old daughter. Appellee acknowledged that prior to the incident at the courthouse, she and the victim had been arguing about who would pay for their daughter's passport.
Appellee admitted that she had observed her ex-husband speaking with Reyes and believed he was reporting a crime to Reyes and probably wanted her to get arrested. Appellee said that when Reyes initially questioned her, she was afraid to answer him because she feared she might be arrested. She was also afraid to walk away because she was afraid Reyes would come after her. Although Appellee did not reveal whether or how she responded to Reyes' more general questions, Appellee recalled that she responded to Reyes' more specific question regarding whether she had hit the victim, only because she believed she was required to answer him. Appellee testified that she was not informed of her rights before she responded to Reyes' questions.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court recognized that an officer is required to inform a suspect of her Miranda rights only if the suspect is in custody. The court expressed its opinion that the key question in making this determination was whether Appellee "perceived" she was being detained when Reyes was questioning her and whether Appellee had a subjective belief that she was not free to leave. On the record, the trial court stated: "I am going to make a finding that the defendant was, in fact, detained at the time of the questioning. That the impression subjectively expressed by the defendant was that she was not free to leave, therefore, making her an object of an investigation." The trial court therefore concluded that Reyes had been required to read Appellee her Miranda rights prior to questioning, and that consequently, any statements Appellee made in response to Reyes' questions had to be suppressed.
The trial court later signed a written order granting Appellee's motion to suppress, but did not provide specific written findings of fact or conclusions of law. The State thereafter filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and contemporaneously filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order.
This Court thereafter issued an order noting the trial court's failure to respond to the State's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. We cited State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), for the proposition that upon request, a trial court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, in order to "provide an appellate court with a basis upon which to review the trial court's application of the law to the facts." We further expressed concern that the trial court had applied an incorrect standard, because the trial court appeared to have based its custody determination on Appellee's "subjective belief that she was not free to leave," rather than on the objective factors identified by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372-73 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012), and Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254-55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We directed the trial court to make specific findings in accordance with the "objective factors which are determinative of the custody issue."
In response, the trial court issued supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its supplemental findings, rather than utilizing the objective factors set forth in Ortiz and Dowthitt, the trial court again utilized a subjective standard, indicating its belief that the "measure of whether a person is in custody is, largely, whether the person perceives a limitation or restriction on the freedom to leave the presence of an interrogating representative of law enforcement." The trial court then made the following specific findings of fact:
• Appellee had credibly testified that she "felt she could not leave while being questioned."The trial court then concluded that Appellee was, "under the circumstances described by the witnesses, in custody and was interrogated while in custody[,]" finding it significant that Deputy Reyes' questions to Appellee "went directly to the heart of the alleged criminal action, i.e. an assault on the complaining witness."
• Deputy Reyes testified on cross-examination that he believed Appellee was not free to leave while he was questioning her.
• Deputy Reyes did not question Appellee as part of a "legitimate investigatory interrogation," and instead "pressed [Appellee] three times as to 'specifics' until the admission sought after was finally made."
• Deputy Reyes' testimony established that he had "sufficient probable cause" to arrest Appellee before she made her incriminating statements based on the information he had already obtained from the alleged victim, yet Deputy Reyes continued to engage in "persistent questioning" of Appellee until he elicited her "admission."
DISCUSSION
In a single point of error, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion to suppress because Appellee was not in custody at the time she made her inculpatory statements, and the deputy was therefore not required to inform Appellee of her Miranda rights before she made the statements. We agree.
Standard of Review
Miranda requires a law enforcement officer to warn an individual of certain constitutional rights if the individual is considered to be the subject of "custodial interrogation." Allen v. State, ___S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 2183526, at *5 (Tex.App. - El Paso May 8, 2015, no pet.) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Conversely, the requirements of Miranda do not apply if the statements made are not the result of a custodial interrogation. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 263; see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Miranda warnings are only required when there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody"); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 5 (West Supp. 2015) (statements made by an accused that do not stem from a custodial interrogation are admissible at trial).
The accused has the initial burden to establish that his or her statements were the product of a custodial interrogation. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Accordingly, the State need not "show compliance with Miranda ... warnings unless and until the defendant proves that the statements he wishes to exclude were the product of custodial interrogation." Id. at 526 (citing Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)).
A trial court's determination whether a defendant was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 526-27 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)). We must apply "(1) a deferential standard of review to the trial court's factual assessment of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and (2) a de novo review to its ultimate legal determination that appellee was in custody." State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (citing Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 372). As we noted in Allen, "[t]he trial court's ruling will be upheld it if is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case." Allen, 2015 WL 2183526, at *2 (citing Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)); see also Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010).
The Law on Custodial Interrogation
The standard for determining whether an accused's statements stemmed from a custodial interrogation is well-established. As we recently noted in Allen, "custodial interrogation" means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Allen, 2015 WL 2183526, at *5 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct at 1612). A "person is in 'custody' only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298-299 (1994)); see also Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526 (treating the requirement of "custody" under Miranda consistently with the requirement of custody under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). Therefore, an investigative detention that is characterized by a lesser degree of restriction on the individual's movement than an arrest, does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda, regardless of the suspect's subjective beliefs. Bartlett v. State, 249 S.W.3d 658, 669 (Tex.App. - Austin 2008, pet. ref'd).
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have made it clear that whether an accused was the subject of custodial interrogation depends solely on the "objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254. The determination must be based on whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would "have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Allen, 2015 WL 2183526, at *5 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)). In addition, the "reasonable person" standard presupposes an "innocent person." Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254.
Both courts have also made it clear that an officer's subjective view that an individual was in custody or was not free to leave bears upon the custody issue only if the officer's belief is "conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned," and only to the extent that the communication of those views would affect a reasonable person's understanding of his freedom of action. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. at 1530; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255 ("Stansbury dictates that the officers' knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect."). If the officer's belief is undisclosed, and is not "somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the suspect," the officer's belief remains wholly irrelevant to the inquiry. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 114 S.Ct. at 1530).
"The determination of custody is made on an ad hoc basis after considering all of the objective circumstances." Allen, 2015 WL 2183526, at *6 (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). In making this ad hoc determination, four general situations have been identified that may constitute custody for purposes of determining whether an officer must provide a suspect with Miranda warnings:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way;
(2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave;
(3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and
(4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.Id. (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). The first three situations require the restriction on a suspect's freedom of movement to reach "the degree associated with an arrest" instead of an investigative detention. In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex.App. - El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). The fourth situation, in which probable cause exists for an arrest, requires a showing that the officer manifested his knowledge of probable cause to the suspect by word or deed. Id. (citing Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255); see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. at 1530 (an officer's knowledge or beliefs regarding probable cause may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned). Further, custody is not established by the fourth factor, unless the manifestation of probable cause combined with other circumstances of the interview, such as duration or factors of the exercise of police control over a suspect, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d at 462 (citing Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255-57).
Application of the Four Factors to Appellee's Case
Appellee asserts that factors one, three, and four bode in her favor. In particular, she contends that she was physically restrained when she was being questioned by Deputy Reyes; that a reasonable person would have believed her freedom had been significantly restricted under the circumstances; and that Reyes had probable cause to arrest her before she made her incriminating statements, and failed to inform her that she was free to leave. Appellee acknowledges that Reyes made no affirmative statements to her indicating that she was not free to leave while he was questioning her at the security checkpoint, and she therefore concedes, and we agree, that the second factor does not apply. Accordingly, we review the trial court's decision with regard to the three remaining factors at issue.
Whether Appellee was physically deprived of her freedom in any significant way
The trial court made no findings that Appellee was physically restrained or deprived of her freedom by Reyes in any way before she made her incriminating statements. We have reviewed the testimony from the suppression hearing, and we find nothing in the record to support such a finding. Neither Reyes nor Appellee testified that Appellee was physically deprived of her freedom before she made her statements, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Appellee was handcuffed, placed in restraints, or otherwise physically restrained by Reyes until after she made her incriminating statements and after Reyes made the decision to formally place her under arrest.
Nevertheless, Appellee contends that she was "physically deprived of freedom of action" when Reyes "took possession of [her] money while persisting in his questioning," and otherwise "secured" her belongings during their encounter. We do not agree that Reyes' actions rose to the level of a physical restraint on Appellee's movement.
First, we note that Appellee mischaracterizes Reyes' actions when she states that he "took possession" of her money or otherwise secured her belongings while he was questioning her. The uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that Appellee voluntarily placed the money on the conveyer belt of the x-ray machine at the security checkpoint, and that Reyes picked up the money in an attempt to give the money back to Appellee, repeatedly explaining to her that he could not take responsibility for safeguarding her money. The uncontradicted testimony also established that Appellee refused to take the money back from Reyes, and instead advised him that the money was intended for her ex-husband.
In addition, Appellee presented no testimony indicating that Reyes in any way communicated to her that he was taking possession of her money in an attempt to restrain her movements, and there is nothing in the record to support such a conclusion. In fact, the undisputed evidence supports an opposite conclusion—that Deputy Reyes was simply trying to return the money to her. Further, the uncontradicted testimony at the hearing also reflects that after Appellee made her incriminating statements to Reyes, she "grabbed" the money from Reyes' hands, indicating that she did not believe that Reyes had officially taken possession of her money, or that Reyes had "secured" her money in an attempt to restrain her movement. As such, we reject Appellee's argument that she was in any way physically restrained of her freedom at the time of her initial questioning.
Whether Deputy Reyes created a situation that would have led a reasonable person to believe
that her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted
Appellee next argues that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt that her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted while Reyes was questioning her. In particular, Appellee contends that Reyes questioned her in what she contends was a coercive environment, pointing out that she was questioned at a courthouse security checkpoint, in the presence of "at least two uniformed deputies, an x-ray machine, metal detectors, and an ex-husband saying he wanted to press charges." Appellee contends that these factors, combined with the fact that Deputy Reyes had "secured" her belongings (i.e., her money), would have led a reasonable person to believe that her freedom of movement had been significantly restrained.
We disagree. First, we have already rejected Appellee's argument that Reyes "secured" Appellee's belongings in an attempt to restrain her, and we do not believe that a reasonable person would have believed that Reyes' actions in picking up her money was in any way restraining, particularly given Reyes' undisputed testimony at trial that he was attempting to return the money to Appellee.
Second, a reasonable person would not have found the courthouse security checkpoint to be a particularly coercive environment, particularly when we view the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable "innocent person," as we are required to do. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254 (noting that the "reasonable person" standard presupposes an innocent person). In particular, we note that large numbers of individuals pass through security checkpoints every day without being detained, and a reasonable, innocent person would have no reason to fear that he or she might be detained at a checkpoint, or otherwise subjected to custodial interrogation at such a location.
In addition, even if we were to agree with Appellee that the courthouse security checkpoint could be considered a coercive environment, this factor alone would not automatically elevate her questioning to the level of custodial interrogation. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have expressly held that even when questioning takes place in an environment that may considered coercive in nature, such as a police station or other law enforcement facility, this fact standing alone is insufficient to convert the questioning into a custodial interrogation to which Miranda applies. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714 ("a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because ... the questioning took place in a 'coercive environment'"); Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 294-96 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (courts have generally found that merely because an individual was questioned in what might be considered a "coercive" environment, this fact, standing alone, does not necessarily mean that the individual was "in custody" for purposes of giving Miranda warnings); see also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-25, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3519-20, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (station house questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody).
In addition, we find it significant that Appellee voluntarily approached the security checkpoint, without being summoned by Deputy Reyes, despite her belief that her husband was reporting a crime to Deputy Reyes at that time. Further, we note that Appellee voluntarily stood at the checkpoint while Reyes asked her questions, and the record is devoid of any suggestion that Reyes made any statements to Appellee indicating that she was required to answer his questions, that she was under arrest, or that she was not free to leave. As we noted in Allen, the case law is replete with examples of situations, which are far more coercive than the present one, in which the courts have found that an individual was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Allen, 2015 WL 2183526, at *6-7 (defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, where he went to the police station voluntarily and acknowledged three times his understanding that he was not being detained and was free to go, and was never physically restrained).
See also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122-25, 103 S.Ct. at 3518-20 (individual was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station on the day an offense was committed and gave a statement to police after a brief questioning lasting less than 30 minutes, and was thereafter allowed to return home); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714 (holding that a defendant's interrogation was noncustodial where he voluntarily went to the police station, was informed that he was not under arrest, was questioned for a half hour, and left the station afterwards); Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 289-92 (appellant was not in custody where he provided a videotaped statement to the police after he voluntarily went to the police station along with police officers within hours of a murder for which he was a suspect, and was questioned for three to five hours); Anderson v. State, 932 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (individual who voluntarily agrees to be transported to a law enforcement facility by an officer in the course of an investigation is not in custody); Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621-22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (individual who voluntarily went to a fire station and spoke to investigators as part of an arson investigation, was not restrained, and was allowed to leave unhindered after the statements were taken, was not in custody for purposes of Miranda).
Accordingly, we conclude that merely because the questioning took place at a security checkpoint, did not convert the questioning into a custodial interrogation, where the undisputed evidence established the Appellee was at the security checkpoint voluntarily, and there is no evidence that Appellee was physically restrained or told that she could not leave the area during the questioning.
The trial court apparently found it significant that Deputy Reyes asked Appellee specific questions about the alleged assault and appeared to focus on Appellee as a suspect. These factors are not relevant to our custody determination. The key factor in determining whether an individual is entitled to Miranda warnings is not whether the individual was questioned about a particular crime or was the focus of the investigation. Instead the key factor is whether the individual was "in custody" at the time of questioning. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, Miranda warnings are not required simply "because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect." Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. Simply being the focus of a criminal investigation does not equate to custody for Miranda purposes. See Meek, 790 S.W.2d at 621.
We also note that if we were to accept the trial court's reasoning that a suspect may be considered in custody simply because an officer has asked him specific questions about a crime, virtually all police questioning could be considered custodial in nature. Following this reasoning, law enforcement officers would never be permitted to question an individual about a crime without first giving Miranda warnings, regardless of whether the individual was in custody or not. This is clearly not the law. It is well-established that Miranda warnings are only required when the questioning about a crime takes place during a custodial interrogation. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 263; see also Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714.
Finally, we conclude that the trial court improperly focused on the subjective beliefs of both Appellee and Deputy Reyes in making its determination that Appellee was in custody, by focusing on Appellee's testimony that she "felt" that she was not free to leave while Reyes was questioning her, and Reyes' similar testimony on cross examination that he believed Appellee was not free to leave. As explained above, whether an individual was in custody is an objective determination that centers on whether a "reasonable person" would have believed he was in custody. Appellee's testimony regarding her subjective belief that she was not free to leave is not relevant to the determination. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254. Moreover, an officer's belief that a suspect is in custody at the time of an interrogation is only relevant if the officer actually communicates that belief to the suspect. Dowthitt 931 S.W.2d at 254. Although the trial court chose to believe Reyes' testimony on cross-examination that he believed Appellee was not free to leave when he was initially questioning her, the trial court failed to make any finding—and there is no evidence in the record—that Reyes communicated or otherwise manifested this belief to Appellee when he was questioning her.
Accordingly, we conclude that, under the circumstances presented by the record, a reasonable person in Appellee's circumstances would not have believed that her freedom had been significantly restricted or that she was otherwise in police custody prior to the time that she made her incriminating statements to Deputy Reyes.
Whether Deputy Reyes had Probable Cause to Arrest Appellee
The trial court also made a specific factual finding that Deputy Reyes had "more than sufficient probable cause" to arrest Appellee before she made her incriminating statements to him, based on the information Reyes had already obtained from the alleged victim. Appellee believes that this finding is significant. Appellee argues that Deputy Reyes had probable cause to arrest her before he began questioning her, but failed to advise her that she was free to leave, thereby invoking the fourth factor in the test for determining whether she was in custody.
The fourth factor in the test, however, also requires that the officer manifested his "knowledge of probable cause to the suspect by word or deed," which, under the totality of the circumstances, would have led a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave. In re J. T.M., 441 S.W.3d at 462; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. In the present case, the trial court did not find that Deputy Reyes manifested his knowledge of probable cause to Appellee, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that he did so. To the contrary, the undisputed testimony indicated that the only interaction between Deputy Reyes and Appellee consisted of the short questions Reyes asked Appellee regarding what had happened and whether she had hit the victim. There is no indication that Deputy Reyes made any other statements to Appellee, or otherwise engaged in any actions that would have "manifested" to Appellee his "knowledge" that he had probable cause to arrest Appellee, until after she made her incriminating statements and he made his decision to formally place her under arrest.
Accordingly, we conclude that, based on the totality of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, Appellee was not in custody at the time she was questioned by Deputy Reyes, and she was therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings before she made her incriminating statements. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion to suppress those statements.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's suppression order is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
In light of our decision reversing the trial court's order, the stay order that we issued on January 22, 2014 is hereby lifted. --------
STEVEN L. HUGHES, Justice January 13, 2016 Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ. (Do Not Publish)