Opinion
File No(s) 1606024153
04-17-2017
State of Delaware Petitioner v. D- - - - - R- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - C- - - - - - - DE - - - - - Respondent
Petitioner Attorney Kelly Singleton, DAG Respondent Attorney Jonathan Layton, Esq.
CIVIL DISPOSITION
CPI No(s) Nature of Proceeding Petitioner Attorney
Kelly Singleton, DAG Respondent Attorney
Jonathan Layton, Esq. [ ] ANNOUNCED IN COURT [×] DECISION RESERVED
Before the HONORABLE JENNIFER B. RANJI, JUDGE of the Family Court of the State of Delaware:
This is the Court's decision on the pending charges in the above-referenced delinquency matter. Respondent D----- R------- is charged with Burglary Second Degree, Theft of a Motor Vehicle, Conspiracy Second Degree related to the Burglary charge, Conspiracy Second Degree related to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge, and Theft Under $1,500. The Court held a trial on March 20, 2017. At Trial, the Court heard from Ms. M------- D------, the alleged victim of the crimes charged; Ms. A------ R-----, an employee of the Wilmington Housing Authority; Detective J--- M---- of the New Castle County Police Department; and Detective K---- M-----, also of the New Castle County Police Department.
At Trial, Ms. M------- D------ testified that on June 28, 2016, she and her family went to bed with their Ford Explorer, Ford Escape, and Jeep locked and parked in the driveway of their home, garage door openers in both the Explorer and Escape, keys to the vehicles hanging in their kitchen, and the doors to their home locked. Ms. D------ testified that she went to bed at approximately midnight and awoke the next morning, on June 29, 2016, at approximately 5:00 A.M., to find that the Explorer and Escape were missing and to find the garage door, the door from the garage into the house, and the front door all open. Ms. D------ further testified that drawers and cabinets in the house were open and that several items were missing, including her husband's laptop computer and briefcase that had been left in the family room as well as cell phones that belonged to her children.
Ms. A------ R----- testified that she works for Wilmington Housing Authority and on the morning of June 29, 2016, she reported to her then place of work at Baynard Apartments, 309 W. 18th Street, Wilmington. Ms. R----- testified that upon arriving at work at approximately 8:30 AM, she noticed an unfamiliar black Ford Explorer parked in the parking lot. After checking with others to determine whether anyone recognized the vehicle, law enforcement was contacted regarding the presence of the unknown vehicle in the parking lot.
See State's Exhibit #s 19, 27. In Exhibit 19, one can observe a white sign on a fence behind the Explorer which reads, "Wilmington Housing Authority Tenant Parking Only."
Ms. R----- further testified that the Wilmington Housing Authority operates a video camera with a partial view of the parking lot at Baynard Apartments. Ms. R----- was able to identify a video that the State offered into evidence and played during the trial. Ms. R----- testified that the video came from the Wilmington Housing Authority and that it showed the parking lot at Baynard Apartments on the morning of June 29, 2016.
State's Exhibit #43.
The video shows what appears to be a black Ford Explorer driving past the camera shortly after 5:00 A.M., entering from the right of the screen and exiting the camera screen to the left. Approximately 5 minutes later, the video camera shows two individuals walking from the left of the screen and exiting to the right of the screen. One of the individuals is wearing a bright red hooded sweatshirt with a white zipper and two-toned red and black sneakers with light grey or light brown pants. Ms. R----- testified that neither of the individuals lived in Baynard Apartments, as she knows the residents there and the apartments are for older adults, while the individuals in the video appeared to be much younger.
Detective J--- M---- of the New Castle County Police Department testified that he responded to Ms. D------' house on June 29, 2016, due to a call regarding a burglary. Detective M---- further responded to Baynard Apartments later on June 29, 2016 due to the call regarding the black Ford Explorer in the parking lot. Detective M---- testified that the vehicle was identified as the Ford Explorer that had been stolen from Ms. D------' home hours prior, and he further testified that the laptop and briefcase taken from Ms. D------' home were found in the Ford Explorer. Detective M---- testified that he performed DNA and fingerprint sampling both in Ms. D------' house and inside and outside of the Ford Explorer on June 29, 2016.
Detective K---- M-----, also of the New Castle County Police Department, testified that he works in the Evidence Detection Squad of the Department and performs fingerprint analysis for the Department. Detective M----- testified that he processed the fingerprints lifted by Detective M---- and, after doing so, entered the prints into the system that the Department utilizes to compare latent prints to live prints that have been taken from individuals. Detective M----- testified that as a result of the fingerprint processing, two sets of fingerprints - each taken from an area near the front passenger door handle of the Ford Explorer - were identified as belonging to the Respondent. Upon questioning, Detective M----- agreed that fingerprints can last for a significant period of time.
As a result of the fingerprint match, on June 30, 2016, following issuance of a warrant, Respondent was brought in for questioning and was photographed by Detective M----. Said photograph was entered as Petitioner's Exhibit 42. The photograph shows Respondent wearing a bright red hooded sweatshirt with a white zipper, red and black two-tone sneakers, and light grey or beige sweatpants, each of which appeared identical to those worn by the individual who appeared in the video walking away from the direction in which the stolen vehicle had just been parked.
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Layton made a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal which was denied. In his Motion and his closing argument, Mr. Layton argued that the fingerprints could have been on the car door as a result of Respondent innocently walking past the car in a parking lot years ago and touching it. Mr. Layton further argues that there is no evidence that the Respondent entered the victim's house, nor is there evidence of a conspiracy. Finally, as it relates to the charge of Theft, Mr. Layton argues that in addition to the alleged lack of evidence regarding Respondent's part in the charged crimes, the State failed to provide evidence of the value of the items allegedly stolen. Mr. Layton argues that value must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even when the State alleges that the value is at the lowest level provided by statute which, for Theft, is less than $1,500.
Mr. Layton also appears to argue that the same argument as to value applies to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge. The Court notes, however, that Theft of a Motor Vehicle does not require that any value be declared or proven.
The State argues that the evidence is sufficient to prove all five charges beyond a reasonable doubt and that it is not required to provide proof of the value of stolen goods that are valued at less than $1,500. In addition, the State argues for the application of the Accomplice Liability statute as well as the presumption found in 11 Del. C. §306(c)(2). The accomplice liability statute is found at 11 Del. C. § 271, and it provides:
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when: (1) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient for commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct constituting the offense; or
(2) Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense the person:
a. Solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or
b. Aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or
c. Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so; or
(3) The person's conduct is expressly declared by this Criminal Code or another statute to establish the person's complicity.
The relevant portion of Section 306(c)(2) provides as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Criminal Code, the following rebuttable presumptions are expressly preserved:The Court will discuss the application of these two statutes as they relate to each of the charges.
***
(2) A person found in possession of goods acquired as a result of the commission of a recent crime is presumed to have committed the crime.
The State is required to prove each element of the instant charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 Del. C. § 301. "Reasonable doubt means a doubt based upon reason and common sense which arises from a fair and rational consideration of all of the evidence, or the lack of evidence, in the case." Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845, 851 (Del. 1999).
Initial Factual Findings by the Court
The evidence established by the State shows that Ms. D------' Ford Explorer was taken from her driveway sometime between midnight and approximately 5:00 A.M. on June 29, 2016. A black Ford Explorer was seen on videotape, being driven into a parking lot at Baynard Apartments shortly after 5:00 A.M. on June 29th and, when law enforcement responded later that morning, they determined that was in fact Ms. D------' stolen vehicle. Two individuals were seen on video walking away from the area in which the stolen vehicle had just been parked, approximately five minutes after the vehicle entered the parking area. The Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle that entered the parking area was the stolen vehicle and that the individuals seen walking away from the area in which the vehicle had just been parked at approximately 5:00 A.M. were in fact the individuals who had been in the vehicle. One of the individuals walking away from the vehicle was wearing brightly colored clothing - specifically a hooded red sweatshirt with a white zipper and two-tone reddish sneakers. The Respondent was questioned by police one day after the vehicle was stolen, at which point his photograph was taken and said photograph was entered into evidence. The photograph shows that Respondent was at that time wearing a bright red hooded sweatshirt with a white zipper and two-toned reddish sneakers. In addition, the State's evidence shows that fingerprinting completed the day the vehicle was stolen and recovered found Respondent's fingerprints in two places on the passenger side of the stolen vehicle, near the area of the front passenger door handle. This, coupled with the video evidence, is sufficient for the Court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent was in the vehicle when it was driven into and parked in the Baynard Apartments parking lot on the morning the vehicle was stolen and that he left the vehicle in that lot and walked away from the car approximately five minutes later.
State's Exhibit #42.
State's Exhibit #s 36-40 are photographs of the passenger side of the Explorer. Each of the photographs displays either one, or two, pieces of tape indicating the location of where the fingerprints were lifted from the vehicle. State's Exhibit #44 is a screenshot of the fingerprint analysis.
Count I and Count IV -- Burglary in the Second Degree and Conspiracy Second Degree
Regarding Count I, Burglary in the Second Degree, and Count IV, Conspiracy Second Degree, the Court cannot find that the State proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A key element of the Burglary Second Degree charge is that the Respondent have entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling. The State offered no direct evidence that Respondent entered Ms. D------' home, and the Court does not find the circumstantial evidence - that the keys to the car were in Ms. D------' home and Respondent was in the car shortly after it was stolen - sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the home. Despite the efforts of Detective M----, there were no prints of Respondent found inside of Ms. D------' home, nor was there other evidence of his presence there. As for accomplice liability, the State did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Respondent aided, counseled, agreed or attempted to aid another in committing the Burglary, as required by 11 Del. C. § 271.
See 11 Del. C. § 825 which states:
(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully:
(1) In a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein; or
(2) In a building and when, in effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime:
a. Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
b. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime.
The State also argues the applicability of the presumption found in 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(2), asking that this Court find Respondent delinquent as to the Burglary Second Degree charge based on Respondent's possession of the stolen vehicle and items found therein. A recent opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court again addressed how Section 306(c)(2) is to be applied, without shifting the burden of proof to the defendant or respondent. In Tymes v. State, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Hall v. State, that Section 306(c)(2) "allows for an 'inference' rather than a rebuttable presumption." The Supreme Court further noted that the inference is permissive and should be used only if the trier of fact determines that the inference is warranted by the evidence presented. In this case, taking the evidence as a whole, the Court cannot find that the inference is warranted. The Court therefore finds Respondent Not Delinquent of the Burglary Second charge and the accompanying Conspiracy Second charge.
Tymes v. State, 2017 WL 915110, at *3 (Table) (Del. Mar. 7, 2017).
Hall v. State, 473 A.2d 352 (Del. 1984).
See Hall, 473 A.2d at 355-56.
Count II - Theft of a Motor Vehicle - Delinquent
The Court finds Respondent Delinquent as to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge. The relevant portion of the Theft of a Motor Vehicle statute states that an individual "takes, exercises control over or obtains a motor vehicle of another person intending to deprive the other person of it or appropriate it." The Court agrees with the State that the rebuttable presumption in 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(2) applies as to this charge. As noted above, while the rebuttable presumption found in Section 306(c)(2) does not shift the burden from the State, it does provide that if the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the theft of the vehicle took place - which the Court has found in this case - then the inference can reasonably be made that an individual in possession of the vehicle shortly thereafter was the thief or one of the thieves, provided that the Court finds "such inference to be warranted in view of all of the evidence in the case."
See Sellman v. State, 805 A.2d 903 n.1 (Table) (Del. 2002).
In this case, the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent was in a stolen vehicle which did not belong to him or the other individual who was in the vehicle with him when it was dropped off at Baynard Apartments, just a few hours after it was stolen. This occurred in the middle of the night or early morning hours, with the vehicle being driven into the parking lot at approximately 5:00 A.M. Respondent and the other individual then left the vehicle in an apartment complex parking lot at which neither he nor the other individual resides. Taken as a whole, the Court finds the inference of Section 306(c)(2) to be warranted in this case. Further, the Court finds that these facts and findings provide sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent took, exercised control over, or obtained the motor vehicle with intent to deprive Ms. D------ of it, either because he was the principal in said crime or as an accomplice to that individual's criminal acts.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt "does not mean that the guilt of the accused must be established to an absolute certainty. Such a requirement would be impracticable and unreasonable." "Reasonable doubt means a doubt based upon reason and common sense which arises from a fair and rational consideration of all of the evidence, or the lack of evidence, in this case." By accompanying the other individual in the vehicle as he drove the vehicle to and left it at the apartment complex under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that reason and common sense would lead one to conclude that the Respondent did not aid the other individual in exercising control over the vehicle with the intention of depriving another person of it or appropriating it. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that even if Respondent was not the principal who took or exercised control over the vehicle, his actions indicate that he intended to facilitate the theft and aided another in committing it. The Court therefore finds Respondent delinquent as either the principal or as an accomplice.
Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845, 851 (Del. 1999).
Id.
See State v. McCoy, 2012 WL 2835052, at *4 (Del. Super. June 26, 2012) (denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal holding that even though defendant was not driving the stolen vehicle, he could still be found guilty of theft of a motor vehicle under accomplice liability).
Based on these findings, the Court finds Respondent delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt as to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge, either as the principal in the crime or as an accomplice thereto.
Count V - Conspiracy Second - Delinquent
As to Count IV, Conspiracy Second Degree related to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge, the Court finds the Respondent Delinquent.
Conspiracy Second Degree requires that a person, while intending to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony:
(1) Agrees with another person or persons that they or 1 or more of them will engage in conduct constituting the felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; or11 Del. C. § 512. A conspiracy requires "a unity of design and purpose," and it can be shown by direct or by circumstantial evidence. "Proof of a conspiracy will generally, from the nature of the case, be circumstantial." Further, "A conspiracy may be formed and a party not be in it at the time of its formation, but may afterwards come in and be connected with the conspiracy, and in such case he is as guilty as he would be if he were in the first stage thereof..."
(2) Agrees to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of the felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; and the person or another person with whom the person conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.
State v. Biter, 119 A.2d 894, 897 (Del. Super. 1955).
See McCoy, 2012 WL 2835052, at *3 (citing Biter, 119 A.2d at 898).
Id.
Biter, 119 A.2d at 898.
Based on the Court's findings above, Respondent and another individual took and/or exercised control over a motor vehicle belonging to Ms. D------ with the intent to appropriate it or to deprive her of it. Respondent and the other individual acted together, as driver and passenger, in taking the vehicle into the parking lot where neither Respondent, nor the other individual, nor the vehicle, had any reason to be, no more than a few hours after it was taken. As such, the Court finds no reasonable doubt, after careful, conscientious consideration, that there was an intent to promote or facilitate the theft of a motor vehicle and an agreement between the two individuals to do so. Respondent is therefore Delinquent of Conspiracy Second Degree related to the Theft of a Motor Vehicle charge. Count III - Theft Under $1,500 - Delinquent
Pursuant to Title 11, Section 841, "A person is guilty of theft when the person takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or appropriate it." In this case, property that had been stolen - specifically the laptop and briefcase - was found in the stolen vehicle shortly after the theft of the vehicle, the laptop, and the briefcase. Based on the photographs entered into evidence by the State, the laptop and briefcase were lying on the backseat of the stolen vehicle, where they would be evident to anyone in the front or back seat of the vehicle. The Court has already found beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent was either the driver or passenger in said vehicle. Respondent was therefore in possession of property acquired as a result of the commission of a recent crime and the presumption found in Section 306(c)(2) applies. The Court finds the application of the presumption warranted in this case in light of all of the evidence, and the Court finds that the State has proven Respondent Delinquent of Theft of Property under $1,500.
State's Exhibit #s 32, 33, 35.
Mr. Layton argues that the State has not proven Theft of Property under $1,500 because the State failed to prove that the property at issue - specifically the laptop and briefcase - were valued at less than $1,500. Mr. Layton argues that the value of the property at issue is an element of the crime of Theft and therefore the State is required to prove its value.
The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of theft when the person takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or appropriate it.11 Del. C. 841. The State argues that it is not required to prove value unless it has charged the Respondent with Theft of Property Valued at $1,500 or more, which is a Class G Felony level charge, as opposed to the Misdemeanor A crime with which the Respondent is charged. The State argues that pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 224(3), if value is not proven, the Court may deem the property worth less than $100. The relevant portion of that statute reads as follows:
***
(c)(1) ... [T]heft is a class A misdemeanor unless the value of the property received, retained or disposed of is $1,500 or more, in which case it is a class G felony.
Whenever the value of property is determinative of the degree of an accused's criminal guilt or otherwise relevant in a criminal prosecution, it shall be ascertained as follows:11 Del. C. § 224.
(1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, "value" means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if that cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the crime.
***
(3) When the value of property cannot satisfactorily be ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than $100.
The Court agrees with the State. First, the structure of the Theft statute itself does not lend itself to Mr. Layton's interpretation. Subsection (a) of the statute sets forth the elements of the crime of Theft, which are that an individual takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or appropriate it. Subsection (c) of the statute then sets forth the elements necessary to determine whether the theft is a Class A Misdemeanor or a Class G Felony, providing that the theft is a Class A Misdemeanor "unless the value of the property received, retained or disposed of is $1,500 or more, in which case it is a class G felony." The language of the statute does not require that the value of the property be proven to be less than $1,500. Rather, the statute provides that upon proving that an individual has taken, obtained, or exercised control over the property of another with intent to deprive or appropriate, that individual is guilty or delinquent of Theft. Pursuant to Subsection (c), based solely on having proven the elements required in Subsection (a), the respondent would be delinquent of a Class A Misdemeanor. Subsection (c) then goes on, however, to give the State the ability to prosecute at a higher level - specifically a class G felony - if the State shows the property to be valued at $1,500 or more. Therefore, while the statute would require the State to prove that property is valued at $1,500 or more in order to obtain a delinquency finding at a Class G Felony level, it does not require the State to prove the value of property to support a delinquency finding at a Class A Misdemeanor level. This is proven solely by proving the elements of the crime founds in Subsection (a).
The Court further notes that even were the Court to read Section 841 differently, Section 224 would in fact provide the ability for the Court to determine that value does not need to be proven in this case, as it provides that if value cannot be determined, it shall be deemed to be valued at less than $100. Mr. Layton argues that Subsection (3) of Section 224 applies only if evidence as to value is "unavailable." While the Court recognizes the requirement in Section 224 that the value be unavailable before the Court can deem property to be valued at less than $100, the Court does not read this provision in the way that Mr. Layton urges. The question for the Court is not whether there is some way for the prosecution to obtain market or replacement value for the items taken. Rather, the question is whether the Court was presented with that information. If the Court was not, then as to the Court, that information is unavailable and the Court will assign the property a value less than $100. This interpretation achieves what the statute calls for, which is essentially providing that if the State chooses not to or is unable to present evidence of value, the State cannot prove Theft at a Felony level and must instead settle for a conviction at a Misdemeanor level.
Under Mr. Layton's interpretation, if the property taken had no market or replacement value - for example, if the item were a family photo or a letter that has intrinsic value to the owner but not to anyone else - then the State would be permitted to not put on any evidence of value and a Misdemeanor Theft conviction could be obtained. Alternatively, if the item had a market value of $5.00, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is worth less than $1,500 to obtain that same conviction. Yet the actions of the respondent in both cases was the same and the level of charge was the same, in the taking, exercising control over, or obtaining property of another. There is simply no reason to require a higher showing by the State in the latter case than in the former. The structure of the Theft statute supports the Court's interpretation and the language in Section 224 does not prevent it.
Mr. Layton provided the Court with the Court of Common Pleas case of State of Delaware v. Wyatt J. Johnson (case no. 1409014646) interpreting the Criminal Mischief statute and determining that value, even when charged at the lowest level with a damage value of less than $1,000, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Johnson opinion was based on a different statute, one which requires damages as an element of the crime, and as the opinion did not consider the application of Subsection (3) of Section 224, the Court does not consider the reasoning applicable to this case. --------
The Court finds Respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Theft under $1,500.
A sentencing hearing for case number 1606024153 shall be held June 13, 2017. A Pre-Sentencing Investigation is hereby ordered. Case number 1701001660 shall be scheduled for trial May 23, 2017, at 1:00 p.m., before Commissioner Mayo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/ Jennifer B . Ranji /
Jennifer B. Ranji
Family Court Judge JBR/
cc: Parties, File
Date emailed/mailed: