State v. Edwin

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Bumgarner-Ramos

    187 Conn. App. 725 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding that defendant's conviction of both assault in first degree and manslaughter in first degree violated constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy because defendant could not have caused victim's death in manner charged without first having caused victim serious physical injury

    See, e.g., State v. Gerald A. , 183 Conn. App. 82, 94, 191 A.3d 1003 ("jury was free to infer, on the basis of this record and its common sense, that if [the victim] flinched and clenched because [i]t hurt when the defendant tried to put his finger inside of her vagina, that the defendant digitally penetrated, at the very least, [the victim's] labia majora." [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 914, 193 A.3d 1210 (2018) ; State v. Elmer G. , 176 Conn. App. 343, 354, 170 A.3d 749 (concluding that jury could infer that when defendant forced victim to put her "mouth on his penis," that defendant did so "in a manner that caused his penis to enter into her mouth"), cert. granted on other grounds, 327 Conn. 971, 173 A.3d 952 (2017) ; State v. Edwin M. , 124 Conn. App. 707, 725–26 and n.7, 6 A.3d 124 (2010) (evidence that anal injury consistent with penile penetration sufficient for the purposes of affirming sexual assault conviction), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 922, 11 A.3d 151 (2011). Here, the defendant contends that the application of physical force on N's vagina and labia majora was insufficient to support a conviction of sexual assault because there was no evidence that he penetrated N's genital opening.

  2. State v. Edwin M

    11 A.3d 151 (Conn. 2011)

    Decided January 4, 2011 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 124 Conn. App. 707 (AC 30481), is denied. EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consideration of or decision on this petition.

  3. Healey v. Haymond Law Firm, P.C.

    174 Conn. App. 230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Even if we assume, without deciding, that the court's retroactive application of the amended statute was an error satisfying the first prong of the plain error doctrine, we conclude that such error fails to satisfy the second plain error prong because it did not result in manifest injustice. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez , 308 Conn. 64, 84, 60 A.3d 271 (2013) ("assuming that it is not debatable that [trial court improperly failed to give a Ledbetter instruction] ... the omitted jury instruction did not result in manifest injustice"); 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC , 138 Conn.App. 776, 804, 54 A.3d 232 (2012) ("assum[ing] that the [court's] failure to require [the counterclaim plaintiffs to amend their pleadings] was an error in satisfaction of the first prong of the plain error test, we would be unable to conclude that the results of such a claimed error rose to the level of fundamental unfairness in satisfaction of the second prong of the test"); State v. Edwin M. , 124 Conn.App. 707, 716, 6 A.3d 124 (2010) ("[e]ven if we assume, without deciding, that it was improper for the trial court to allow ... an expert opinion in the area of sexual abuse, we do not believe that [t]his testimony ... work[ed] a serious and manifest injustice on the [defendant]" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 922, 11 A.3d 151 (2011).Turning then to the second prong, in "address[ing] ... claim[s] of plain error despite a finding of waiver or induced error ... [our Supreme Court] has relied in part on the defendant's action as a basis for concluding that the defendant had not demonstrated the manifest injustice or prejudice required to prevail under the plain error doctrine."

  4. State v. Vega

    128 Conn. App. 20 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 9 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwin M., 124 Conn. App. 707, 726, 6 A.3d 124 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 922, 11 A.3d 151 (2011). Although Chute's testimony encompassed a larger time frame than the days surrounding the attack on Wells, it still aided the jury in determining whether the defendant displayed a consciousness of guilt. If the incriminating text messages were deliberately erased from the defendant's telephone, then evidence supporting such a determination renders it more probable that the defendant was the individual who attacked Wells.

  5. State v. Elliott

    14 A.3d 439 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    " (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwin M., 124 Conn. App. 707, 723-24, 6 A.3d 124 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 922, A.3d (2011). A

  6. State v. William L

    126 Conn. App. 472 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwin M., 124 Conn. App. 707, 714-15, 6 A.3d 124 (2010). On the basis of our review of the evidence at trial, we conclude that this is not one of those extraordinary situations calling for the reversal of the judgment of conviction.