Opinion
No. CR06-598693
August 23, 2007
By Motion dated July 26, 2007, and as supplemented by a claim raised in oral argument on August 1, 2007, the defendant contends that he is entitled to one of the following three alternative forms of relief: (1) the granting of his motion to withdraw his pleas of nolo contendere; (2) the granting of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and the vacating of the judgment of his conviction; or (3) the termination of certain conditions of his probation. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the court hereby dismisses the defendant's Motion to the extent that it seeks a withdrawal of his pleas, and denies the Motion in all other respects.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 16, 2007, the defendant, after negotiating the terms of a plea agreement, entered pleas of nolo contendere to the charges of Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 53a-73a, and Criminal Trespass in the First Degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 53a-107. On the same date, and upon acceptance of these pleas, this court sentenced the defendant on each count to one year, execution suspended, and three years of probation, with the sentences on each count to run consecutively. At the time of sentencing, the court also imposed certain special conditions of probation, which the court noted would be "in addition to the usual terms" of probation. Transcript, May 16, 2007 at 6. Specifically, the court ordered that the defendant "undergo whatever sex offender evaluation and treatment that [would be] deemed necessary by the probation department," and "have no contact . . . with the complainant." Id. at 6-7.
On or about May 21, 2007, the defendant met with the probation department and was advised that he would be required to comply with certain so-called "Sex Offender Conditions of Probation" [hereinafter "Sex Offender Conditions"], which were set forth on Court Support Services Division form JD-CR-131 Rev. 3-06, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to the defendant's Motion. The defendant was also advised at that time that, as an additional requirement of his probation, he would be obligated to notify his employer of his convictions.
On July 26, 2007, the defendant filed the instant Motion with the court, seeking either the withdrawal of his pleas or, in the alternative, the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis and the vacating of his judgment of conviction. On August 1, 2007, the court heard argument on this Motion. During the course of the hearing, the defendant advanced a third prayer for relief — arguing that even if his pleas were not vacated, that the court should terminate the Sex Offender Conditions and the employer notification requirement. The State objected to all forms of relief sought by the defendant, challenging not only the merits of the defendant's contentions, but also the court's jurisdiction to entertain the claims in the first instance.
This Motion is not the first filed by the defendant in connection with the terms of his probation. On May 24, 2007, the defendant filed a Motion for Modification of Conditions of Probation. This court heard testimony and argument in connection with that motion on May 31, 2007, and ordered that enforcement of certain of the Sex Offender Conditions, and also the employer notification requirement, would be suspended pending the defendant's completion of a sex offender evaluation and further order of the court. On July 10, 2007, after the results of that evaluation were made available, the court heard further argument and testimony relating to the Motion for Modification. On the basis of such argument and testimony, the court reaffirmed and extended its earlier suspension of some of the Sex Offender Conditions, but revoked its earlier order which had suspended the enforcement of the employer notification requirement. With regard to employer notification, the court ordered the defendant to comply with this condition on or before August 1, 2007, or risk being found to be in violation of his probation. The instant Motion, as noted, was then filed by the defendant on July 26, 2007. On the same date, the defendant filed a second motion seeking a temporary order further staying the employer notification requirement, and prohibiting the probation department, pending a decision on the instant Motion, from commencing any violation of probation proceedings against him on the basis of alleged noncompliance with the disputed conditions. On August 1, this court entertained oral argument on both motions. The court thereupon issued the temporary order sought by the defendant and took the instant Motion under advisement. With the issuance of this written decision, all temporary orders entered by the court on August 1, 2007 are hereby terminated.
II. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEAS
The defendant first moves for permission to withdraw his pleas of nolo contendere on the ground that the pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. More specifically, the defendant contends that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary because he had not been made aware at the time of his pleas that he would be subject to the Sex Offender Conditions and the employer notification requirement. Indeed, the defendant goes on to allege that, had he known that he would be subject to these additional conditions, he would not have entered his pleas.
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. Our Supreme Court has long held that, at least as a general matter, "[i]n a criminal case the imposition of sentence is the judgment of the court . . . When the sentence is put into effect and the [defendant] is taken in execution, custody is transferred from the court to the custodian of the penal institution. At this point jurisdiction of the court over the [defendant] terminates." State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 775 (2006). In other words, except in limited circumstances, "the court `loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections and begins serving the sentence.'" Id., quoting State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427, 432 (1994).
Connecticut case law appears to recognize only two narrow situations in which the trial court retains jurisdiction after the imposition of sentence. The first of these limited circumstances, as recently noted in State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 775 (2006), arises where the legislature has expressly conferred upon the trial court continuing jurisdiction. The second situation in which the trial court may retain jurisdiction is in those cases where "it is apparent on the record that a defendant's constitutional rights were infringed during the plea taking proceeding or that the defendant was not advised of the consequences of his plea and was therefore denied due process." E.g. State v. Falcon, 84 Conn.App. 429, 434 (2004); State v. Perez, 85 Conn.App. 27 (2004).
(1)
The issue of the applicability of the first of these exceptions, the "legislative grace" exception, can be quickly resolved. The defendant here does not claim to act under such a legislative grant of continuing jurisdiction. To the contrary, rather than relying on legislation specifically allowing postsentence review of a plea, the defendant, ironically, brings his motion to withdraw pursuant to Practice Book § 39-26, which specifically prohibits such review in stating that a defendant ` may not withdraw his . . . plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence is imposed." (Emphasis added.) See also State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 775-76. Accordingly, the court cannot assume jurisdiction over the defendant's Motion by virtue of this first exception.
(2)
The exception that the defendant does rely upon is that which permits post-sentence review of pleas where a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights appears of record. Specifically, he claims that the record of his plea canvass establishes that he was not adequately advised of the consequences of his plea because he was not informed that he would be required to comply with the Sex Offender Conditions and with the employer notification obligation. The defendant is correct that the court did not specifically refer either to these Sex Offender Conditions or to the need for employer notification. However, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to these requirements, this court concludes, for the reasons explained below, that the defendant did receive a constitutionally adequate advisement as to the consequences of his pleas. As a result, this exception also fails to provide the court with jurisdiction to consider the defendant's Motion on its merits.
It is well established that "unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable." State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 143 (2005). It is also true that the "constitutional essentials for the acceptance of a plea . . . are included in our rules and are reflected in Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20." Id. at 144. So, while a defendant must be advised of these specifically prescribed direct consequences of his plea, "[t]here is no requirement, however, that the defendant be advised of every possible consequence of such a plea." Id. at 145. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that "the scope of direct consequences [of which a defendant must be advised] is very narrow . . . [and] include[s] only the mandatory minimum and maximum possible sentences; the maximum possible consecutive sentence; the possibility of additional punishment because of previous conviction(s); and the fact that the particular offense does not permit a sentence to be suspended." Id. quoting State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 201-02 (2004).
In sum, these provisions require the court to determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, as well as its maximum possible sentence, including any nonsuspendable mandatory minimum sentence. Practice Book §§ 39-19(1)-(4). The court must also be satisfied that the defendant understands that the plea constitutes a waiver of the right to plead not guilty, the right to a court or jury trial, the right to counsel, the right to confront ones' accusers, and the right not be compelled to incriminate oneself. Practice Book § 39-19(5). Finally, the court must be certain that the plea is entered voluntarily and not as the result of threats or promises. Practice Book § 39-20.
The defendant here does not contend that the court failed in any way to comply with the requirements of Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20. Rather, as noted, the sole basis of his claim is that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised that the Sex Offender Conditions would be imposed or that he would have to report his conviction to his employer. In the view of this court, however, these probation requirements simply were not "direct consequences" which the defendant had a constitutional right to receive notice of prior to his entry of a plea. These probation obligations were merely collateral consequences of the plea and, as our Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he failure to inform a defendant as to all indirect and collateral consequences does not render a plea unintelligent or involuntary in a constitutional sense." State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 144.
While the defendant argues that he would not have entered pleas had he known of these additional probation conditions, this fact does not serve automatically to transform the disputed conditions into direct consequences. For example, in State v. Andrews, 253 Conn. 497 (2000), the defendant moved to withdraw his plea because he had not been advised that his plea to murder would render him statutorily ineligible for parole. Our Supreme Court concluded that there had been no constitutional violation because parole ineligibility was not a direct consequence of a plea. Similarly, in State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134 (2005), the Court held that, because the introduction of the defendant's guilty pleas at his later trial on factually related charges was not a direct consequence of his pleas, the trial court did not have a constitutional duty to inform the defendant of the existence of that risk. In State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 203 (2004), the Court held that, because "the conduct proscribed by a particular condition of probation is not a `direct consequence' of the plea," the trial court was not required to notify the defendant that his failure to acknowledge guilt could result in the violation of the condition of his probation requiring sex offender treatment. Finally, in State v. Groppi, 81 Conn.App. 310 (2004), the Appellate Court held that a restitution order was not a direct consequence of a plea, and the trial court therefore was not constitutionally required to advise the defendant during the plea canvass that he would be required to pay the victim $85,000 as a condition of probation. Certainly, it is fair to assume that the defendants in Andrews, Greene, Faraday and Groppi may not have wished to enter their pleas had they then known what they subsequently came to learn after sentencing. But these cases make clear that this "regret" did not mean that their pleas, any more than those of the defendant here, were constitutionally deficient.
In reaching this conclusion, the court has given due consideration to the Appellate Court decision in State v. Hatch, 75 Conn.App. 615 (2003), a case which the defendant relies upon in his brief. In Hatch, the court held that "a special condition of probation is a direct consequence of a guilty plea that a defendant has the right to known about at the time of his guilty plea . . . [because a] defendant cannot make an intelligent and knowing decision with regard to a probation sentence without any knowledge of the special conditions thereto." Id. at 622-23. The court concludes, however, that Hatch is not controlling here.
First, Hatch appears never to have been cited for this proposition by any other court at either appellate level, and the case seems irreconcilable with (if not implicitly overruled by) more recent decisions, discussed above, of both the Supreme Court, State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 203 (2004) (holding that "the conduct proscribed by a particular condition of probation is not a `direct consequence' of the plea"); and of the Appellate Court itself, State v. Groppi, 81 Conn.App. 310, 315 (2004) (holding that a special condition of probation requiring restitution is not a direct consequence of a plea). Moreover, this court's own research has disclosed that Hatch is the only Connecticut case to find that there do exist direct consequences to a guilty plea beyond those listed in Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20. See State v. Andrews, 253 Conn. 497, 507 n. 8 (2000) ("[Although] we do not hold, as a matter of law, that there can never be direct consequences to a guilty plea . . . beyond those listed in Practice Book § 39-19, . . . we conclude that neither this [Supreme] court nor the Appellate Court has identified any such additional consequences to date").
There is also a critical factual distinction between Hatch and the instant case a distinction which the defendant apparently overlooks. In Hatch, it was the trial court that, at sentencing, itself imposed a special condition of probation which had not been explained to the defendant at the time he chose to enter his plea. Thus, to the extent that Hatch still has precedential value, it stands only for the proposition that a trial judge, at sentencing, cannot unilaterally modify the terms of a plea agreement by imposing special conditions of probation which the defendant had not agreed to at the time of the plea. This is not, however, what happened here.
In this case, this court advised the defendant of the special conditions of probation it intended to impose, the defendant agreed to those conditions, and the court then imposed precisely those conditions and no others. Unlike the situation in Hatch, the defendant here learned not that the court had chosen to impose new special conditions of probations at sentencing, but that the probation department, after it had assumed responsibility for the defendant's supervision, had chosen to impose certain additional obligations upon him. Despite the defendant's effort to equate the two, these additional conditions imposed post-sentencing by the probation department are not the same as the so-called "special conditions of probation," which were at issue in Hatch and which only a court has the power to impose. For this reason as well, this court concludes that Hatch does not inform the resolution of the instant Motion.
Therefore, contrary to the defendant's contention here, the probation department's imposition of the Sex Offender Conditions and the employer notification obligation did not result in a sentence at odds with that which the defendant had bargained for, nor did the defendant suffer any violation of his right to due process when these additional requirements were imposed. At his plea, "the defendant bargained for a sentence that included a term of probation . . . In accepting probation, the defendant accepted at the time of sentencing the possibility that the terms of his probation could be modified or enlarged in the future in accordance with the statutes governing probation. Under these circumstances, the modified conditions of probation did not go beyond the terms of the plea bargain agreed to by the defendant. The modification of the terms of probation, therefore, was not a violation of his constitutional rights." (Emphasis added.) State v. Thorpe, 57 Conn.App. 112, 121 (2000), cited with approval in State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 841.
In fact, for the court to adopt the defendant's contention would mean that every time the probation department exercised its Practice Book § 53a-30(b) authority to modify or enlarge the conditions of a defendant's probation, that defendant would have the automatic right at his or her option either to trump the new conditions (regardless of how necessary they were to the defendant's reformation or the public's safety), or to withdraw his or her pleas entirely (regardless of how long ago they bad been entered). It would also mean that a court, in order to ensure a constitutionally valid plea, would be compelled to advise a defendant as to every conceivable condition which the probation department might choose to impose in the future. See State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 203. This court respectively declines the defendant's invitation to bring about such an absurd result.
For these reasons, the court concludes that although the defendant was not specifically advised during the canvass of his plea that Sex Offender Conditions and employer notification could be imposed by the probation department, he was, as a constitutional matter, properly and adequately informed of the consequences of his pleas. Because the record therefore fails to demonstrate that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated, the defendant cannot seek postsentence review of his pleas on the basis of this second exception.
(3)
For all of the foregoing reasons, the claim of the defendant does not present one of the limited circumstances in which a trial court retains jurisdiction over a case after sentencing. As a result, "the trial court lack[s] jurisdiction to hear and determine the defendant's motion to withdraw," State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 776, and the court's only proper action is to dismiss the motion on that basis. Accordingly, that portion of the instant Motion in which the defendant seeks to withdraw his pleas is hereby dismissed.
III. WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
In an alternative claim for relief, the defendant moves the court to grant his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and to vacate his judgment of conviction on the grounds that the judgment is void. The court denies the petition.
"A writ of error coram nobis is an ancient commonlaw remedy which authorized the trial judge, within three years, to vacate the judgment of the same court if the party aggrieved by the judgment could present facts, not appearing in the record, which, if true, would show that the judgment was void or voidable." State v. Brooks, 89 Conn.App. 427, 437-38 (2005). "The facts which may be so presented by such a writ of error are few. They are limited to such facts that were not presented to the court upon the trial or the original action, and which show that the party either had no legal capacity or no legal opportunity to appear, or that the court had no power to render the judgment complained of." Id.
The defendant's petition seeking the issuance of the writ fails for the simple reason that the defendant has not proven that the judgment complained of was void or voidable. The defendant's sole claim in this regard is that his pleas were void because he entered them without knowledge that the Sex Offender Conditions and employer notification requirement would be imposed by the probation department. But for the reasons discussed in considerable length in Section II of this decision, this court has already concluded that the imposition of these conditions did not render his pleas unknowing or involuntary, or otherwise cause them to suffer from any constitutional deficiency. In reaching these conclusions, the court therefore has implicitly determined that the defendant's judgment of conviction is neither void nor voidable.
In State v. Brooks, 89 Conn.App. 427, the defendant petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, contending that his drug conviction was void because he was unaware at the time he entered his plea that he was eligible for a diversionary drug treatment program. The court there noted that "the defendant cites no authority, and we are aware of no such authority, that a judgment of conviction following a plea of guilty by a person who was not aware of his eligibility for the pretrial drug education program renders the judgment of conviction void or voidable, a prerequisite for relief on a petition for a writ of error coram nobis." Id. at 439. Similarly, the defendant here has provided no authority, and this court is aware of none, supporting the claim that a judgment of conviction is rendered void or voidable where a defendant is unaware that the probation department has the statutory right to impose, and that department in fact does impose, additional conditions of probation upon a defendant.
Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate that his pleas are void or voidable, his claim "cannot serve as the basis for the extraordinary remedy of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis." State v. Brooks, 89 Conn.App. 439. The defendant's petition is therefore hereby denied.
IV. TERMINATION OF PROBATION CONDITIONS
In his final claim for relief, the defendant urges the court to modify the conditions of his probation by terminating the Sex Offender Conditions and employer notification requirement which were imposed by the probation department when it assumed the supervision of the defendant. In advancing this claim, the defendant has objected most specifically and most strenuously to the requirement that he notify his employer of the fact of his conviction — a requirement which he contends, if fulfilled, will result in the termination of his employment. As to the Sex Offender Conditions, the defendant has objected to their continued enforcement, but has failed otherwise to identify the precise hardship they have caused or will cause in the future. Given the nature and extent of the authority granted to probation authorities, and for the reasons hereinafter set forth, the court denies the motion to terminate in its entirety.
When a defendant has been placed on probation, the probation department has the statutory authority to impose conditions not specified by and in addition to those imposed by the sentencing court. General Statute § 53a-30(b) provides that "[w]hen a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the Office of Adult Probation may require that the defendant comply with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court." Recognizing this authority, our Supreme Court therefore has held that "[w]hen the court imposes probation, a defendant thereby accepts the possibility that the terms of probation may be modified or enlarged in the future . . ." State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 830, 841 (2001). In fact, Smith notes that "in sentences of probation, the court will . . . usually leave the conditions to be set by the probation authorities." State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 841 n. 18, quoting Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Comment to § 53a-30.
In order to determine, therefore, whether the probation department may properly add certain conditions to a probation, the reviewing court must decide whether the added conditions "could have" been imposed by the court itself at sentencing; and, if so, whether the added terms are inconsistent with any conditions that were in fact imposed by the court at sentencing. If the added conditions could have been imposed by the court, and are not inconsistent with any conditions which the court did impose, then the added conditions are presumptively valid — without the need for a specific order of the court. Thus, in other words, "an order of probation may be modified by the probation authorities ex parte, . . . [there being] no requirement that the defendant be given a court hearing . . . before the modification properly may occur." State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 839. A probationer subject to such an added condition may, however, contest the reasonableness of the modification either at a subsequent probation revocation hearing or, even sooner, by a motion to modify filed pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-30(c). Id. at 840. If such a challenge is raised, it then becomes incumbent upon the court to determine whether the terms added by the probation department bear a rational relationship to the recognized purposes of probation. Id.
Here, the court must first decide whether it would have been authorized to impose the Sex Offender Conditions and an employer notification requirement as special conditions of the defendant's probation. The court concludes that such conditions could have been imposed. General Statutes § 53a-30(a) provides a list of seventeen conditions that a court may impose as part of a defendant's probation. This statute "sets out, as a kind of guideline, the general conditions that the court may impose, . . . [but] the list is not intended to be exhaustive." State v. Boyle, 102 Conn.App. 507, 512 (2007). In fact, the last of these seventeen conditions is a catch-all provision which allows the court to order that the defendant "satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation." Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(17). "By allowing the trial court to impose ` any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation,' the legislature authorized the court to impose any condition that would help to secure the defendant's reformation." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 287 (1999). Thus, under this statute a trial court "has an exceptional degree of flexibility in determining [the terms of probation], id. at 288, and "may impose a variety of conditions to a sentence of probation that are aimed at rehabilitating the defendant." State v. Boyle, 102 Conn.App. 512.
Given this broad grant of authority, this court concludes that, at sentencing and pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-30(a)(17), it could have imposed the Sex Offender Conditions and the employer notification requirement as special conditions of the defendant's probation. Since the court had the authority to impose these conditions at sentencing, the probation department would be authorized to impose them after sentencing, except to the extent that they would be inconsistent with any of the special conditions of probation that the court had imposed. Here, the court finds that neither the Sex Offender Conditions nor the employer notification requirement are by their nature inconsistent with any of the special conditions of probation imposed by the court. To the contrary, in that the court did impose a special condition of probation requiring the defendant to undergo sexual offender evaluation and treatment deemed necessary by the probation department, the conditions added by the probation department are entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of the court's own orders. Therefore, the additional conditions imposed by the probation department were presumptively valid and binding upon the defendant.
However, as noted above, a defendant who "believes that the office of adult probation imposed an unreasonable condition . . . may request a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-30(c)." State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 840. This is precisely what the defendant seeks here in his third claim for relief. With this issue of reasonableness having now been raised, it becomes incumbent upon this court to determine whether these added conditions are reasonably related to the purposes of probation — that is, to the rehabilitation of the offender and to the protection of society. State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 168-69 (1988).
Turning first to the employer notification obligation, the court concludes that such a requirement is reasonably related to both of the stated purposes of probation. Almost this identical issue was addressed by our Supreme Court in State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280 (1999). In that case, the defendant, like the defendant here, had been convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree (and another misdemeanor offense), and had received a suspended sentence with probation with a special condition of sexual offender evaluation and treatment. Like the defendant here, the defendant in Misiorski was advised shortly after he commenced probation that there would be a notification requirement. Whereas, here, that requirement obligates the defendant to notify his employer of his conviction, in Misiorski the defendant was told that his probation officer intended to notify the defendant's neighbors and fellow bowling league participants. Id. at 284-85. The defendant there objected to this notification and moved the court to resolve the issue. The trial court, after hearing, authorized the notification of the defendant's neighbors, as well as the local school principal. Id. at 288. The defendant then appealed.
It is not clear from the Supreme Court decision whether the trial court refused to allow the notification of the bowling league participants, or whether that request was withdrawn. It is also unclear as to how notification of the school principal became an issue before the court.
In Misiorski, the Supreme Court, relying on General Statutes §§ 53a-30(a) and 54-108, concluded that the trial court had "properly upheld the authority of the office of adult probation to give notification as a condition of probation." Misiorski, 250 Conn. 288. Specifically, the Court held that "the trial court acted within its discretion in permitting the office of adult probation, as a condition of probation, to notify members of the defendant's community in an attempt to foster the defendant's reformation." Id. at 289. Noting that the trial court had ordered sexual offender treatment as a condition of probation, the Court determined that "[n]otification to the public was a reasonable component of the defendant's sexual offender treatment," id., which "would be a suitable means to `aid and encourage the defendant and to bring about improvement in his conduct and condition.'" Id., quoting General Statutes § 54-108. Misiorski thus makes clear that notification requirements, at least in connection with sexual assault convictions, can reasonably be imposed as conditions of probation.
General Statutes § 54-108 provides in relevant part as follows: "Duties of Probation Officers. Probation officers shall . . . use all suitable methods to aid and encourage [a probationer] and to bring about improvement in his conduct and condition . . ."
Here, the defendant was convicted of crimes arising from an incident in which he appeared at the home of woman he had dated in the past, refused her repeated requests that he leave, forced himself on top of the woman, and had sexual contact with her genitals without her consent. T. at 4. The court placed the defendant under the supervision of probation authorities, who, after assessing the nature of the defendant's conduct, determined that the defendant's employer should be made aware of the defendant's conviction. The court concurs fully in this determination.
In the view of this court, the response of the probation department was entirely reasonable and was fully consistent with not only one, but both, of the recognized purposes of probation. Notification to the defendant's employer was unquestionably important for public safety by "enabl[ing] the recipients of such notification to have information that helps to protect them [or their employees] from becoming victims of sexual offenses." State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 289 quoting Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) (testimony of Connecticut's deputy director of operations for the office of adult probation, discussing purposes of community notification). Moreover, notification also served the rehabilitative interests of probation in that "notification adds to the offender's self-restraints by virtue of the fact that knowing that others out there are aware of his circumstances would act as an inhibitor on his desire to engage in any activities that might place him at risk of relapse or reoffending." Id. at 290.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the employer notification requirement condition was validly imposed by the probation department pursuant to its statutory authority. The court further finds that this condition is appropriate both as a means of bringing about the reformation and rehabilitation of the defendant, and as a means of ensuring the safety of the community. On this basis, the court denies the defendant's motion to terminate this requirement, lifts its order staying enforcement of this condition, and orders the defendant to comply with this condition on or before September 14, 2007, or be subject to such further action or proceedings which the probation department in its discretion may deem appropriate.
Although the court understands this condition as specifically requiring the defendant to notify his employer, the court hereby authorizes the probation department to itself effectuate such notification in the event that the defendant does not demonstrate to the probation department's satisfaction that he has timely complied with this condition on his own. If due to the defendant's inaction notification is made by probation authorities, this court expresses no opinion as to whether the defendant's failure to provide the notification on his own would alone constitute an adequate basis to find him in violation of his probation. The defendant must proceed at his own peril in this regard, leaving to another day a decision on this question in the event that it should arise.
Finally, with regard to the defendant's challenge to the Sex Offender Conditions, the court, having already determined that these conditions were presumptively valid, is still left with the task of deciding whether they are reasonable in light of the purposes of probation. In this regard, however, the defendant has provided the court with little, if any, argument or evidence relevant to this question. Unlike the comparative breadth of information made available to the court relating to the requirement of employer notification — the court heard extensively from both counsel as well as from representatives of the probation department as to the claimed need for and reasonableness of this condition — the record is nearly devoid of any information pertaining to the need for or appropriateness of the Sex Offender Conditions. Indeed, the defendant has failed even to specify which of the many Sex Offender Conditions he finds unreasonable, choosing instead to employ what could be termed a "shotgun approach" in challenging these conditions. But in waging such a wholesale attack, the defendant has offered nothing which even tends to establish that any of the Sex Offender Conditions fails to bear a rational relation to the purposes of probation. Accordingly, the court therefore must deny the defendant's motion to terminate these conditions.
Contrary to what appears to be the defendant's sole contention, the court reiterates that the Sex Offender Conditions are not rendered unreasonable merely because they were not expressly referred to in the plea agreement.
The defendant, of course, is not barred by this ruling from attempting in the future to present a more specific challenge to the reasonableness of any of the Sex Offender Conditions. However, the defendant is reminded that until such time as a court orders otherwise, these conditions are presumptively valid and the defendant's noncompliance with any of them potentially could expose him to violation of probation proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the court hereby DISMISSES the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas; DENIES his petition for the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis; and DENIES his motion to terminate any of the current conditions of his probation. The court also hereby terminates the temporary orders it entered on August 1, 2007, see supra, at p. 2, n. 1, and directs the defendant to comply with the employer notification requirement on or before September 14, 2007, as is more particularly explained herein. See supra, at p. 18, n. 6 and accompanying text.