Opinion
A15-0572
02-08-2016
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Gerald Ira Evans, Appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Damien F. Toven, Princeton City Prosecutor, Dove Fretland Van Valkenburg, PLLP, Princeton, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). Affirmed
Ross, Judge Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-10-2522 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Damien F. Toven, Princeton City Prosecutor, Dove Fretland Van Valkenburg, PLLP, Princeton, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The district court found Gerald Evans guilty after a stipulated-facts trial, and it convicted him of two counts of driving while impaired. Evans argues that the district court failed to make findings crediting the arresting officer's version of the events leading to the traffic stop. Because the district court implicitly credited the officer's testimony, and because the officer had a particularized and objective basis for making the stop, we affirm.
FACTS
Princeton police officer Ryan VanDenheuvel testified at a contested omnibus hearing that he was on duty in his squad car when he observed a vehicle closely following the car in front of it. He followed the tailgating car and saw it turn onto a side street without a signal. The officer watched as the car pulled into a residential driveway; its brake lights remained on for roughly 30 seconds followed by its reverse lights illuminating for another 30 seconds. Officer VanDenheuvel believed the driver knew he was being followed and was attempting to evade him by pulling into a stranger's driveway. The officer continued watching until the car backed out of the driveway and proceeded north. The car took a wide turn followed by two additional unsignaled turns, and then it entered the Princeton Police Department parking lot. The officer also drove into the lot, and he activated his car's emergency lights.
The driver, whom the officer later identified as Gerald Evans, left his car and walked toward the squad car. Officer VanDenheuvel suspected that Evans was drunk. He confirmed that suspicion with a preliminary breath test that revealed Evans's alcohol concentration of 0.129. He arrested Evans and a urine test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.11. The state charged him with two alternative counts of second-degree driving while intoxicated based on his alcohol level and on his impairment.
Evans moved the district court to suppress all evidence obtained after the stop, which he argued was unconstitutional. He disputed the officer's version of the events, testifying that he never attempted to avoid the officer by pulling into the driveway, but rather was dropping off a woman he had been socializing with at a bar. He also claimed that he signaled all the turns.
The district court denied Evans's suppression motion, and Evans stipulated to the state's case under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 3, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The district court found Evans guilty following a stipulated-facts trial. Evans appealed his convictions, and this court determined that Evans's stipulation was invalid because he did not make a complete waiver of his rights. State v. Evans, No. A12-1333, 2013 WL 2149889, at *2 (Minn. App. May 20, 2013). On remand Evans again stipulated to the state's case, and the district court again found him guilty of both counts.
Evans appeals.
DECISION
Evans challenges the district court's suppression ruling. Police need only reasonable suspicion—a "particularized and objective basis" to believe that criminal activity is afoot—to justify stopping a car to investigate the suspicion. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). We review de novo the district court's conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the driver. State v. Cox, 807 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. App. 2011). And although we rely on the district court's underlying fact-findings unless they are clearly erroneous, the findings must be sufficiently detailed to allow us to understand the reason for the determination. State v. Rainey, 303 Minn. 550, 550, 226 N.W.2d 919, 921 (1975).
Evans challenges the district court's determination on the ground that the district court failed to make findings stating that the court was crediting the officer's version of the events and rejecting his version. Evans is correct that the district court does not expressly credit the officer's account over his. But the crediting is necessarily implied by the district court's determination coupled with this language in the order:
Officer VanDenheuvel testified that he observed the Defendant fail to signal a turn on three occasions within several minutes and that the Defendant at one point executed a wide turn well into the on-coming traffic lane. These observations more than establish an articulable suspicion warranting the Officer's stop of the vehicle.
The district court implicitly accepted the officer's version of the events, and it detailed them in a manner sufficient for us to understand the reason behind its decision. Evans does not dispute that his failure to signal his turn (even once) constitutes sufficient ground for the stop. See Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (2014) (requiring drivers to signal turns); see also State v. Doebel, 790 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn. App. 2010) (upholding a stop based on the failure to signal a lane change). Based on the facts relied on by the district court after it credited the officer's account over Evans's account, we are satisfied that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Evans's car and that the district court correctly rejected the motion to suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.