State v. Davis

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Mitchell

    18 Kan. App. 2d 530 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 5 times

    ' " 221 Kan. at 687, 561 P.2d 845.        We believe that this case is controlled by State v. Davis, 2 Kan.App.2d 10, 573 P.2d 1124 (1978). In Davis, we reversed the trial court's decision to permit the use of a preliminary hearing transcript for a witness who was not present at trial.

  2. State v. Corby

    699 P.2d 51 (Kan. 1985)   Cited 2 times
    In Corby, the prosecution subpoenaed a key witness who testified at the preliminary hearing, but subsequently moved 100 miles away. 699 P.2d at 52.

    The stipulated facts indicate that the State made a good faith effort to produce the witness. See State v. Davis, 2 Kan. App. 2d 10, 573 P.2d 1124 (1978). The trial court's order prevented the State from proceeding with this prosecution.

  3. State v. Warren

    230 Kan. 385 (Kan. 1981)   Cited 82 times
    Holding that where eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution's case and there is serious doubt about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given

    We have concluded that, under the circumstances, the statement made by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury that an absent witness, Tammie Moss, had previously identified the defendant as being one of the robbers was clearly hearsay and violated the defendant's right of confrontation. In reaching this conclusion, we note the following cases which hold that the admission into evidence of inculpatory hearsay testimony of an absent witness constitutes a denial of the defendant's right of confrontation: State v. Davis, 2 Kan. App. 2d 10, 573 P.2d 1124 (1978); State v. Kirk, 211 Kan. 165, 505 P.2d 619 (1973); State v. Hooks, 202 Kan. 68, 446 P.2d 770 (1968). Misconduct on the part of the prosecutor in making unwarranted comments and going outside the record may be so prejudicial as to deny an accused a fair trial and require reversal.

  4. State v. Fondren

    11 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that authority to enter a building may be express or implied and may depend on the character of the building

    For purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause the test for "unavailability" is the "reasonable diligence" rule. The rule was stated in State v. Davis, 2 Kan. App. 2d 10, 12, 573 P.2d 1124 (1978): "`Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a "good faith effort" to obtain the witness's presence at trial ( Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 88 S.Ct. 1318).

  5. State v. Gray

    616 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 9 times
    Characterizing the per se approach as the "majority rule"

    1972); State v. Ray, 123 Ariz. 171, 598 P.2d 990 (banc 1979); State v. Waits, 92 N.M. 275, 587 P.2d 53 (1978); Brooks v. State, 35 Md. App. 461, 371 A.2d 674 (1977); Anderson v. State, 362 So.2d 1296 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978). Contra: State v. Kirk, 211 Kan. 165, 505 P.2d 619 (1973); State v. Davis, 2 Kan. App. 2d 10, 573 P.2d 1124 (1978); State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 440 P.2d 429 (1968). (It should be noted, however, that Martin was decided only two days after the decision in Barber and makes no reference to that opinion.