Opinion
CR-12-7843
03-27-2013
STATE OF MAINE v. BRENTON H. DICKSON
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
E. Mary Kelly Unified Criminal Court Judge.
A testimonial hearing was held on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on March 21, 2013. Defendant appeared, represented by Attorney Robert Andrews. The State was represented by Assistant District Attorney William Barry.
Defendant seeks to suppress evidence arising from what he contends was an unconstitutional stop of the vehicle he was driving. Defendant argues that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the stop because the police officer was did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion and was proceeding on a theory of "mistaken identity" when he pulled the vehicle over.
The facts leading up to the stop are undisputed. Officer Garrett Strout of the Scarborough Police Department testified that on the evening of November 9, 2012 he was parked on the side of Route 22 observing passing traffic and conducting random license plate checks on his patrol car's computer. In running the license plate numbers of the car Defendant was driving, Officer Strout learned that the vehicle was registered to a female, and that the Scarborough Police Department had recently had contact with a previous male driver of the vehicle. That male individual, identified on the computer as one Kevin Prescott, was shown to have outstanding warrants, active bail conditions, and a suspended license. The description provided for Kevin Prescott stated that he was a white male, between the ages of 30 and 40, with brown hair and a thin build.
Officer Strout testified that when the car passed him he had observed the driver, who appeared to be a white male matching the description of the individual who had been previously linked with the vehicle and who had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Believing that the driver on November 9 was that same individual, Officer Strout pulled the vehicle over. After the stop, it became apparent that the current driver was not Kevin Prescott, the male with the active warrants, but Brenton Dickson, the Defendant.
The court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument that the facts of this matter distinguish this stop from those upheld in State v. McDonald, 2010 ME 102, State v. Tozier, 2006 ME 105, State v. Huether, 2000 ME 59, State v. Eklund, 2000 ME 175 and Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738 (Tx. 1994). On the contrary, those cases make clear that the governing standard requires that the officer at the time of a motorist stop made the stop for a reason that was both reasonable and articulable: that the suspicion be based "on more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch." That the officer's reasoning subsequently turns out to be mistaken does not render the stop invalid. See, e.g., Heuther, 748 A.2d at 995 (upholding stop as justified by reasonable articulable suspicion where officer realized after stop that driver was not who he thought he was); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (upholding stop even though reason for stop turned out to be mistaken). The Texas case cited by Defendant likewise suggests that suppression here is not warranted. See Hurtado, 881 S.W.2d at 742 (upholding stop where officer's purpose was to determine whether driver was one of several individuals with outstanding warrants who showed up in license plate check conducted on patrol car computer); That Hurtado involved dealer's plates does not render its reasoning distinguishable. Defendant argues that the reasonableness of the arresting officer's suspicions is undermined by the difference in hair color between Kevin Prescott and Defendant. While Defendant's driver's license lists his hair color as blond or strawberry, and while he may well have had hair of such color at another time, having had the opportunity to observe Defendant in court, it is apparent that his hair color can reasonably be regarded as brown.
Accordingly, because Officer Strout had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver was someone with a suspended license and outstanding warrants, the stop was constitutional and there are no grounds for Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
It is therefore hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.