Opinion
ID No. 91005224DI Cr. A. Nos: IN91-06-0121R1, IN91-06-0122R1, IN91-06-1007R1, IN91-06-1008R1
Date submitted: July 10, 2002
Date decided: August 22, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief: SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
Upon review of Defendant Abraham Feleke's motion for postconviction relief and the record, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Abraham Feleke was convicted by a jury on September 25, 1991, of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the Third Degree, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, and Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.
2. Defendant appealed his Superior Court conviction, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and a mandate to that effect was issued on February 26, 1993.
3. In this motion, Defendant asserts that: (1) "movant has a protected right in a proceeding under the Protection From Abuse Act. It is a specific law under 10 Del. C. § 1041-1048." Also, that his constitutional rights were violated when "the State removed him out of the protected class that he was in, and treated him differently under the law," (2) The Protection From Abuse Act was "intended to protect against domestic violence and give relief. A proceeding under this Act in which the petitioner is seeking an order of protection is civil in nature and held in the Family Court by a Master," (3) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to punish the movant; and (4) counsel was ineffective because he did not make movant aware of his rights under the Protection From Abuse Act.
4. In reviewing motions for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. Rule 61(i)(1) provides, in part, that a motion for postconviction relief "may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final. . . ." A criminal conviction does not become final until the issuance of the Supreme Court's order affirming the conviction.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (emphasis added).
Younger, 580 A.2d at 554.
5. According to Rule 61(i)(5), procedural bars in Rule 61(i)(1), (i)(2), and (i)(3), do not apply if court lacked jurisdiction or if there is a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
6. In the case at bar, Defendant seeks relief from his conviction under the Protection From Abuse Act ("PFA statute"). Defendant claims that he has a protected liberty interest, that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over him, that justice miscarried and that his conviction violated both due process and equal protection of law. He claims that these issues were never raised because his attorney's representation was constitutionally ineffective.
7. The usual standard for evaluating ineffectiveness claims is whether counsel's conduct was professionally unreasonable and whether the alleged errors were prejudicial to the defendant. However, to apply this analysis to the allegations raised by Defendant would be an exercise in futility. Defendant fails to recognize that the statute he claims was not addressed by his attorney was not in existence until years after his trial.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
69 Del. Laws, c. 160, c. 335; see also State v. Manista, 651 A.2d 781 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1994).
8. The PFA statute provides a civil remedy to family members, living spouses or individuals who have a child in common from abusive, violent, harassing or threatening behavior by other family members. It is intended to protect individuals against domestic violence. Defendant's assertion that he is a member of the protected class of individuals under the PFA statute is worse than frivolous.
State v. Torres, Del.Super., I.D. No. 30101192DI, Ableman, J. (May 24, 2002).
9. Defendant filed his motion for postconviction relief on May 29, 2002, more than nine years after a mandate was issued by the Supreme Court affirming his conviction. Consequently, because Defendant's Rule 61 motion was filed "more than three years" after his conviction became final, this Court finds that his claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1).
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.