We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision whether to grant a motion to suppress. State v. Feldt , 512 S.W.3d 135, 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (citing State v. Selvy , 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) ; State v. Milliorn , 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990) ). We reverse only if the court's decision is clearly erroneous.
Moreover, this violation of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial is a manifest injustice and entitles the defendant to plain-error relief. Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted); see alsoState v. Feldt , 512 S.W.3d 135, 143 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) ("Violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial constitutes manifest injustice under plain error review.").
Moreover, in decisions post-Baxter, our Court has rejected the State's primary arguments here - that there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial because defense counsel requested a bench trial in Defendant's presence and because Defendant failed to object to proceeding with a bench trial. See State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 143-44 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (holding a record does not demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial where the defendant failed to object to proceeding with a bench trial); Beam, 334 S.W.3d at 705 (holding a record does not demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial where defense counsel requested a bench trial in the defendant's presence).
Conversely, Missouri courts have repeatedly held a waiver is not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the only evidence of waiver comes from defense counsel's bare assertions. See, e.g., State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Mo. App. 2017); State v. Williams, 417 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo. App. 2013); State v. Beam, 334 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Mo. App. 2011) ("The fact that Beam's counsel may have requested a bench trial in her presence, without more, does not demonstrate 'with unmistakable clarity' that Beam 'voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently' waived her right to a jury.");
"Wood decided at most that specifically when the reviewing court reverses for inadmissible evidence, the defendant is not entitled to a determination whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him, since such inquiry might prejudice the State if both the inadmissible evidence were ignored and the State were deprived of a proper opportunity to present additional evidence …" State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 155 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hilbert, 663 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. banc 2023). Appellant’s sufficiency argument is predicated on the erroneous admission of his phone records.
Haneline argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Haneline had knowledge of and control over the controlled substance he was charged with possessing. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible evidence presented at trial should be considered, since ignoring inadmissible evidence might prejudice the State, in that the State may be deprived the opportunity to "present additional evidence that would have been presented at the first trial if it had not been cumulative to at least some of the improperly-admitted evidence." State v. Feldt , 512 S.W.3d 135, 155 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, our task is to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to permit a reasonable fact finder to find the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Because Schurle's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument would entitle him to broader relief than his right-to-counsel arguments, we consider Point I despite our disposition of his remaining claims. See, e.g. , State v. Matthews , 552 S.W.3d 674, 681 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) ; State v. Feldt , 512 S.W.3d 135, 154–55 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his third point on appeal, Minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy (Count V) and a related incest charge (Count VI) because the evidence failed to establish that Minor's penis contacted or penetrated Child's anus as alleged. Although we would reverse these convictions and remand for a new trial on all counts, we are also compelled to address Minor's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts V and VI due to double jeopardy considerations. See State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 154 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
Because Schurle's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument would entitle him to broader relief than his right-to-counsel arguments, we consider Point I despite our disposition of his remaining claims. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 552 S.W.3d 674, 681 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018); State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 154- 55 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, because C.A.R.A.'s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim would entitle him to dismissal of the first-degree statutory sodomy allegation, not merely a new trial, we consider Point I despite our disposition of Points II and III. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 552 S.W.3d 674, 681 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (despite reversal for new trial based on erroneous admission of evidence, separately considering a criminal defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments); State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 154-55 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (same).