Opinion
1509003025
07-13-2022
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. SHAWN D. DANIELS, Defendant.
Date Submitted: April 19, 2022
ORDER
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
Upon the pro se Defendant Shawn D. Daniels' Motion for Correction of Sentence Pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(a) - DENIED
This 13th day of July 2022, upon consideration of the pro se Defendant Shawn D. Daniels' Motion for Correction of Sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) (D.I. 71), the State's Response (D.I. 74), Defendant's Reply (D.I. 75), Defendant's Motion to Strike (D.I. 76), Defendant's Motion for Reargument and its supplements (D.I. 80-83), the State's Response to the reargument motion (D.I. 85), Defendant's Reply thereto (D.I. 86), and the complete record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:
RELEVANTPROCEDURAL HISTORY
(1) On March 7, 2016, Daniels pleaded guilty to a single count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP). He did so in exchange for dismissal of the other indicted charges and a favorable sentencing recommendation. Through his written plea forms and during his plea colloquy, Daniels admitted that for this PFBPP offense he was eligible for habitual criminal offender sentencing under then-existing 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and subject to a minimum term of 15 years at Level V-comprised, in part of a statutory minimum term of incarceration and, in part, of a habitual criminal sentence-with a maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment.
Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Form, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 1509003025 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2016) (D.I. 15).
As further explained below, in Daniels' case the PFBPP is a class C felony. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1448(c) and (e)(1) (2015) (PFBPP when one has a prior violent felony conviction is a class C felony); id. at § 1448(e)(1)(c) (providing that any person convicted of PFBPP "shall receive a minimum sentence of: Ten years at Level V, if the person has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony.").
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2015) (providing then that for one, like Daniels, who had been thrice previously convicted of felonies-no matter what those felonies were-and was thereafter convicted of any Title 11 violent felony can be declared a habitual criminal; such a habitual criminal must receive a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty otherwise provided for the triggering Title 11 violent felony (or felonies) that formed the basis of the State's habitual criminal petition); id. at §§ 1448(c), (e)(1) and 4205(b)(3) (maximum sentence for PFBPP as a class C felony is 15 years at Level V).
Id.; Plea Transcript, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 1509003025 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2016), at 6-9 (D.I. 25).
(2) His sentencing occurred on September 9, 2016, after the Court denied Daniels' motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the State filed an amended habitual criminal petition.
D.I. 31.
D.I. 34.
(3) That amended petition was the result of the parties' agreement to apply the substantive revisions to Delaware's Habitual Criminal Act that were enacted after Daniels' plea was entered but before he was sentenced. At Daniels' sentencing the parties and Court addressed the applicability of the then-new habitual criminal sentencing provisions. The parties and Court agreed to the application of those new provisions to the PFBPP conviction for which the State sought habitual criminal sentencing. This benefitted Daniels by allowing his counsel to argue that the Court might sentence him to less than the 15 years required by the pre-July-2016 version of the Habitual Criminal Act.
See 80 Del. Laws Ch. 321 (eff. July 19, 2016).
Sentencing Hrg. Tr., State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 1509003025 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2016), at 3-5, 9, 13-14 (D.I. 39).
Id. Such agreements were permitted for just that small universe of habitual criminal cases pending disposition when the 2016 revisions to Delaware's Habitual Criminal Act were first enacted. They were permitted for two reasons: (1) for the defendant, the potential resulting sentence was always either the same or better than the law in effect when the then-pending case started; and (2) application of the old law might foster needless review under new § 4214(f)- relief under which was application of the new habitual criminal provisions. See e.g. State v. Dillard, 2019 WL 118437, at *5-6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2019) (providing an example of such a case, the parties' agreement, and the benefit to a defendant's case that fit into the small universe).
Sentencing Hrg. Tr., at 8-10 (D.I. 39). Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2015) (any person sentenced under then-existing § 4214(a) had to receive a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty otherwise provided for any fourth or subsequent Title 11 violent felony that formed the basis of the State's habitual criminal petition); with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2016) (providing under revised habitual criminal sentencing provisions one who had been thrice previously convicted of felonies and is thereafter convicted of a Title 11 violent felony must receive a minimum sentence of not less than one-half the statutory maximum penalty otherwise provided for the triggering Title 11 violent felony that forms the basis of the State's habitual criminal petition). Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ id. at §§ 1448(c), (e)(1), 4201(c), and 4205(b)(3) (2015) (PFBPP was then, and is now, a class C violent felony with a statutory maximum of 15 years imprisonment). In effect, Daniels' sentencing exposure became a minimum of ten years-due to the operation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(c)-and a maximum of life. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2016) (one sentenced thereunder could receive a sentence of "up to life imprisonment").
(4) Daniels is correct that the sentencing provisions-including those of the Habitual Criminal Act-in effect at the time that a criminal act is committed are those applied when imposing a sentence for that act. And Delaware courts need apply intervening ameliorative changes to sentencing statutes only when the General Assembly expressly provides for their retroactive application. Indeed then, Daniels succeeded in having the State agree to and the Court consider sentencing parameters more favorable than controlling law required.
Wright v. State, 2022 WL 499979, at *3-4 (Del. Feb. 17, 2022); Garnett v. State, 2022 WL 1639226, at *2-3 (Del. May 23, 2022).
See Fountain v. State, 139 A.3d 837, 842-43 (Del. 2016) (Statutory revisions allowing for concurrent sentences in some circumstances do not apply to defendants whose crimes occurred before those changes because General Assembly did not expressly provide for their retroactive application.); State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257, at 263-64 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019) (same); State v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004) (Noting when declining to apply statutory changes favorable to the defendant that were enacted while his prosecution was pending: "Just as the State will not surprise a defendant with greater punishment in an ex post facto fashion, neither should a defendant feign surprise about the penalties that accompanied his conduct at the time of offense."), aff'd, 2004 WL 1587040 (Del. July 9, 2004) (affirming "on the basis of and for the reasons set forth in [that] well-reasoned decision" of this Court). See also Wicks v. State, 559 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Del. 1989) (In the face of silence on the issue, there is no reason to believe the General Assembly would intend punishment to depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of when a defendant was convicted and sentenced rather than when his crime was committed.).
Candidly, the Court overlooked this wrinkle in the history of Daniels' habitual criminal and sentencing proceedings when it first considered this motion for correction of sentence. (See order dated January 31, 2022, D.I. 78). As a result, the Court issued a corrected sentencing order (D.I. 79) to correct what the State advised was a "scrivenor's error" including the wrong § 4214 designation. (See D.I. 74. The State advised that the Defendant was sentenced under § 4214(a). This was incorrect.). The record makes clear that the Defendant was sentenced under § 4214(b) . Given the Court's disposition of Daniels' remaining argument-that his 2015 PFBPP offense is indeed a subsequent Title 11 violent felony-he would much rather stick to the deal he cut and have the Court clarify that the provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) that took effect just before his sentencing are those applied to his sentencei.e., that the minimum habitual criminal portion of his sentence was 7½ as opposed to 15 years. See Def. Rule 36(a) Mot., at 4 (D.I. 71) (citing the post-2016 version of § 4214(b) as that he wished applied here). Accordingly, the Court will issue herewith a corrected sentencing order clarifying that designation.
(5) The Court granted the State's amended habitual criminal petition with Daniels' agreement, heard the parties' arguments on sentencing, and imposed the following as a matter of its own sentencing discretion: for PFBPP (IN15-09-0671)- 13½ years of Level V incarceration followed by six months of supervised probation.Again, the first ten-year portion of Daniels' Level V period is comprised of a minimum term of incarceration that must be imposed and cannot be suspended.And the Court's order provides that Daniels' sentence is effective September 4, 2015.
D.I. 35.
Sentencing Order, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 1509003025 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016) (D.I. 37).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448(e)(1)(c) (2015) (providing for a minimum sentence of "[t]en years at Level V, if the person [convicted of PFBPP] has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony").
Sentencing Order, at 1.
(6) Daniels' conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.And he has since filed unsuccessful motions for sentence reduction and postconviction relief.
Daniels v. State, 2017 WL 2812926 (Del. June 28, 2017).
E.g. D.I. 46 and 49 (order denying Daniels' first motion for sentence reduction and reargument thereon); D.I. 61 and 62 (denial of Daniels' first postconviction motion); D.I. 66 (order denying subsequent motion for reduction of sentence).
(7) Daniels' current application is his "Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a)." In this motion (and its many supplements), Daniels insists he is serving an "illegal sentence." In his view, he "do[es] not have a prior violent conviction" and, therefore, the 2015 PFBPP for which he is convicted also must be deemed non-violent. Thus, he says, the only habitual criminal sentencing provision that should be applied to him is the pre-2016 version of § 4214(a) and there should have been no minimum mandatory term- whether it derive from § 1448 or § 4214-applied to his 2015 PFBPP offense.
D.I. 71.
See Def. Supp. Ltr. (Mar. 14, 2022), at 1 (D.I. 83); Def. Rule 35(a) Reply (Nov. 16, 2021), at 2 (D.I. 75) ("However, as to the defendant's offense PFBPP (2015), it is a non-violent felony because he did not have any previous violent offenses as defined in 11 Del. C. § 4201(c).") (emphasis in original).
Id.; Def. Rearg. Mot. (Feb. 9, 2022), at 2 (D.I. 80) (suggesting that his 2015 PFBPP conviction should be classified as a class D non-violent felony).
(8) On January 31, 2022, the Court issued an order denying Daniels' request for correction of sentence and, a few days later, docketed its modified sentencing order in accord with that judgment. Almost immediately, Daniels' filed a timely Motion for Reargument suggesting that the Court misconstrued either the operable facts or the arguments he made regarding the habitual criminal sentence he is serving.
D.I. 78 and 79.
D.I. 80. See Samuel v. State, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1 (Del. Aug. 17, 2010) ("A timely-filed motion for reargument is 'the proper device for seeking reconsideration" of [this Court]'s findings of fact and conclusions of law.") (citations omitted).
APPLICABLELEGALSTANDARDS
(9) Criminal Rule 35(a) permits this Court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Relief under Rule 35(a) is available when, inter alia, the sentence imposed: exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits; omits a term required to be imposed by statute; is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) ("Correction of sentence. -- The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time . . .").
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
(10) In Delaware, there is no specific criminal rule governing motions for reargument. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d), however, the Court "regulate[s] its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule or in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or the rules of the Supreme Court." Thus, Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) is controlling in this criminal matter.
State v. Binaird, 2016 WL 1735504, at *1 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016); State v. Zachary, 2013 WL 5783388, at *1 n.1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d).
Dickens v. State, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 n.3 (Del. June 25, 2004); Parker v. State, 2001 WL 213389, at *1 n.4 (Del. Feb. 26, 2001); Binaird, 2016 WL 1735504, at *1 n.2; Zachary, 2013 WL 5783388, at *1, n.1.
(11) "Clarification is a form of relief that may be granted under Rule 59(e) where the meaning of what the Court has written is unclear." And procedurally, an application seeking clarification is treated as a motion for reargument. So clarification under Rule 59(e) might be appropriate if the Court overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principle, or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would have affected the outcome or articulation of the underlying decision. The Court's review is "limited to consideration of the record," meaning the Court may not consider issues raised for the first time in a motion for clarification or reargument.
GXP Capital, LLC v. Argonaut Manufacturing Services, Inc., 234 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Del. Super. Ct. 2020); State ex rel. French v. Card Compliant, LLC, 2018 WL 4183714, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2018).
State ex rel. French, 2018 WL 4183714, at *4.
See State v. Brown, 2019 WL 3249402, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2020) (setting forth the bases for reargument of a decision in a criminal matter).
State ex rel. French, 2018 WL 4183714, at *4.
(12) Having considered Daniels' assertions on reargument and the parties' positions taken in their supplemental materials, the Court recognizes the value of greater clarity in the Court's findings and holdings, hereby modifies its January 31, 2022 Order as set forth in this Order, and corresponding Second Corrected Sentence Order.
D.I. 78.
The Court's Corrected Sentence Order, dated February 1, 2022 (D.I. 79) is further corrected by the issuance of a second Corrected Sentence Order clarifying that Defendant was sentenced pursuant to 11 Del. C. 4214(b).
DISCUSSION
(13) It should not go unnoticed that Daniels is doing precisely that which this Court has seen far too often in such cases-a criminal defendant resolves his serious firearms charges by plea and then later invites the Court to assist his violation of his plea and sentencing agreement. Perhaps that should be enough to dispose of this claim because it is presumed that Daniels' admission that he was subject to the 15-year minimum and acknowledgment of his habitual criminal status and its consequences-both verbally at his plea hearing and in writing-were the truth.But for avoidance of any doubt as to whether those representations were well-grounded, the Court will address Daniels' current attempt to undermine them.
See generally State v. Felton, 2022 WL 189327, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2022) (noting that such petitions are "at bottom, a breach of that [plea] agreement" and "[i]t matters not whether that breaching request is made during the sentencing hearing, immediately thereafter, or anytime later").
Plea Transcript, at 6-9; Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Form, at 1-2; Sentencing Hrg. Tr., at 4-5, 8-10, 13 (D.I. 39) (at sentencing Daniels and his counsel seemed to express gratitude to the State and Court for the fortuitous opportunity that allowed the Court to consider less than that 15-year minimum).
See Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) ("With or without the witness oath, a defendant's statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful. Those contemporaneous representations by a defendant pose a 'formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.'") (internal citations omitted). See also Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 551-57 (2011) (observing generally that state court motions for sentence correction or reduction are forms of collateral review).
(14) At this point, it is important to clarify what Daniels does not contest. He agrees that he has no less than the four prior felony convictions listed in his plea agreement and the State's amend motion. He also agrees that if he had a prior conviction for any violent felony, then his 2015 PFBPP is itself a violent felony.And lastly, Daniels agrees that the definition of "violent felony" as that term is used in both § 1448(e) and § 4214 is controlled by the version of § 4201(c) in effect at the time he committed his 2015 PFBPP.
Def. Rule 35(a) Mot. (Aug. 18, 2021), at 1 (D.I. 71); See Def. Rearg. Reply (Apr. 19, 2022), at 4 (D.I. 86).
See Def. Rule 35(a) Reply (Nov. 16, 2021), at 2 n.1 (quoting Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 541 n.21 (Del. 2017)).
See Def. Rule 35(a) Mot. (Aug. 18, 2021), at 3; Def. Rearg. Reply (Apr. 19, 2022), at 4 (quoting Butcher and Jones v. State, 2021 WL 4098967 (Del. Sept. 8, 2021) for this point).
(15) The plain language of § 1448(e)(1)(c) requires the Court to impose a minimum sentence of "[t]en years at Level V, if the person has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony." Under § 1448(e)(3), a "violent felony" is a felony defined as violent by 11 Del. C. § 4201(c). And there is no doubt now that § 4201(c) designates a PFBPP conviction as a violent felony only if the defendant is subject to sentencing under § 1448(e). Under the law in effect when Daniels' illegally possessed a firearm on September 4, 2015, he actually had more prior violent felony convictions than would have been required to render him liable to sentencing under § 1448(e)(1)(c).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448(e) (2016) (Possession and purchase of deadly weapons by persons prohibited; penalties).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448(e)(3) (2016).
Butcher, 171 A.3d at 541.
(16) While he'd rather not, one must first look to Daniels' 1997 conviction for Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4752.That felony was not just a designated violent felony on the § 4201(c) list in 2015, it has been a constant on the § 4201(c) list of violent felonies. And it is that felony that first made Daniels a person prohibited. Inarguably then, his 2000 PFBPP conviction is-for § 1448, § 4201(c), and § 4214 purposes-a Title 11 violent felony. So too is Daniels' 2002 PFBPP conviction. And while the remaining felony drug convictions alleged in the State's amended habitual criminal petition would not count in this case as "violent" felonies for aggravated sentencing enhancement under § 1448 or § 4214, they certainly remain in the base equation to calculate Daniels' habitual criminal status.
See Indictment, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 9608013180 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1996) (D.I. 2); Verdict and Sentence, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 9608013180 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 1997) (D.I. 29 and 30) (Daniels found guilty and sentenced for Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana (IN96-08-1626) in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4752).
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (1996) ("Title 16, Section . . . 4752 Manufacture/Delivery/Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled or Counterfeit Controlled Substance" as a violent felony); id. at § 4201(c) (2015) (listing "Title 16, Section . . . [Former] 4752 Manufacture/Delivery/Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled or Counterfeit Controlled Substance" as a violent felony).
See Ex. A to State's Amended Habitual Criminal Petition, State v. Shawn D. Daniels, ID No. 1509003025 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2016) (D.I. 34) (documents from Daniels' 2000 PFBPP conviction, including the indictment charging him with being a person prohibited from possessing a firearm due to his 1997 possession with intent to deliver conviction).
Butcher, 171 A.3d at 543; Jones, 2021 WL 4098967, at *2.
See Ex. B to State's Amended Habitual Criminal Petition (documents from Daniels' 2002 PFBPP conviction, including the indictment charging him with being a person prohibited from possessing a firearm due to his 2000 PFBPP conviction).
Ayala v. State, 204 A.3d 829, 838-40 (Del. 2019); Garnett, 2022 WL 1639226, at *3.
(17) Given controlling law at the time of Daniels' crime and sentencing, his 2015 PFBPP conviction was no doubt eligible for enhanced sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(c) and, therefore, could properly be deemed a subsequent triggering Title 11 violent felony under § 4214(b).
In fact, the State could have moved for sentencing under then-new § 4214(c) or § 4214(d) which would have brought the minimum right back up to 15 years at Level V. It did not and that was a matter of its own discretion when filing its amended habitual criminal petition. See Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 1343761, at *2 (Del. June 18, 2002). Where the State files a substantively adequate motion for application of one's habitual offender status and that motion becomes the basis for a finding of the existence of his habitual offender status, this Court must apply that specific habitual offender status sought and apply it to each specific count-no more or no less-advanced by the State. See Brown v. State, 2020 WL 609646, at *2 (Del. Feb. 7, 2020); Hawkins v. State, 2002 WL 384436, *2 (Del. Mar. 6, 2002); Reeder v. State, 2001 WL 355732, at * 3 (Del. Mar. 26, 2001); Kirby v. State, 1998 WL 184492, at *2 (Del. Apr. 13, 1998).
CONCLUSION
(18) Daniels is not serving an illegal sentence. He is serving a sentence well within the range permitted by both the applicable person-prohibited and habitual criminal statutes. The structure of that sentence is in no way malformed by some undue application of a statutory minimum. The Court understood the minimum required by the habitual offender status ultimately petitioned-for to be 7½ years at Level V. The Court understood too that the § 1448(e) statutorily-required minimum sentence was 10 years at Level V because Daniels, when he possessed a firearm in 2015, had been convicted previously of at least two violent felonies. And lastly, the Court understood it had the discretion to impose a life sentence.
(19) Daniels acknowledged all of this during his plea colloquy and confirmed he knew the basis of his enhanced PFBPP sentence. Daniels' Rule 35(a) motion for correction of sentence that now seeks to back away from his admissions and agreement must, therefore, be DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.