Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0199-PR
05-14-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Ralph David Cruz Jr., Petitioner.
Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender By David J. Euchner and Sarah R. Kostick, Assistant Public Defenders, Tucson Counsel for Petitioner
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20002693001 The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge
Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender By David J. Euchner and Sarah R. Kostick, Assistant Public Defenders, Tucson Counsel for Petitioner
Judge Gard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Chief Judge Vasquez concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GARD, JUDGE:
¶ 1 Ralph Cruz Jr. seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 33, Ariz. R. Crim. P., after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to State v. Valencia (Valencia II), 241 Ariz. 206 (2016). Our supreme court overruled Valencia II in State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 256 Ariz. 1 (2023). Thus, although we grant review, we deny relief.
¶ 2 In August 2000, then-sixteen-year-old Cruz shot and killed a mother and her two children during a robbery. Cruz pled guilty to three counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery. The plea agreement specified that Cruz would be sentenced to natural life or life with the possibility of release after twenty-five years for the first murder count or release after thirty-five years for the second and third murder counts. The plea agreement also required Cruz's prison terms to run consecutively. The court sentenced Cruz to life with the possibility of release after twenty-five years for the first murder, to be followed by consecutive terms of natural life for the children's murders. The court imposed a 10.5-year consecutive prison term for armed robbery.
¶ 3 Cruz sought post-conviction relief in 2013, asserting inter alia that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), required that he be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole and the court gave insufficient weight to his age as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied relief, and we denied relief on review, observing that "even under Miller's heightened standard, the sentencing court adequately considered Cruz's youth in determining whether to impose a natural life sentence." State v. Cruz, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0102-PR, ¶¶ 3, 11, 13 (Ariz. App. Oct. 8, 2014) (mem. decision).
¶ 4 In 2016, Cruz again sought post-conviction relief, arguing he was entitled, under State v. Valencia (Valencia I), 239 Ariz. 255 (App. 2016), vacated, 241 Ariz. 206, to resentencing so the trial court could consider whether his crimes reflected permanent incorrigibility such that a natural life sentence could be imposed. The proceeding was stayed until our supreme court issued Valencia II. In Valencia II, the supreme court determined that juvenile offenders sentenced to natural life terms, like Cruz, were entitled to an evidentiary hearing to "have an opportunity to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but instead transient immaturity." 241 Ariz. 206, ¶ 18. The court set an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony over several days in 2019. The court continued the hearing in anticipation of rulings by the United States Supreme Court related to juvenile sentencing; the hearing resumed in March 2023.
Some of the delay was also attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.
¶ 5 The trial court denied relief. It noted, first, that the sentencing court had been "required, and did, consider [Cruz]'s youth before imposing the sentences." Thus, the court concluded, "the constitutional requirements of the Miller decision were satisfied." The court nonetheless "revisit[ed]" the sentencing court's decision in light of "subsequent rulings on the subject by both the United States Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court." The court concluded Cruz had failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "his actions . . . were the result of transient immaturity" and instead "were the result of permanent incorrigibility/irreparable corruption." The court therefore affirmed Cruz's natural life prison terms.This petition for review followed.
The trial court additionally ordered that, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-716, Cruz would be eligible for parole for his release-eligible life term after serving the required twenty-five years. Insofar as Cruz's argument is based on the unavailability of parole at the time of his offenses, Cruz is entitled to seek parole for the eligible count under § 13-716, which provides parole eligibility to juvenile offenders "on completion of the minimum sentence."
¶ 6 On review, Cruz asserts the trial court erred by denying relief. He argues he "overwhelmingly proved he is not permanently incorrigible," the court erred by rejecting expert testimony "based on preconceived notions and lay assumptions," and the court "cherry-picked certain testimony." As we explain, we need not reach these arguments. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015) ("We will affirm the trial court's decision if it is legally correct for any reason.").
¶ 7 After the trial court's ruling, our supreme court decided Cooper, overruling Valencia II in light of Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021). 256 Ariz. 1, ¶ 47. The court thus eliminated Valencia II's rule that juvenile defendants seeking post-conviction relief are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate "that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but instead transient immaturity" when a court has imposed a natural life sentence "without distinguishing crimes that reflected 'irreparable corruption' rather than the 'transient immaturity of youth.'" Id. (quoting Valencia II, 241 Ariz. 206, ¶¶ 15, 18). A natural life sentence is constitutional if the court considered the "juvenile offender's 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" Id. ¶ 42 (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 106). The court noted that the Supreme Court had clarified in Jones that sentencing courts need not provide "an 'on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.'" Id. (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 115).
¶ 8 Although Cruz acknowledges Cooper, he argues that we "should reach the merits of [his] claim" because "a Valencia hearing occurred." He does not cite any authority, however, nor otherwise explain how this court could conclude the trial court erred by denying Cruz relief after an evidentiary hearing held to address a question our supreme court has since clarified the trial court was not required to address.
¶ 9 Cruz claims the sentencing court in his case "did not address the attendant characteristics of youth nor did it have discretion to impose a sentence of life with the possibility of parole." But he has not developed any argument that his sentencing procedure was unconstitutional in light of Jones and Cooper. See State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (failure to develop argument waives claim on review). And no constitutional infirmity is apparent from the record. As we noted above, the court found Cruz's age to be a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court clarified in Jones that neither the Constitution nor "historical or contemporary sentencing practice" require "an on-the-record explanation of the mitigating circumstance of youth by the sentencer." 593 U.S. at 116-17. Nor does Arizona law require such findings. See State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 501 (App. 1995). And the court had discretion to impose a sentence other than natural life.
¶ 10 We grant review but deny relief.