Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 17-0235
02-27-2018
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DEANTA DOMINIQUE EDWARDS, Appellant.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Paul J. Prato Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee Deanta D. Edwards, San Luis Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2016-110102-001
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Paul J. Prato
Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee Deanta D. Edwards, San Luis
Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined. BEENE, Judge:
¶1 This appeal was timely filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969) following Deanta D. Edwards's ("Edwards") convictions for theft and trafficking stolen property. Edwards's counsel searched the record on appeal and found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530 (App. 1999). Counsel now asks us to search the record for fundamental error. Edwards filed a brief in propria persona and challenges the superior court's admission of evidence at Edwards's priors trial and the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his prior convictions. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm Edwards's convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts and resolve all inferences against Edwards. See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
¶2 In February 2016, police officers responded to a complaint that two televisions and an X-Box were missing from a home. Officers searched recent pawn transactions and found that Edwards sold merchandise matching the stolen items.
¶3 The State charged Edwards with theft, a class 5 felony, and trafficking in stolen property in the second degree, a class 3 felony. Edwards rejected the State's plea offers, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury found Edwards guilty as charged. The jury also found the State proved two aggravating circumstances. In a separate bench trial, the State proved Edwards had a prior felony conviction in Illinois. Edwards was sentenced to presumptive, concurrent terms of 2.25 years' incarceration for theft and 6.5 years for trafficking in stolen property.
¶4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶5 The record reflects no fundamental error in pretrial or trial proceedings. The superior court conducted two Donald hearings in Edwards's presence. Edwards was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings. Edwards was present at all critical stages of the proceedings.
State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (App. 2000).
¶6 The jury was properly composed of 12 members and two alternates. One juror was dismissed during trial after she informed the court she recognized a witness from high school. The State presented direct and circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict. The superior court properly denied Edwards's motions for mistrial and directed verdict. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charges. The key instructions concerning burden of proof, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the necessity of a unanimous verdict were also properly administered. The jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts.
¶7 The superior court received a presentence report and accounted for aggravating and mitigating factors. Edwards was provided an opportunity to speak at sentencing. The superior court properly sentenced Edwards to presumptive, concurrent sentences of 2.25 years' incarceration for theft and 6.5 years' incarceration for trafficking in stolen property. The court properly applied 264 days of presentence incarceration credit. The sentencing minute entry was corrected to show that Edwards has one prior felony conviction.
I. Evidence Presented Was Properly Admitted and Sufficient to Prove Prior Conviction
¶8 Edwards argues the superior court erred when it admitted four exhibits regarding his prior felony conviction in Illinois because the documents were not properly authenticated. Further, he contends his right to confrontation was violated because he was not able to question or cross-examine the secretary who prepared some of the information in the four documents from Illinois. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Additionally, he argues the court lacked sufficient evidence to prove he committed the felony, as the State did not compare the fingerprint on file in Arizona with a fingerprint from Illinois.
¶9 Edwards's argument that the Illinois documents were not properly authenticated is without merit. Three of the documents are public records regarding Edwards's previous arrest and conviction from the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, McDonough County. These documents were certified by the Clerk of the Circuit court. Thus, the documents were self-authenticating under Arizona Rules of Evidence ("Rule") 902(4). The final document from McDonough County is an information sheet from McDonough County Court Services Department. The State presented testimony from a probation officer who met with Edwards and entered his biographical information and photo into the document as part of her duties with the Probation Department. The officer testified a secretary input Edwards's case number and charges on the document.
¶10 Edwards argues that because the secretary entered information into the document, then he or she must testify to the document's authenticity to establish foundation. However, the document was properly authenticated by the probation officer's testimony under Rule 902(7). As the authenticated document was not hearsay, Edwards did not have the right to confront the secretary and Crawford does not apply. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1985) (non-hearsay confession raises no confrontation clause concern).
¶11 Edwards's argument that the State failed to properly prove his prior felony is also without merit. When a prior conviction is alleged, the State must prove: "(1) that the defendant in the present case and the one convicted in the prior case are the same individual, and (2) that there was in fact a prior conviction." State v. Pennye, 102 Ariz. 207, 208 (1967). "The proper procedure for establishing a prior conviction is for the state to submit a certified copy of the conviction and establish that the defendant is the person to whom the document refers." State v. Cons, 208 Ariz. 409, 415, ¶ 16 (App. 2004). Here, the State properly submitted into evidence certified copies of documents with Edwards's photo and personal information. These documents stated Edwards was convicted of a felony. The probation officer assigned to the case identified Edwards as the same man who committed the Illinois felony. Thus, the evidence that the State presented was sufficient to support the superior court's finding that Edwards had a prior felony conviction.
CONCLUSION
¶12 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and find none; therefore, we affirm the convictions and resulting sentences.
¶13 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligation pertaining to Edwards's representation in the appeal will end. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Edwards of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds "an issue appropriate for submission" to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). On the Court's own motion, Edwards has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per motion for reconsideration. Further, Edwards has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per petition for review.