Opinion
No. 4653.
Submitted February 4, 1959.
Decided February 27, 1959.
1. A complaint for malicious damaging of property in an amount exceeding fifteen dollars (RSA 572:14) phrased in the words of the statute and reciting specific overt acts was held valid since it informed the respondent of the nature and cause of the accusation with sufficient definiteness so that he could prepare for trial.
COMPLAINT AND WARRANT, charging the defendant Bentley Farwell with maliciously damaging the property of one Louis Bergh to an amount exceeding fifteen dollars contrary to RSA 572:14. The relevant portions of the complaint alleged that the defendant, at a certain time and place, maliciously committed "an act whereby the property of another was injured in an amount exceeding Fifteen Dollars, to wit: said Bentley Farwell did throw two stones on the windshield of a 1952 Chevrolet Automobile of the property of Louis Bergh, husband of said Mildred E. Bergh, while being located on the property of said Louis Bergh on Mason Road in said Brookline . . . ." The material portions of the statute read as follows: "If any person shall willfully, maliciously, wantonly, or unnecessarily commit any act . . . whereby the property of another shall be injured not exceeding fifteen dollars, he shall be fined not more than twenty dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. If the injuries exceed fifteen dollars he shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it violated Article 15th, Part I, of the Constitution of New Hampshire, known as the Bill of Rights, in that it did not "fully and plainly, substantially and formally . . ." describe to him the offense with which he was charged. To the denial of his motion he excepted and Nelson, Judge of the municipal court of Milford, transferred the case here in advance of trial pursuant to RSA 502:24. Further facts appear in the opinion.
Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General, John J. Zimmerman, Assistant Attorney General, and Conrad Danais, county attorney, for the State.
Leonard G. Velishka for the defendant.
It is too well settled here to require extended citation that the test to determine the sufficiency of a complaint or indictment is to inquire whether it "informs the defendant `of the nature and cause of the accusation with sufficient definiteness' so that he can prepare for trial." State v. Rousten, 84 N.H. 140, 143.
It is not essential to the validity of a complaint or indictment that it could possibly be made more comprehensive and certain; it is only necessary that it allege "every element of the offense charged in language sufficiently definite to apprise the respondents of what they must be prepared to meet for trial." State v. Story, 97 N.H. 141, 146. In the present case the complaint used the words of the statute and also alleged specific overt acts, namely that the defendant threw "two stones on the windshield" of the automobile of the complainant's husband, "whereby" his property was damaged "in an amount exceeding Fifteen Dollars." This has been held sufficient. See State v. Davis, 99 N.H. 88, 89.
Such cases as State v. Gilbert, 89 N.H. 134, relied upon by the defendant, where the accused was not informed of facts reasonably necessary to enable him to prepare for trial, are clearly distinguishable from the situation before us and do not support the defendant's position. It follows the order is
Exception overruled.
All concurred.