512 U.S. at 599, 114 S. Ct. at 2435 ("We see no reason why collateral statements, . . . even ones that are neutral as to interest, . . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded."). Cf. State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 74, 817 P.2d 18, 19 (App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121, 112 S. Ct. 1243 (1992) ("In short it was not necessarily against [declarant's] penal interest to inculpate appellant, and he may have believed it would further his own interest by creating the possibility of a 'deal' with police."). However, once defendant made the tactical decision to introduce some of Woods' testimony about the August conversation, he could not simultaneously preclude the state from introducing other evidence of that same conversation.

. We review the court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 74, 817 P.2d 18, 19 (App. 1991), but review any confrontation clause issues raised below de novo. State v. Bronson, 204 Ariz. 321, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 1058, 1061 (App. 2003).

512 U.S. at 599, 114 S.Ct. at 2435 ("We see no reason why collateral statements, . . . even ones that are neutral as to interest, . . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded."). Cf. State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 74, 817 P.2d 18, 19 (App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121, 112 S.Ct. 1243, 117 L.Ed.2d 475 (1992) ("In short it was not necessarily against [declarant's] penal interest to inculpate appellant, and he may have believed it would further his own interest by creating the possibility of a `deal' with police."). However, once defendant made the tactical decision to introduce some of Woods' testimony about the August conversation, he could not simultaneously preclude the state from introducing other evidence of that same conversation.

We need not guess as to what the trial court found as fact. See U.S. v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631, 634 (11th Cir 1992) (after the intervening decision in Idaho v. Wright, supra, the appellate court "must decide whether, if the corroborating evidence [of guilt] is not considered, there were adequate guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admitting" the statement), cert den ___ US ___, 113 S Ct 1053 (1993); State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 817 P.2d 18 (1991) (also using this approach), cert den ___ US ___, 112 S Ct 1243 (1992); see also Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., 192 Or. 23, 233 P.2d 258 (1951) (if subsequent to the trial court judgment and before the decision of the appellate court the governing law changes, the current law must be applied). Some of the factors discussed previously are not "corroboration" of defendant's guilt of the crime but, given that the statement is against declarant's interest in avoiding criminal liability, are true "trustworthiness guarantees" of the statement itself.

However, we review the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 74 (App. 1991). ¶10 Morrison attempts to assert attorney-client privilege because "it is not clear in this case that [he] could have reached his attorney and his brother was therefore a necessary agent to make the phone call."

¶10 We review the superior court's rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 74, 817 P.2d 18, 19 (App. 1991). Under Arizona Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." ¶11 The poems describe a shooting factually similar to the murder in Vasquez's case and thereby support the State's contention that Vasquez was the primary shooter.

Canaday, 141 Ariz. at 35, 684 P.2d at 916. See also State v. Daniel, 169 Ariz. 73, 817 P.2d 18 (Ct.App. 1991). Just as the court held in Canaday that particular scrutiny must be given to statements made in a custodial setting because of the likely presence of any number of motives to fabricate, the same is also true with respect to the testimony of an accused defending himself in a criminal prosecution.