Opinion
No. 62513-6-I.
January 25, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-1-12710-1, Brian D. Gain, J., entered September 23, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Becker, J., concurred in by Cox and Ellington, JJ.
The State charged Anthony Dias with 19 felony charges relating to three separate incidents of home invasion rape, assault, and robbery. His attorneys asserted their belief that Dias was not competent to stand trial. During the competency hearing, the trial court considered an ex parte declaration from one of Dias's attorneys outlining why his attorneys believed that Dias could not rationally assist them. The trial court found Dias competent after reviewing reports from his expert and the State's experts. While the trial court did not explicitly mention the opinions of Dias's attorneys, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Dias competent when it explained in its findings, which were supported by substantial evidence, why it found that Dias did not lack the capacity to assist in his defense. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Dias with seven counts of first degree rape, three counts of first degree burglary, three counts of first degree unlawful imprisonment, two counts of first degree robbery, two counts of second degree assault, and two counts of indecent liberties. The State also alleged that Dias committed each offense while armed with a firearm. There were a total of 14 victims involved in the 19 counts.
In May 2007, defense counsel raised concerns about Dias's competence, and the trial court committed Dias to Western State Hospital for observation and evaluation. Following an examination, Dr. Gregg Gagliardi of Western State Hospital submitted an evaluation status report on July 2, 2007. Dr. Gagliardi concluded that Dias was "not suffering from any mental disorders except some situational depression, anxiety, and anger."
Dias's counsel hired Dr. George Woods, who examined Dias and concluded in his August 9, 2007 report that Dias was not able to rationally assist his attorneys in the preparation of his defense. Woods opined that Dias suffered from postconcussive syndrome following a July 31, 2005 car accident in which Dias crashed into a parked police car. Woods theorized that the concussion exacerbated Dias's pre-existing paranoia and that his paranoid distrust in addition to other symptoms impeded his ability to rationally assist his lawyers. Following Dr. Woods' assessment, Dr. Gagliardi referred Dias to Dr. Christopher Graver, a neuropsychologist, who conducted a neuropsychological assessment of Dias and concluded that there was "no physical or neurological evidence that [Dias] suffered a head injury or resulting traumatic brain injury."
On October 23, 2007, Dr. Gagliardi issued a final psychological evaluation concluding that Dias was competent to stand trial. Dr. Gagliardi stated that his examination did not show that Dias lacked the capacity to assist defense counsel. Dr. Gagliardi did not rule out Dias's distrust causing serious problems in assisting counsel, but stated that Dias's suspiciousness and cynicism were likely related to personality traits, not mental disorder.
Dias moved for an order finding him not competent on the grounds that he was not able to rationally assist his attorneys in the preparation of his defense. In that motion, his lawyers asserted their belief that "the defendant is not competent to stand trial." Dias requested that the competency hearing be closed, but the trial court denied his motion. At the competency hearing, one of Dias's lawyers handed the trial court an ex parte declaration stating that his lawyers would be unable to provide specific information during an open competency hearing about Dias's inability to assist them. The record shows that the trial court recessed to review the declaration from counsel.
Following the competency hearing at which the trial court considered the reports of Dr. Woods, Dr. Gagliardi, and Dr. Graver, the trial court concluded that Dias was competent to stand trial or enter a plea based on the following findings:
2. The defendant is able to discuss with his attorneys the case against him, the evidence, the legal theories and methods of proceeding in his defense.
3. The defendant has the ability to participate in his defense with his attorneys, though he may not always agree with their advice.
4. The defendant's observed symptoms do not rise to a level that makes the defendant incapable of assisting his attorneys. Based on the report considered by the court, it is likely those symptoms are reflections of the defendant's current legal situation, a personality trait, or a product of his life experience, rather than incompetent to assist his counsel.
5. Although the court acknowledges the defendant may need medications or other medical intervention to address his symptoms, this fact alone does not render the defendant incompetent due to an inability to participate in his defense.
6. The defendant understands the nature of the proceedings against him and is able to effectively assist counsel in the defense of his case.
7. The defendant has the ability to understand the nature and consequences of a change of plea.
Inits oral ruling, the trial court stated its satisfaction with Dias's ability to
discuss with his attorneys the case against him, the evidence against him, the legal theories and the proposed methods of proceeding in his defense.
So, as I previously indicated, I am satisfied that it is a question of ability and he is not incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to fulfill those rudimentary functions in assisting his counsel.
Thetrial court also stated that "many clients do not trust their attorneys, or trust anyone for that matter, and it's not a question of incapacity to do so." After being found competent, Dias pled guilty to 15 felony charges and received an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term of 432 months.
COMPETENCY
"No incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues." RCW 10.77.050. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has the capacity to understand the nature of the charges against him and can assist in his defense. State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992). "`Incompetency' means a person lacks the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense as a result of mental disease or defect." RCW 10.77.010(14). A trial court judge is given wide discretion in determining the competence of a defendant, and its decision on competency will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986).
Dias argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully address his lawyers' opinion that he lacked the ability to rationally assist them. "The trial judge may make his [competency] determination from many things, including the defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric reports and the statements of counsel." State v. Dodd, 70 Wn.2d 513, 514, 424 P.2d 302, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 948 (1967). A lawyer's representation concerning the competence of his client is a factor that is entitled to considerable weight. State v. Israel, 19 Wn. App. 773, 779, 577 P.2d 631 (1978) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering counsel's statement about his client's competence in deciding that defense counsel could waive RCW 10.7.060(1)'s examination requirement on his client's behalf); see also State v. Hicks, 41 Wn. App. 303, 308-09, 704 P.2d 1206 (1985) (trial court need not place substantial weight on the competency opinion of an attorney other than the defendant's own and holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the defendant competent even though the defendant's own lawyer asserted that his client was absolutely impossible to work with); State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn. App. 326, 331, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant competent despite his counsel's reservations about his competency), aff'd, 98 Wn.2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 (1983).
Here, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court failed to consider the opinions of defense counsel other than the fact that the findings do not explicitly mention their opinion that Dias is not capable of rationally assisting in his defense. But the detailed findings directly address the contention that Dias was incapable of rational assistance. And those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the form of Dr. Gagliardi's report.
Additionally, the record shows that during the competency hearing the trial court reviewed the ex parte declaration from one of Dias's lawyers stating that his attorneys had additional evidence that they were unwilling to present in an open hearing. To the extent that additional evidence would have supported their opinions about Dias's incompetence, the trial court cannot be expected to give considerable weight to evidence not before it, and Dias does not challenge the trial court's decision in favor of holding an open competency hearing. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dias competent to stand trial or to enter a plea, we affirm Dias's conviction.