Opinion
08-22-00049-CR
01-31-2023
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SANDRA FLORALIE DUFORAT, Appellee.
Do Not Publish
Appeal from the 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, Texas (TC# P-4141-112-CR)
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
OPINION
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE
When there is a stop sign alongside a road accompanied by a clearly marked stop line on the road, a motorist is required to stop at the line. Here, we are called to determine what "at" means in this context. The State of Texas charged Appellee, Sandra Floralie Duforat, with one count of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one (methamphetamine) in an amount less than one gram. Duforat moved to suppress the narcotics evidence, arguing that the officer seized the methamphetamine from her vehicle following a traffic stop for failing to stop at a stop line under Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c). Following a hearing, the trial court granted Duforat's motion to suppress based on a dispute over whether the officer properly pulled her over for failure to stop where the law required. The State now appeals the trial court's order granting the motion, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the meaning of the word "at" as that term applies in section 544.010(c). For the following reasons, we agree with the State and reverse the trial court's order.
Background
During the suppression hearing, Trooper Luca Walter of the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified that on October 31, 2019, he was on patrol in Fort Stockton, Texas. Also present in the vehicle was Trooper Ingalls, Walter's field-training officer. While on patrol, Walter observed a vehicle Duforat was driving, approach an intersection on a county road. Walter saw that prior to coming to a complete stop, the vehicle "went over the line at a stop line that had a stop sign with it," and the vehicle "stopped over the line at the stop line waiting for traffic to clear so [Duforat] could turn left." From Walter's recollection, the vehicle's front tire "was completely over the line," and the line was "probably closer to the middle of the vehicle" when the vehicle came to a complete stop. Walter described the stop line as "a lot wider and bigger than a fog line." The stop sign was partially knocked down but still visible. There was no crosswalk at the intersection.
Walter stopped Duforat for a violation of Texas Transportation Code § 544.010(c). When asked about the requirements of section 544.010(c), Walter testified that the statute requires a vehicle to stop "behind the white line" and "before going over the line," and that "[n]o part of the vehicle can cross that white line." Walter stated that the purpose of the stop line was "in order for vehicles to know where they are having to stop so they are not too far into the road that they are trying to get onto." After making contact with Duforat, Walter smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and initiated a search that yielded a quantity of methamphetamine. Walter arrested Duforat and the passengers in the vehicle for possession of methamphetamine.
Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court orally granted the motion to suppress from the bench. The court subsequently entered the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
1. On October 31, 2019, the dash cam recording from DPS Trooper Luca [Walter's] vehicle shows that a stop line appears at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18, Fort Stockton, Pecos County, Texas.
2. The dash cam recording reveals that the Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop at the stop line at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18.
3. After the Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop, Trooper Luca [Walter] testified that he observed the Defendant's vehicle "going over the stop line" on West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18.
4. Trooper [Walter] activated the emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop for "fail[ure] to stop at [a] designated point at [a] stop sign."
5. After approaching the Defendant's vehicle, Trooper [Walter] advised the Defendant that the reason for the stop was that "her front tire was over the line."
. . . .
Conclusions of Law
. . . .
1. The reasons for the stop of the Defendant's vehicle articulated by Trooper [Walter] were: "fail[ure] to stop at [a] designated point at [a] stop sign;" "her front tire was over the line;" and Trooper [Walter's] belief that the law requires a vehicle to stop before arriving at a stop line.
2. Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code, provides three different stop requirements:
(1) if a crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop before entering the crosswalk;
(2) if no crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; and
(3) if no stop line exists, the driver shall stop "at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway."
[3.] Trooper [Walter] failed to articulate any other traffic violation that led to the stop of the Defendant's vehicle.
[4.] The reason articulated for Trooper [Walter's] stop of the Defendant's vehicle was based on his understanding or interpretation of Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code.
[5.] Trooper [Walter's] mistake about Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code, cannot serve to provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle and cannot validate an otherwise invalid seizure.
. . . .
[9.] Since the Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop at the stop line as required by Section 544.010(c)(2), Texas Transportation Code, there was no traffic violation and as a result Trooper [Walters] lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle and his subsequent search of the Defendant's vehicle was unreasonable.
[10.] The legislature in Section 544.010(c) chose to use the "at" to designate where drivers are to stop at a stop line rather than "before."
[11.] Common usage of the word "at" would be mean to be "in," "on" or near."
[12.] The Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop at a clearly marked stop line at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18 in compliance with Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code.
[13.] therefore was no traffic violation and no basis existed for a stop based on reasonable suspicion.
[14.] Trooper [Walter's] reasonable suspicion of an alleged traffic violation cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws.
[15.] Trooper [Walter's] honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic law which prompted the stop of the Defendant's vehicle is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement.
[16.] Any evidence obtained from the search resulting from the illegal stop is suppressed.
This interlocutory appeal follows. In its sole issue, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because it misinterpreted section 544.010(c)'s requirement that a vehicle stop "at" the stop line to not necessarily require stopping before the line is crossed.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. See State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). "A trial court's findings of historical fact and its determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record." See id., citing Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the facts is reviewed de novo. See id. Likewise, all purely legal questions are reviewed de novo, including whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When the trial court makes findings of fact, a reviewing court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, supports those findings. See Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The prevailing party is afforded the "strongest legitimate view of the evidence," along with all reasonable inferences that can come from it. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), quoting State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Here, Duforat argues that the trial court's ruling should be upheld because the evidence that Walter saw the vehicle cross the stop line is equivocal. But based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court appears to not have based its ruling on a determination of historical fact, such as the credibility of Walter's testimony that he saw Duforat's vehicle cross the stop line before coming to a stop. Rather, the court's decision rests solely on Walter's purported legal misunderstanding of section 544.010(c)'s requirement that a motorist must stop before crossing the stop line. As such, the trial court's ruling is based on its legal interpretation of section 544.010(c), and we review the court's ruling de novo. See Johnson, 336 S.W.3d at 657 (purely legal questions are reviewed de novo).
B. Statutory Interpretation
In relevant part, section 544.010 of the Texas Transportation Code provides as follows:
(a) Unless directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, the operator of a vehicle or streetcar approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop as provided by Subsection (c).
. . . .
(c) An operator required to stop by this section shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. In the absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway.Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(a), (c) (emphasis added).
Section 544.010(c) does not explicitly define what stopping "at" a clearly marked stop line means; thus, we must construe the statute. See Timmins v. State, 601 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). "When we construe a statute, we begin by examining its text in the context in which it appears." Id. If this examination reveals a meaning that should have been plain to the legislators who voted on the statute, we give effect to that meaning. Id. We only look beyond the statute's text in two situations: (1) when the text does not bear a plain contextual meaning, such that the text is reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding; and (2) when the text's unambiguous meaning would lead to "'absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have intended.'" Id., quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Applying the canons of construction to determine the meaning of a statute, we presume that: (1) compliance with the constitutions of Texas and the United States is intended; (2) the entire statute is intended to be effective; (3) a just and reasonable result is intended; (4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and (5) public interest is favored over any private interest. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (setting forth the above presumptions).
i. "At" is susceptible to more than one understanding.
When construing the meaning of a word in a statute, we may consult standard dictionaries. Clinton, 354 S.W.3d at 800. The dictionary defines "at" as being "used as a function word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near." At, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014). This definition is nearly identical to the trial court's conclusion of law stating that "at" can be defined as "in, on, or near." But these definitions do not evince a clear meaning within the context of section 544.010(c) because the words "on" or "near" the stop line can mean completely different things. A car can stop "on" the stop line by crossing the threshold of the line, while it can stop "near" the stop line by stopping seemingly anywhere close to the line. Because there is more than one reasonable understanding to the meaning of "at," we may look beyond the section 544.010(c)'s text to determine the word's meaning. See Timmins, 601 S.W.3d at 348.
ii. The legislature could not have meant to give drivers the choice of stopping in, on, or near the line.
We may also consider the legislative purpose of the statute. See Banegas v. State, No. 08- 17-00224-CR, 2019 WL 6271270, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-El Paso Nov. 25, 2019, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication), citing Spence v. State, 325 S.W.3d 646, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (a court may consider the legislative purpose of a statute in determining the meaning of the words in the statute). Although the legislative history regarding section 544.010(c) in particular does not expressly evince the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, we can reasonably infer that the purpose behind requiring drivers to stop at the line is to maintain public safety. Specifically, in this context the intent is (1) to prevent vehicles from colliding with other vehicles traveling on an intersecting street; and (2) to allow pedestrians to safely cross streets where they have the right of way.
"Crosswalk" is defined as: "(1) the portion of a roadway, including an intersection, designated as a pedestrian crossing by surface markings, including lines; or (2) the portion of a roadway at an intersection that is within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway." Tex. Transp. Code § 541.302(2); c.f. Tex. Transp. Code § 552.005(a) (indicating pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to a vehicle on the highway if crossing a roadway at a place other than a marked crosswalk or in an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection).
Here, the legislature clearly intended for vehicles to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians regardless of whether the crosswalk is marked or not. Consequently, as a practical matter, vehicles cannot cross over a marked or unmarked stop line before coming to a complete stop to yield to pedestrians. See Lerma v. State, No. 08-04-00152-CR, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2 (Tex. App.- El Paso June 30, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist under section 545.010(c) where the motorist's vehicle crossed a stop line, stopped with its front end in an intersection and other violations). Our interpretation of the word "at" to require stopping prior to crossing over a stop line accomplishes what we believe to be the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute and leads to a reasonable result favoring public interest. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795 at 800; see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021.
iii. Interpreting "at" as in, on, or near would lead to absurd results.
We must look beyond the common dictionary definition of at because it would lead to absurd results. See id. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court granted the motion to suppress because section 544.010(c) does not require a vehicle to stop "before" the stop line and because Walter mistakenly believed that a vehicle was required to stop before crossing the stop line. On appeal, the State argues that applying the trial court's definition of "at" to mean "in, on, or near," would render section 544.010(c) meaningless because it would allow vehicles to stop anywhere in the general vicinity of the stop line, including after, on top of, or before the stop line. The State further posits that the trial court's interpretation would create a vague standard that cannot be reasonably enforced by law enforcement.
We agree with the State that the trial court's definition of "at" could not have been what the legislature intended; it would lead to absurd consequences that would render the relevant portion of section 544.010(c) unenforceable. As a practical matter, interpreting "at" to mean "in, on, or near" would allow vehicles to legally pass beyond the stop line and pose a threat to the very safety of pedestrians and other vehicles that the statutory scheme endeavors to protect.
It is also noteworthy that "at" appears later in the same subsection where it is stated: ". . . in the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway . . . ." See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c).
We also agree that such a vague definition of "at" renders the statute practically unenforceable by allowing motorists to stop anywhere in the general vicinity of the stop line, which creates an unworkable standard for law-enforcement officers and motorists alike. This interpretation would not comport with the presumptions that a just and reasonable result of enacting the statute was intended, as well as a result that is feasible of execution. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021.
iv. Our interpretation of "at" is consistent with prior opinions
Finally, our holding is consistent with prior Texas cases that have upheld the legality of a traffic stop based on section 545.010(c) where a motorist crossed over a stop line prior to coming to a complete stop. Lerma v. State, No. 08-04-00152-CR, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2; Villareal v. State, 565 S.W.3d 919, 923, 927 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 2018, pet. ref'd) (holding that a motorist violated section 544.010(c) by when he stopped "five or six feet over the stop line," and thus he "cross[ed the stop line] before stopping") (emphases added); Holcomb v. State, No. 12- 22- 00008-CR, 2022 WL 2374645, at *1, 3 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where the defendant failed to stop "before" the stop line and drove "past" the stop line, officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for violation of section 544.010(c)); Williams v. State, No. 05-18-00727-CR, 2019 WL 1872925, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (any mistake of law by an officer in stopping a motorist under section 545.010(c) was reasonable where the officer testified that the motorist "stopped with the stop line approximately in the middle of the vehicle" at an intersection with a stop line but no crosswalk); Torres v. State, No. 11-13-00172-CR, 2015 WL 4438051, at *4 (Tex. App.-Eastland July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist under section 545.010(c) where the motorist's vehicle crossed a stop line and traveled five feet into an intersection).
Duforat argues that this case is analogous to Mumper where an officer stopped the motorist because his vehicle stopped beyond a stop line but before the crosswalk at an intersection with both a stop line and a marked crosswalk Mumper v. State, No. 05-08-00141-CR, 2009 WL 201142, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 29, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The Dallas court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the driver because the plain language of section 544.010(c) requires a driver to stop at the stop line only in the absence of a marked crosswalk and because the undisputed evidence showed that the motorist stopped beyond the stop line but before the marked crosswalk. Id. at *2. Here, it is undisputed that Duforat encountered a stop line but no marked crosswalk, which invokes a different portion of section 544.010(c), requiring him to stop "at a clearly marked stop line" rather than to stop "before entering the crosswalk . . . ." As such, Mumper is inapposite.
In sum, we hold that the portion of section 544.010(c) at issue in this case requires a vehicle to stop before it crosses over a stop line, and the trial court erred by concluding that section 544.010(c) permits a motorist to stop "in, on, or near" a stop line.
C. Reasonable Suspicion
Having determined section 544.010(c)'s requirement as it pertains to this case, we next address whether Walter had reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat for a violation of that statute. A traffic stop and any ensuing detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). "Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has 'specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.'" Id., quoting Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch; the standard requires considerably less proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause. Garcia v. State, No. 08-19-00176-CR, 2021 WL 235658, at *4 (Tex. App.-El Paso Jan. 25, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication), citing Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020) (noting that reasonable suspicion falls considerably short of 51% accuracy). When determining whether reasonable suspicion to conduct a detention exists, we disregard the subjective motives of the arresting officer and instead determine whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. See Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Thus, a traffic stop is justified if the officer had a reasonable basis to believe that the motorist committed a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 943-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
Here, Walter testified that he observed the front tire of Duforat's vehicle go "completely over the line" to the point that the line was "probably closer to the middle of the vehicle." The trial court entered findings that Walter stopped Duforat after he "observed [Duforat's] vehicle 'going over the stop line.'" Given our legal interpretation of section 544.010(c), Walter had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat. See Villareal, 565 S.W.3d at 923, 927; Holcomb, 2022 WL 2374645, at *1, 3; Williams, 2019 WL 1872925, at *1-2; Torres, 2015 WL 4438051, at *4; Lerma, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2. The trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress on the basis that Walter did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat.
The State's Issue One is sustained.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order granting Duforat's motion to suppress and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
Because a warrantless traffic stop is a seizure analogous to a temporary detention, the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968); see also Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). "A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if [the officer] has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead [an officer] reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Where the record objectively establishes a traffic violation, an officer's stop and detention is reasonable under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) ("As long as an actual violation occurs, law enforcement officials are free to enforce the laws and detain a person for that violation, regardless of whatever the usual practices or standards of the local law enforcement agency are and regardless of the officer's subjective reasons for the detention.").
Because the facts of this case are uncontested, the suppression issue turns on whether the record objectively established a reasonable suspicion for Trooper Luca Walter to stop and detain Appellee Sandra Floralie Duforat. Walter testified he initiated the warrantless stop based solely on his belief that Duforat committed a stop sign violation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(a), (c) (providing that, in the absence of a crosswalk, a vehicle operator shall stop "at a clearly marked stop line"). Most notably, he did not allege she failed to completely stop at the stop sign in question, but rather, that she failed to stop at a designated place relative to the marked line included with the stop sign. He testified, "her front tire was over the line." He further explained that he believed the law required her vehicle to stop before arriving at the stop line.
The trial court found that Duforat's vehicle came to a complete stop at the stop line of the intersection. This finding is supported by the record including a video of Duforat's driving captured by Walter's dashcam recording, which shows the vehicle stopped on the line itself such that the line transects the vehicle's midsection. The trial court concluded that no traffic violation occurred, that Trooper Walter lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat's vehicle, and his subsequent search of the vehicle was unreasonable. In construing the statute on appeal, this Court holds as a matter of law that the obligation to "stop at a clearly marked stop line" as required by § 544.010(c), requires a motorist to "stop before it crosses over a stop line." Because I would conclude the legislature rejected such an exacting requirement under the scenario presented, I disagree. Respectfully, I dissent.
When interpreting statutes, courts are admonished to effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). In doing so, the focus of the attention is placed on the text of the statute in question such as "to discern the fair, objective meaning of the text at the time of its enactment." Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d. 265, 271-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Boykin, 818 S.W.3d at 785). "We do not focus solely upon a discrete provision; we look at other statutory provisions as well to harmonize provisions and avoid conflicts." Id. Words and phrases are read in context and construed according to rules of grammar. Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If a particular term is not legislatively defined but it has acquired a technical meaning, the court must construe that term in its technical sense. Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 272. When it has not acquired that meaning, the term is construed according to common usage. Id. To that end, courts may consult a standard or legal dictionary to determine the meaning of undefined terms. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Ordinarily, we give effect to the meaning of the statute as revealed by the plain meaning of its text in the context in which it appears. See Timmins v. State, 601 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). We look beyond the statute's text and context to discern its meaning in only two situations: first, when the text does not bear a plain contextual meaning, that is, when the text is reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding; and second, when the text's unambiguous meaning would lead to "absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended." Id.
Section 544.010 is one of several provisions included in title 7, subtitle C. See Tex. Transp. Code. Ann. §§ 541.001-600.004 (titled, "Rules of the Road"). In relevant part, section 544.010 of this subtitle provides:
(a) Unless directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, the operator of a vehicle or streetcar approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop as provided by Subsection (c).
. . . .
(c) An operator required to stop by this section shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. In the absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway.Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(a), (c) (emphasis added).
The traffic code contains a similar provision for stopping at an intersection controlled by a traffic light. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007(d) ("An operator of a vehicle facing only a steady red signal shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection.") (emphasis added).
When read together, subsections (a) and (c) of § 544.010, require a vehicle operator to stop at a stop sign as provided under three scenarios: (1) if a crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop before entering the crosswalk; (2) if no crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; and (3) if no stop line exists, the driver shall stop "at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway." Id. (emphasis added). Notably, § 544.010(c) does not explicitly define what stopping "at" a clearly marked stop line means.
To that extent, the term "at" must be construed according to established interpretation principles. As the majority references in its decision, a standard dictionary classifies and defines "at" as a preposition that is "used as a function word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near." At, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 77 (11th ed. 2014). This definition mirrors the trial court's conclusion of law, providing that "at" can be defined as "in, on, or near." But in this instance the majority rejects the common usage of the term "at," concluding the legislature intended "prior to" instead, such that § 544.010(c) requires a vehicle to stop "prior to crossing over a stop line." The term "prior to," which is also a preposition, is defined as "in advance of: BEFORE." Id. at 988. In turn, "before" means "in front of; ahead of; in advance of," which plainly differs from "in, on, or near." Id. at 110. In context, interpreting the phrase, "shall stop at a clearly marked stop line," as requiring a driver to stop prior to and with no part of the vehicle encroaching on the stop line, effectively substitutes the term "at" with "prior to," which itself equates to "before." Because this interpretation alters the plain meaning of the text, I disagree with the majority.
An interpretation of "at" as permitting a motorist to stop on the line, as the trial court concluded, is reinforced by the legislature's use of the word "before" when describing where a motorist must stop when confronted with a cross-walk. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c) ("An operator required to stop by this section shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection.") (emphasis added). The legislature's choice to use the word "before" in one situation, and "at" in a different scenario immediately following, is most telling. When construing a statute, we "presume that the Legislature selected and used language in a careful and deliberate manner[,]" and "[t]he same rules should apply to the failure of the Legislature to include language." Ex parte Kibler, No. WR-91,197-01, 2022 WL 4360668, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (quoting Ex parte Perez, 612 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)) (en banc). The distinction makes intuitive sense. For those stop-sign-marked intersections that include crosswalks, motorist must be extra-cautious when stopping to avoid striking vulnerable pedestrians. Yet, at a stop-sign-controlled intersection without a crosswalk, a motorists must completely stop at the line of the stop sign, but the vehicle operator is not otherwise instructed to keep the vehicle entirely behind the line. And here, the trial court expressly noted the intersection included no crosswalk.
I disagree with the majority's determination that its interpretation of "at" comports with other Texas cases. None of the cases cited have expressly concluded that § 544.010(c) requires a motorist to completely stop before any part of the vehicle crosses over the line of a stop sign. First, in Lerma v. State, No. 08-04-00152-CR, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-El Paso June 30, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication), the record established the officer initiated a stop for three violations, a stop line violation, a seatbelt violation, and a license plate violation. The stop line itself was not even mentioned; instead, the decision pointedly described that the motorist's vehicle had partially entered the intersection, which is factually distinguishable from the case at hand. Id. Likewise, in Villareal v. State, 565 S.W.3d 919, 923, 927 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 2018, pet. ref'd), our sister court of appeals held that a motorist violated section 544.010(c) by stopping "five or six feet over the stop line," and it "cross[ed the stop line] before stopping." Similarly, in Holcomb v. State, No. 12-22-00008-CR, 2022 WL 2374645, at *1, 3 (Tex. App.- Tyler June 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the motorist drove "past" the stop line, partially entering the intersection road. Lastly, in Torres v. State, No. 11-13-00172-CR, 2015 WL 4438051, at *4 (Tex. App.-Eastland July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the Eastland Court of Appeals found that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist under section 544.010(c) where the motorist's vehicle crossed a stop line and traveled five feet into an intersection. In contrast, Trooper Walter testified here that "her front tire was over the line," which at least acknowledges that the remaining part of Duforat's vehicle was completely stopped on the line, or not over the line. This stopping either at or on the line is captured by Trooper Walter's dashcam recording. In sum, these cases cited by the majority are distinguishable factually or were resolved on other grounds.
Appendix A at the end of this opinion is a screenshot from the dashcam recording.
Although factually similar, in Williams v. State, No. 05-18-00727-CR, 2019 WL 1872925, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the Dallas Court of Appeals resolved a mistake of law argument, which is not at issue here. There, the court found the officer's mistake of law in stopping a motorist under section 544.010(c) was reasonable where the officer testified that the motorist "stopped with the stop line approximately in the middle of the vehicle" at an intersection with a stop line but no crosswalk. Id. In contrast, the trial court here made a finding that Walter's mistake of law was unreasonable, but the State does not challenge that finding on appeal. Nor did the State argue below or on appeal that the traffic stop was justified because Walter's mistake of law was objectively reasonable. As a result, we cannot consider that argument here. See State v. Hardin, No. PD-0799-19, 2022 WL 16635303, at *8 n.45 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (declining to apply same mistake-of-law theory in case involving a vehicle encroachment on a lane line when the State did not raise the argument); see also Van Horn v. State, No. 10-15-00394-CR, 2016 WL 936275, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 10, 2016, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (an appellate court cannot make arguments on behalf of a party because the court would abdicate its role as an independent tribunal).
The majority expresses a concern that if "at" is interpreted to mean "near" then a motorist could stop anywhere-before, on, or well after the stop line. But if a motorist were to stop so far beyond the stop line that their vehicle infringed on the travel lanes of the intersecting road, that itself would constitute its own separate offense under the traffic code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.302(a)(3) ("An operator may not stop . . . a vehicle . . . in an intersection[.]"). In any event, the record here only deals with a vehicle that was, at most, "on" the stop line, or even in part situated before the line, but not entirely past it.
As required by our rules of interpretation, we must presume that the legislature chose its words carefully, recognizing that every word was included for some purpose. Ex parte Santellana, 606 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en ban). Based on this presumption, I would conclude, under the scenario presented, the legislature deliberately chose to require motorists to stop "at" a stop line as it grants a bit of leeway in safely bringing a vehicle to a complete stop. Legislators certainly know how to use the term "before" when they so desire as the term is used in the first scenario, where crosswalk safety is a paramount concern, and in other traffic code provisions as well. Plainly, in the scenario at issue here, the term "before" was clearly rejected and not chosen by the lawmakers themselves. Following our appellate rules of the road so to speak, I would hold that § 544.010(c) does not require exacting conduct in the scenario such that a motorist violates a traffic law by failing to stop before or prior to any part of the operator's vehicle crosses over the marked line. Based on the statute's plain text and our interpretation principles, I would conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that § 544.010(c) permits a motorist to stop in or on a marked stop line as occurred here. Because Trooper Walter lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop as is required by our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, I would affirm the trial court's granting of the motion to suppress.
APPENDIX A
(Appendix Omitted)