Opinion
NUMBER 2015 KA 1383
06-06-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMES EARL
Warren Montgomery District Attorney Franklinton, LA Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Nick Noreia Assistant District Attorney Franklinton, LA Mary Roper Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant James Earl
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Washington State of Louisiana
Docket Number 11 CR5 112566
Honorable Martin Coady, Judge Presiding Warren Montgomery
District Attorney
Franklinton, LA Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana Nick Noreia
Assistant District Attorney
Franklinton, LA Mary Roper
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
James Earl BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ. GUIDRY, J.
The defendant, James Earl, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. Following a hearing on the matter, the motion to suppress was denied. Following a jury trial, the jury returned the responsive offense of manslaughter, a violation of La. R.S. 14:31(A). The defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
Ricky Magee and Donald Dawson were also indicted for second degree murder. Magee and Dawson pled guilty to manslaughter. The defendant was also indicted (on a second count) for conspiracy to commit second degree murder. At trial, the defendant was charged only with second degree murder. Whether this second count was nol-prossed or severed is not clear from the record.
FACTS
On the night of January 6, 2011, Richie Martin was parked in a Geo Tracker in a driveway on Jenkins Road in Washington Parish. Raymond Terry Lyons was in the front passenger seat of the Tracker, and the two men were waiting for someone. Ricky Magee, who had driven in a black Malibu from his house, pulled in the driveway near the Tracker. Magee's front-seat passenger was the defendant. Donald Dawson (aka "Pee Wee"), who had been at Magee's house looking to buy drugs, was driving a white Buick and had followed Magee and the defendant, as Magee had instructed. After Magee parked, Dawson, whose passenger was his girlfriend, Tessie Starnes, parked about thirty feet away in the driveway next to Magee. The defendant, Magee, and Dawson each got out of their respective vehicles and approached the Tracker.
According to several eyewitness accounts, either the defendant or Magee struck Lyons with a board or piece of wood, identified by most as a "2x4." The defendant then shot Lyons once in the chest, killing him. Martin got out of the Tracker, ran to a nearby trailer, and called 911. The defendant, Magee, and Dawson got in their vehicles and left the scene. When the defendant was interviewed by Detective (now, Captain) Jim Miller, with the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office, the defendant admitted that he shot Lyons. At trial, the defendant testified that he lied about shooting Lyons because he was afraid of Magee. The defendant testified that he struck Lyons with his hands, but that it was Dawson who shot Lyons.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement. Specifically, the defendant contends that his interview was conducted while he was under the influence of pain medication and sleep deprivation.
Before a confession can be introduced into evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Since the general admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial court, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. See State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d 1144, 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 11 (La. 1991). The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a confession is admissible. State v. Hernandez, 432 So.2d 350, 352 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). Testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Mackens, 35,350, p. 13 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So.2d 454, 463, writ denied, 02-0413 (La. 1/24/03), 836 So.2d 37.
When a confession is challenged on the ground that it was not freely and voluntarily given because the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the confession, the confession will be inadmissible only when the intoxication is of such a degree as to negate the defendant's comprehension and to make him unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying. Whether intoxication exists and is sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of a confession are questions of fact, and the ruling of the trial court on this issue will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the evidence. State v. Williams, 602 So.2d 318, 319 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1125 (La. 1992).
Although the burden of proof is generally on the defendant to prove the grounds recited in a motion to suppress evidence, such is not the case with the motion to suppress a confession. In the latter situation, the burden of proof is with the State to prove the confession's admissibility. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 703(D). In determining whether the ruling on defendant's motion to suppress was correct, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case. State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1223 n.2 (La. 1979).
When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 11 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.
The defendant asserts in his brief that he indicated in his interview that he was on marijuana and cocaine at the time of the incident. The defendant also stated he took pain medication for scoliosis. The defendant suggests he was drowsy during the interview and impaired by the pain medication and, as such, the State failed to prove his statement was freely and voluntarily given.
After two witnesses had testified at trial, the trial court heard the motion to suppress out of the presence of the jury. Detective Miller testified that he interviewed the defendant on January 13, 2011. The defendant was read his rights from a Miranda rights form. At the bottom of the form, it indicated the defendant understood his rights, that he consented to questioning at the time, and that he did not want a lawyer. The defendant signed the rights form. Detective Miller testified he did not promise, threaten, or coerce him in any way. The detective took an audio statement of the defendant. On cross-examination, Detective Miller read an excerpt from the interview transcript regarding the defendant's use of drugs or alcohol:
Q. Captain, I would specifically refer your attention to page 3. James, are you under any medication right now or under the influence of narcotics, alcohol or anything? Na, I take medicine for my back. Are you sleepy? Yea, I am sleepy. So, you ask him the question, that's the response he gave you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He told you he was taking pain medication for scoliosis of the spine?
* * *
Q. Did you determine what the specific pain medicine was that he -
A. No, sir. I didn't.
Q. Did you determine when he last took pain medicine?
A. No, sir.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, without reasons. We see no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling. The testimony of Detective Miller indicated the defendant was cognizant and able to speak to him in a responsive manner. While the defendant may have ingested cocaine and marijuana on the night Lyons was killed, the defendant's interview with Detective Miller was a week, or seven days, after the incident. The defendant said that he was sleepy and that he took pain medicine for his scoliosis. But there was nothing in the interview that suggested the defendant's awareness and understanding were in any way affected because of sleepiness or scoliosis medication. While the defendant may have been tired during the interview, there was no evidence that he was intoxicated, and his answers to the detective were relevant, appropriate, and coherent. Throughout the interview, the defendant was lucid and intelligible.
Accordingly, nothing in the record before us suggests that the defendant's alleged "chemically impaired" or "sleep deprived" state was of such a degree as to negate his comprehension or make him unconscious of the consequences of what he was saying to Detective Miller. We find the trial court's ruling is supported by the evidence and, thus, will not be overturned. See Williams, 602 So.2d at 319; Patterson, 572 So.2d at 1150.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In this assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for manslaughter and that, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. C. Cr. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 06-0207, p. 10 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 01-2585, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Hughes, 05-0992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051; see State v. Davis, 01-3033, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163-64.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Guilty of manslaughter is a proper responsive verdict for a charge of second degree murder. La. C. Cr. P. art. 814(A)(3). Manslaughter (under the facts of this case) is a homicide committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in La. R.S. 14:30 or 14:30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person. See La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a).
La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) defines manslaughter as a homicide which would be either first degree murder or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the factfinder finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. See State v. Maddox, 522 So.2d 579, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). This type of manslaughter was not applicable in this case because there was no evidence of provocation by Lyons or of the killing having been committed in sudden passion or heat of blood.
Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503, p. 13 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La. 1982). The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. McCue, 484 So.2d 889, 892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
The parties to crimes are classified as principals and accessories after the fact. La. R.S. 14:23. Principals are all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. An individual may be convicted as a principal only for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. See State v. Pierre, 93-0893 (La. 2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427, 428 (per curiam). The State may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as a principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. State v. Smith, 513 So.2d 438, 444-45 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1987). One who aids and abets in the commission of a crime may be charged and convicted with a higher or lower degree of the crime, depending upon the mental element proved at trial. State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722, 726 (La. 1980).
In his brief, the defendant argues the evidence did not support the conviction for manslaughter because of the internally inconsistent and contradictory statements made by testifying witnesses. According to the defendant, every witness presented by the State "was shown to have lied at some point in the process about critical points." The defendant notes that Martin testified the perpetrator was him (the defendant), then, according to the defendant, Martin testified the perpetrator was Magee and then testified he did not know who the shooter was. The defendant points out that Dawson testified the defendant was the shooter. Dawson also testified, however, that he did not have a gun with him that night; but Starnes, Dawson's girlfriend, was with Dawson that night and stated that Dawson did have a gun with him, and that he took the gun with him when he got out of the car. Finally, according to the defendant, Starnes "denied seeing the perpetrator's face for months," but once arrested as a principal to the killing, Starnes changed her story and implicated the defendant. The defendant asserts that in addition to the "huge inconsistencies" in the State's case, all the witnesses were motivated to testify "in a certain manner" out of extreme fear of Magee.
Martin, who was the driver of the Tracker, testified that Lyons was with him in the front-passenger seat. They were waiting for Magee. Martin had backed into a driveway, so that the front of the Tracker was facing the street. When Magee and the defendant arrived, Magee parked his vehicle very close to the Tracker so that the vehicles were bumper to bumper. At that point, according to Martin, some people approached the Tracker with a 2x4. Martin testified that Magee hit Lyons, the passenger in the Tracker, with the 2x4 two or three times. When Magee stopped hitting Lyons, the defendant, who was standing near the front of the Tracker on the passenger side, shot Lyons. The bullet went through the Tracker's windshield and struck Lyons in the chest, killing him. Martin did not identify the defendant by name because he did not know the defendant. According to Martin, the shooter was "medium build, dark brown, bald headed [and] had facial hair." Martin indicated that the defendant (as he appeared at trial) looked similar to the shooter. Martin, however, did make clear that Magee was not the shooter, but it was the passenger in Magee's vehicle who shot Lyons.
Dawson pled guilty to manslaughter in this case and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Dawson agreed to testify for the State. Dawson testified that he knew the defendant and Magee for a couple of years. Dawson and his girlfriend, Starnes, went to Magee's house to get drugs. Magee told Dawson to follow him in his (Magee's) vehicle and that he had to take care of something first before he got the drugs. Dawson followed Magee to Jenkins Road. Dawson saw Magee pull up to the bumper of the Tracker, Dawson passed up Magee and parked in the driveway next door. According to Dawson, when he (Dawson) got out of his vehicle and walked toward the Tracker, he saw the defendant beating the passenger of the Tracker with a stick or a 2x4. Starnes never got out of the vehicle. Dawson then heard a gunshot and saw the defendant with a gun, pointed at the windshield, and standing near the front of the Tracker. Dawson picked out the defendant in a photographic lineup. On the back of the defendant's picture, Dawson wrote "I saw [the defendant] hit him with a 2x4 and shoot him once." Dawson identified the defendant in court and testified that he was certain the defendant was the shooter. Contrary to Martin's testimony, Dawson testified that Magee did not hit Lyons with a 2x4. Dawson testified that he (Dawson) had made it to the front of the Tracker when Lyons was being attacked and shot; however, Dawson denied that he had a gun on him.
Starnes testified that she rode with Dawson to Jenkins Road. According to Starnes, Dawson had a gun on his lap, and when Dawson got out his car to walk toward the Tracker, it appeared he took the gun with him. While Starnes stayed in the car, she saw the passenger of the Tracker getting hit in the face with a large board. Then Starnes saw the defendant shoot Lyons. Starnes identified the defendant in court and repeatedly testified of her certainty that the defendant was the shooter. On cross-examination, defense counsel arguably impeached the credibility of Starnes by adducing the testimony that in her first two interviews with Detective Miller, Starnes did not see the defendant's face and, therefore, could not identify the shooter. According to defense counsel, it was only when Starnes was arrested, jailed, and charged as a principal in the killing of Lyons that she then identified the defendant as the shooter. Starnes explained that she did see the defendant's face when he shot Lyons, but she did not know his identity. She was reluctant to provide Detective Miller with too much information because Magee was in the same jail she was (in Washington Parish), and she was afraid of Magee. While in jail, Starnes saw a newspaper with pictures of all four of the suspects involved in the Lyons' shooting, including the defendant's picture, She testified she recognized the defendant's picture in the newspaper as the person who shot Lyons. Starnes brought the newspaper to Detective Miller and identified the defendant as the shooter. She was not as afraid at this point because she knew the other perpetrators were in jail as well.
The defendant testified that he only beat Lyons and did not shoot him. The defendant further stated that he struck Lyons with his hands and did not use a 2x4. About a week after the shooting, the defendant was found in Mississippi, arrested, brought back to Louisiana, and questioned by Detective Miller. The defendant's statement was played for the jury. In his interview with Detective Miller, the defendant admitted that he shot Lyons. The defendant told Detective Miller, "I hit him. I shot him." When the detective asked who shot him, the defendant again replied, "I shot him." The defendant further stated in the interview that Dawson was standing near the Tracker with the gun, and that he handed the gun to the defendant. The defendant explained that he was just supposed to "whip" Lyons for robbing Magee. It appeared that Dawson was the person who was to shoot Lyons, but when the moment arrived for him to shoot, Pee Wee could not do it, so the defendant took the gun and shot Lyons.
The defendant testified at trial that he and Magee were cousins who hung out a lot. According to the defendant, he went with Magee to Jenkins Road to beat up Lyons. The defendant stated that he fought Lyons to prove to Magee that he (the defendant) did not allow Lyons into Magee's house to steal Magee's tools. When they arrived at the scene, the defendant saw Lyons getting out of the Tracker. When the defendant ran toward Lyons, Lyons got back in the Tracker, and the defendant began hitting him. At this point, the defendant saw Dawson approach with a gun. The defendant ran toward the gun, and the gun discharged. The defendant took the gun from Dawson and gave it to Magee.
Thus, according to the defendant, he lied to Detective Miller about shooting Lyons and that Dawson was the person who shot Lyons. When asked at trial why he lied about shooting Lyons, the defendant testified that he was scared of Magee and scared for his family. The defendant never explained or clarified, however, why implicating Dawson as the shooter would cause the defendant to be fearful of Magee. In any event, the issue in this case regarding the identification of the defendant as the shooter was one of credibility. The jury heard all of the testimony and viewed all of the evidence presented to it at trial and, notwithstanding any alleged inconsistencies, it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261, p. 6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a "thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Mitchell, 99-3342, p. 8 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83. The fact that the record contains evidence which conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So.2d 592, 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, because the jury was free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, see Taylor, 721 So.2d at 932, even if some, but not all, of each of the eyewitness's testimony was believed, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was the shooter and, as such, was guilty of second degree murder. See State v. Robinson, 024869, p. 8 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 66, 74, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125 S.Ct. 658, 160 L.Ed.2d 499 (2004) (deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range indicates specific intent to kill). Further, if the jury believed the defendant's confession, wherein he admitted that he hit and shot Lyons, this would have been sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of second degree murder. While the jury returned the statutorily approved responsive verdict of manslaughter, see La. C. Cr. P. art. 814(3), this verdict is valid because the evidence at trial established the crime of the charged offense of second degree murder. The defendant did not object to the jury's verdict of manslaughter. When a defendant fails to object to a legislatively responsive verdict, the defendant's conviction will not be reversed, whether or not that verdict is supported by the evidence if the evidence is sufficient to support the offense charged. See State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So.2d 246, 252 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959, 103 S.Ct. 2432, 77 L,Ed.2d 1318 (1983); State v. Harrell, 01-841, p. 4 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 1015, 1017.
Moreover, even if it was a compromise verdict, in that the jury may have felt the State did not prove second degree murder, the verdict of manslaughter was also valid because the evidence established a manslaughter under La. R,S. 14:31(A)(2)(a). The jury may still return a compromise verdict of a lesser offense which is supported by the evidence, even if the evidence also supports a verdict of the charged offense. State v. Porter, 93-1106, p. 9 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 1137, 1142. All witnesses, including the defendant, testified that the defendant beat Lyons. Whether the defendant used a 2x4 or only his hands was at issue in this case, but all agreed the defendant physically attacked Lyons. Thus, if the jury had concluded that the defendant attacked and beat Lyons with his fists or with a 2x4, but did not shoot him, the defendant would have still been guilty of manslaughter, even though he did not kill Lyons. Under the doctrine of intentional misdemeanor manslaughter, if the victim dies while the defendant is engaged in an intentional misdemeanor (i.e. it directly affects the person), the defendant is also criminally responsible for the death of the victim. See State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507, 521 (La. 1981) (on rehearing), (misdemeanor manslaughter committed when a battery resulted in an unintended homicide).
The intentional misdemeanor in this case, assuming the defendant had used only his hands, would have been simple battery. See La. R.S. 14:35. A general principle of accessorial liability is when two or more persons embark on a concerted course of action, each person becomes responsible for not only his own acts but also for the acts of the other, including deviations from the common plan which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan. State v. Smith, 07-2028, p. 8 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291, 296 (per curiam). Under this scenario, therefore, even if the defendant was not the person who shot and killed Lyons, but only beat Lyons, the defendant was nevertheless a principal to manslaughter. See State v. Couvillion, 05-5, p. 14-17 (La. App. 5th Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 991, 999-1002. In beating Lyons in the front-passenger seat, making him an easier target, the defendant enabled Dawson to carry out the plan and shoot Lyons. See Couvillion, 910 So.2d at 1002.
Finally, we note that had the jury felt the defendant did not shoot Lyons, but beat him with a 2x4, all of the above principles, establishing the defendant as a principal to manslaughter, would apply, except that the underlying offense would not have been an intentional misdemeanor. Under this scenario, the underlying offense would have been an aggravated battery or a felony not enumerated in La. R.S. 14:30 or 14:30.1. See La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a), Aboard (or 2x4), including the manner in which it was used in this case, constitutes a dangerous weapon under the aggravated battery statute. See La. R.S. 14:34(A); La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3); State v. McClure, 34,880, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So.2d 454, 457-58; State v. Hopkins, 96-1063, p. 5 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 538, 540; State v. Bell, 94-742, p. 2 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 498, 500.
When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably-inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Wright, 98-0601, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 487, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, and 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.
It is clear from the finding of guilt that the jury concluded the testimony of one or more of the State's witnesses was more credible than the testimony of the defendant, who stated that Dawson was the person who shot Lyons. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 03-1980, p. 6 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). In finding the defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defendant's theory of misidentification. See State v. Andrews, 94-0842, p. 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 448, 453.
As noted, the appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116, p. 2 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442, 443. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of witnesses in whole or in part. Robinson, 874 So.2d at 79. The jury considered all the testimony and other evidence, including evidence that the defendant left the scene after the shooting. He did not call for help after Lyons was shot or contact the authorities to explain his self-alleged minimal involvement in the shooting. Instead, it appears the defendant fled to Tylertown, Mississippi, where he was apprehended days later. Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate consciousness of guilt, and therefore, are circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. See State v. Fuller, 418 So.2d 591, 593 (La. 1982). See also State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 n.4 (La. 1984).
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence clearly negates any reasonable probability of misidentification and supports the jury's verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter. See State v. Calloway, 07-2306, p. 10 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (per curiam).
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.