Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2078-14T2
09-26-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EDWIN ESTRADA, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Gurbir S. Grewal, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Catherine A. Foddai, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Sabatino, Nugent and Currier. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 11-03-0444. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Gurbir S. Grewal, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Catherine A. Foddai, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. PER CURIAM
Defendant Edwin Estrada appeals from his conviction of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), and other offenses, and the resulting sentence. For the reasons that follow, we remand for further proceedings.
In May 2011, a grand jury issued a multiple-count indictment against defendant and a co-defendant. As its most serious count, the indictment charged defendant with murdering an elderly victim after breaking into the victim's house to rob him. The State's proofs reflect that defendant repeatedly struck the victim in the head with a metal pot, and then fled the scene with the victim's credit card. Defendant was age eighteen at the time, and he had no prior criminal or juvenile record. The victim, the grandfather of one of defendant's acquaintances, was age eighty-eight.
Following the indictment, defendant was evaluated by a board-certified psychiatrist, an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine. In his report, the expert diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder and polysubstance abuse. The expert opined that, at the time of the lethal events in the victim's home, defendant's "ability to formulate an intent [to kill the victim] was certainly impaired to one degree or another." The expert attributed that impairment to defendant's "psychiatric condition and the drugs that he abused." The expert's findings are consistent with defendant's account that he had ingested angel dust and smoked marijuana in the victim's bathroom before the attack, had begun to hallucinate, and perceived that the victim was armed and about to shoot him.
The State disputed defendant's claims of diminished capacity. Its case was bolstered by the fact that defendant had made inculpatory statements when he was interviewed by police after his arrest. There was also clear and undisputed evidence that defendant was the person who had attacked the victim.
The prosecutor's office and defense counsel engaged in lengthy plea negotiations for about a year. During that time, the prosecutor's office had an estimated thirty discussions with members of the victim's family. Some of those family members wanted the maximum punishment imposed on defendant, while others were willing to accept a plea agreement that exposed defendant to a less severe sentence.
On January 22, 2013, defendant and his counsel appeared before a judge in the Criminal Part ("the first judge") and presented to him a negotiated plea. Under the terms of that plea, defendant agreed to forego a trial and plead guilty to a reduced charge of first-degree aggravated manslaughter. The State, in turn, agreed to recommend a sentence to the court of a twenty-seven-year custodial term, subject to an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The first judge accepted the factual basis placed on the record to support the aggravated manslaughter conviction, as well as the terms of the plea agreement. The matter was then set down for sentencing.
A different judge ("the second judge") presided over the sentencing hearing on March 8, 2013. At the outset of that hearing, the second judge, sua sponte, played a recording of a voicemail that the victim left for his stepdaughter before his attack, in which he told her that he loved her. The second judge also referred on the record to elderly citizens she had met earlier that week at a religious group meeting, who had impressed the judge as being lively individuals despite them ranging from ages eighty to ninety-six. The judge further observed that the defense psychiatrist's report was "devoid of any indication that the defendant was reckless," or that defendant lacked the ability to formulate a criminal intent. The judge also remarked that defendant's use of alcohol before striking the victim "certainly is not a defense to a crime." On the whole, the judge expressed strong reservations about proceeding with sentencing under the terms of the negotiated plea for aggravated manslaughter rather than murder.
Given her expressed concerns, the judge announced that it would be up to the members of the victim's family as to whether or not the sentencing would proceed in accordance with the plea agreement. At that point, the judge took a recess and ordered the assistant prosecutor to meet again with the victim's family members. The judge made it clear that if the collective sentiment of the family members was to oppose the terms of the plea, the court would "not proceed with the sentence." She added that she would not proceed with sentencing under the negotiated plea unless "the family has decided this is what they want." The court advised the family members who were present in court that when they were ready to do so, they could "come back and [they] can tell [the court] what [their] decision is."
The prosecutor then met during the recess with members of the victim's family, as he had been directed by the court. When the prosecutor returned from that discussion, he reported to the court that he had met with the family again and that "the State will not oppose [the court's] rejection of the plea." Consequently, the second judge issued an order that same day vacating the guilty plea and restoring the matter to a pretrial track. Defendant then filed a motion for leave to appeal, which was subsequently denied.
This court noted in its order that "[t]he issues concerning the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement are preserved for a plenary appeal if defendant is convicted at trial."
Thereafter, the case was tried before a jury and a different judge ("the third judge") over a four-week period in June and July 2014. Defendant pressed his defense of diminished capacity, while the State countered with testimony from its own psychiatric expert, who opined that defendant did indeed have the capacity to formulate an intent to kill the victim purposefully and knowingly.
On July 29, 2014, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder, felony murder, and all of the other nine offenses charged against him in the indictment. At sentencing, the third judge imposed a sixty-year custodial term on the murder count, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under NERA. All other counts were merged for sentencing, or were the subject of concurrent prison terms.
Through his counsel's brief and reply brief on appeal, defendant now raises the following arguments:
POINT I
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA.
A. The Court Improperly Allowed The Victim's Family To Veto The Plea Agreement.
B. Other Improper Considerations By The Trial Court.
POINT II
THE STATE'S EXPERT IMPROPERLY PROVIDED IRRELEVANT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY WHICH REQUIRES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS (Partially Raised Below).
A. Ultimate Issue Testimony.
B. Irrelevant and Prejudicial Responses.
POINT IIIDefendant also presents the following arguments in a pro se supplemental brief:
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE FELONY AND THE DEATH MUST BE INTEGRAL PARTS OF ONE CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION AND THAT THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE WAS RELEVANT TO THIS QUESTION (Partially Raised Below).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE BECAUSE THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO FIND MITIGATING FACTOR 4, INADEQUATELY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S YOUNG AGE, IMPROPERLY FOUND AGGRAVATING FACTOR 1, AND ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE DOUBLE-COUNTING.
REPLY POINT I
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA.
REPLY POINT II
THE STATE'S EXPERT IMPROPERLY TESTIFIED TO THE ULTIMATE ISSUE, REQUIRING REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS.
POINT I
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN COPIES OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS T[O] JURORS FOR USE IN DELIBERATIONS WAS IN VIOLATION OF R. 1:8-3(B)(2) AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (Raised Below).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY REGARDING THE DECEDANT'S (SIC) STATEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE HEARSAY RULE.
POINT IIIWe need only reach the first listed issue concerning the nullification of the plea agreement, because we conclude, for the following reasons, it warrants a remand.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DISALLOWING ANY MENTION TO THE JURORS BY EITHER THE DEFENDANT, HIS FAMILY MEMBERS, OR THE DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT, OR ANY WITNESSES FOR EITHER THE DEFENSE OR THE PROSECUTION, THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED SUICIDE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE STATE'S PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT MENTIONED AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT, THESE ATTEMPTED SUICIDES IN HIS REPORTS. (Raised Below).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISALLOWED ANY TESTIMONY RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE WAS SEXUALLY ABUSED AS A CHILD BY HIS FATHER. (Raised below).
POINT V
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR TO PRESENT HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS REFERENCING DEFENDANT BY NAME. (Partially Raised Below).
POINT VI
THE STATE WITHHELD CRITICAL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF A PLEA AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT'S CO-DEFENDANT, ANDRE ABELLA, WHO TESTIFIED AGAINST DEFENDANT.
POINT VII
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS COMPLAINED OF HEREIN AND THOSE ARTICULATED BY APPELLATE COUNSEL WHEN VIEWED IN THEIR TOTALITY, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV.
Rule 3:9-3(e) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f at the time of sentencing the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement reached by the prosecutor and defense counsel . . . the court may vacate the plea or the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea." This "interests of justice" standard has been explained and applied in case law.
For example, in State v. Madan, 366 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 2004), this court applied that standard in considering a plea agreement that had been set aside by a sentencing judge, where there was an "insufficient factual underpinning" for the judge's conclusion that the circumstances could not support a manslaughter conviction rather than murder, and where there were "legal mistakes in the [trial] court's rationale." Id. at 110. Although we recognized in Madan that a sentencing court's decision to set aside a guilty plea is generally reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we cautioned that such "[j]udicial discretion is not unbounded and it is not the personal predilection of the particular judge." Id. at 108-09.
To be sure, "[o]ne reason for permitting wide discretion in the sentencing judge [when considering whether to set aside a negotiated plea agreement] is that at the time a plea is entered the judge ordinarily has before him only the offense. A fuller picture of the offender does not emerge until sentencing, when the judge has had the benefit of a defendant's presentence report." State v. Brockington, 140 N.J. Super. 422, 427 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S. Ct. 357, 50 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976).
However, in determining whether to set aside a negotiated plea, a trial court is not limited to the consideration of only information in the presentence report that is contrary to representations made during the plea hearing. State v. Daniels, 276 N.J. Super. 483, 487 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 139 N.J. 443 (1995); State v. Salentre, 275 N.J. Super. 410, 418-20 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 269 (1994). Rather, the trial court may consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether "the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement reached by the prosecutor and defense counsel." R. 3:9-3(e).
Here, the trial court erred in several critical respects in reaching its determination to nullify defendant's negotiated guilty plea.
First, as the State concedes in its brief, the trial court mistakenly stated that a defendant's voluntary intoxication cannot be an applicable defense under New Jersey criminal laws. Voluntary intoxication can, in fact, provide a defense to a charge of knowing and purposeful conduct, if it is sufficient to cause a "prostration of faculties." State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 418-19 (1990); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8(a) and (b). The parties dispute whether defendant's expert report, along with other information in the presentence report, was sufficient to raise at least a triable issue on that question. In fact, the case was ultimately tried largely with a focus on defendant's related (and hotly-disputed) claim of diminished mental capacity, see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, stemming from his diagnoses of bipolar disorder and attention deficit disorder, as well as the mental health problems associated with his prior hospitalizations for substance and alcohol abuse.
In a related vein, the trial court incorrectly stated that defendant's expert's report did "not state anywhere that [defendant] could not formulate an intent [to commit the offenses in a purposeful manner]" and did "not state anywhere that he suffers from mental disease or defect." As previously noted, the expert report does contain diagnoses of bipolar disorder and polysubstance abuse. In addition, the expert did opine in his report that "as a result of his psychiatric condition and the drugs that [defendant] abused, [his] ability to formulate an intent was certainly impaired to one degree or another."
The trial court did correctly observe that the defense expert's report was "devoid of any indication" - at least an explicit one - that the defendant "engaged in any type of reckless conduct." However, defendant argues that such recklessness could have been reasonably inferred from the surrounding circumstances. In fact, the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter was charged at the subsequent trial. See Madan, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 114 (in which the evidence supported jury instructions for not only murder, but also for aggravated manslaughter, passion/provocation manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and self-defense).
The second judge further erred by including within her analysis personal experiences she had with elderly persons at a religious group meeting. Those personal experiences, while undoubtedly genuine and poignant, should not have been cited as part of the court's analysis under Rule 3:9-3(e), which must be confined to the record in the case and the applicable legal standards. Id. at 109; see also Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., ___ N.J. ___ (2016) (slip op. at 27-31) (analogously disapproving of judges relying upon their "personal experiences" in evaluating matters presented to them, specifically whether a verdict is excessive or shocks the judicial conscience). In making this observation, we by no means imply that judges who undertake the difficult responsibilities of sentencing convicted persons are obligated to attempt to try to sanitize their minds and ignore their life experiences and our shared values as a civilized society. Even so, in this case, the court went too far by expressly citing to its personal experiences with senior citizens at a religious meeting, and by comparing the victim to those individuals.
Lastly, the trial court procedurally erred in ceding to the members of the victim's family the ultimate decision, following a court-ordered recess, regarding whether to proceed with sentencing under the plea agreement. Certainly, the views and interests of a deceased victim's survivors may and should be considered at sentencing. Nevertheless, Rule 3:9-3(e) requires the court, not representatives of the victim, to make the ultimate - and often difficult - decision as to whether a plea agreement should be set aside. Although "[t]he views of the victim's family may be taken into consideration when considering a plea agreement, . . . the family's level of grief or degree of dissatisfaction with the plea cannot be controlling." Id. at 114. Instead, the court itself independently "must evaluate the facts, both admitted and debated, apply those facts that can be established to the law, and then test the plea agreement against the facts, the law, and the range of permissible sentences under the [Criminal] Code." Ibid. In addition, the judge's announced willingness to allow the plea agreement for manslaughter to be implemented, so long as the family members elected to do so, is difficult to reconcile with her criticisms of the adequacy of the factual basis to support manslaughter.
Given these circumstances, we are constrained by settled precedent to vacate the trial court's March 8, 2013 decision and remand the issue to that court anew for reexamination of the negotiated plea under the appropriate legal criteria expressed in Rule 3:9-3(e) and case law. A fresh assessment of whether the plea should or should not be set aside must be undertaken on remand, with the benefit of the further advocacy of counsel.
We do not determine in advance the scope of what the trial court may consider in the remand proceeding. In particular, because the question has not been briefed on appeal, we do not decide what, if any, weight or consideration shall be accorded to the proofs, including the competing psychological evidence and expert testimony that emerged at trial. Nor do we resolve whether it is appropriate for the trial court on remand to give any consideration to the fact that the jury convicted defendant at trial and thus implicitly rejected defendant's diminished-capacity theory. Those questions of scope and relevance shall be briefed and decided in the trial court in the first instance.
In Madan, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 103, our opinion discussed the facts presented at trial, but noted that they were "not significantly different" from the facts presented to the court when the plea agreement was set aside.
We appreciate that the second judge had serious reservations about proceeding with sentencing in this brutal homicide case under a plea agreement that spared defendant from the more serious penalties of a murder conviction. We respect the judge's prerogative to decline, in good conscience, to carry out a negotiated plea where it appeared to be inconsistent with the "interests of justice" standard set forth in the Rule. Nevertheless, the lapses in the process that was used here in reaching and imposing that determination require that the question be reexamined a second time. In remanding for that purpose, we intimate no views whatsoever on what outcome should be reached on remand, other than to require the process adhere to the criteria of the Rule and case law.
The remand proceedings shall be completed within ninety days. In the meantime, defendant shall remain in custody. If, as a result of the remand, the trial court decides to reinstate the plea agreement, it shall then resentence defendant accordingly. Conversely, if the trial court decides to set aside the plea agreement upon the application of the proper legal standards, then defendant may amend his present notice of appeal to include that ruling and reactivate the present appeal.
Because the first judge has retired, the second judge is now in a different vicinage, and the third judge who presided over the trial and sentenced defendant may or may not appropriately consider on remand what he gleaned from those experiences, we suggest the remand be decided by the vicinage's Presiding Criminal Judge, or a designee of the Presiding Judge who has no prior involvement with this case.
We need not address at this time whether the State would have the right to appeal such a determination. --------
If appellate review is sought, the clerk's office will issue an expedited briefing schedule, and the matter, if feasible, will be recalendared for later this term. Under the circumstances, we need not reach at this time the other issues raised on appeal, some or all of which could be mooted or superseded by the remand decision.
The trial court's March 8, 2013 order is accordingly vacated and the matter is remanded for rehearing, consistent with the terms of this opinion. We retain jurisdiction for the limited purposes and on the conditions that we have expressed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION