Opinion
No. 05-11-01003-CR
06-12-2012
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. JEFFERY DALE CRECY, Appellee
AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 12, 2012.
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22888-86
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Murphy, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Murphy
The State raises one point of error in its appeal of the trial court's order granting Jeffery Dale Crecy's motion for new trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(3) (West Supp. 2011). Specifically, the State asserts the capias issued on its revocation motion was within the term of Crecy's community supervision, and the trial court erred by interpreting its own order to determine it lacked jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background
Crecy was charged with burglary of a building pursuant to an indictment filed September 24, 2004. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(c)(1) (West 2011). He pleaded guilty to the offense and, on March 4, 2005, was placed on community supervision for a term of five years. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 (West Supp. 2011). More than four years later, the trial court signed an order on June 4, 2009 amending and extending Crecy's term of community supervision "for a period of one year, beginning March 4, 2005 for five years probation and then extended to end March 4, 2011." Interpretation of this order is at issue in this appeal.
The State filed a motion to revoke Crecy's community supervision on March 3, 2011. The next day-March 4-the clerk issued a warrant, or capias, for Crecy's arrest. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on June 15, 2011 revoking Crecy's community supervision and sentencing him to serve fourteen months in a state jail facility.
Crecy's Motion for New Trial
Crecy filed a motion for new trial, contending the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision because the March 4 capias was issued one day after the conclusion of his community supervision. Specifically, a court loses jurisdiction to revoke community supervision unless a capias is issued before the expiration of the period of community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(e). The trial court conducted a hearing on Crecy's motion, at which the parties addressed the meaning of the court's language in its June 4, 2009 order that extended the term of Crecy's community supervision "for a period of one year, beginning March 4, 2005 for five years probation and then extended to end March 4, 2011." Crecy argued, relying on Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), that the anniversary date of the imposition of community supervision is not included as part of the community supervision term. Under this reasoning, his community supervision began on March 4, 2005, was extended for one year by the June 4, 2009 order, and concluded on the last full day of Crecy's community supervision, which was March 3, 2011. Crecy therefore was no longer on community supervision on March 4-the anniversary date of his supervision-when the capias for his arrest issued, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision.
The State agreed with Crecy that the anniversary date is usually not included as part of the term of community supervision but argued that this instance is factually distinct from Nesbit because the trial court specified a date that the community supervision period expired. Under the State's reasoning, "the date of expiration is the date that the court says it expires, and if there's a specific date, it is the date that the court orders, which in our case was March 4, 2011." The State argued that using the plain, ordinary meaning of the term "and"-which ordinarily means "plus"-the "and then extended to end March 4, 2011" language in the June 4, 2009 order extended the term of Crecy's community supervision to the date specified by the order, or March 4, 2011. Crecy's community supervision period therefore was extended for one year and one day, not for one year as Crecy contends. Under that reasoning, Crecy was still under community supervision when the capias issued, the trial court did have jurisdiction to hear the State's motion to revoke, and no new trial was warranted.
In reaching its decision to grant Crecy's motion for new trial, the trial court observed that "the provisions in the order conflict." The trial court concluded it was unrealistic to think the court, which was the same judge involved in each of the orders, would extend the community supervision "one year and one day," yet specify in the order that the period was extended for "one year." The trial court ruled that Crecy's community supervision expired on March 3, 2011-the day before the capias issued-and it lacked jurisdiction to revoke community supervision under article 42.12, section 21(e) of the code of criminal procedure. The trial court granted Crecy's motion for new trial, and the State appeals that order.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In conducting our review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give great deference to the trial court's ruling and will overrule that decision only if it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court's ruling. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Analysis
We agree with the trial court that there is a conflict in the provisions of the June 4, 2009 order that extended Crecy's community supervision. It is not clear under a plain reading of the order whether the trial court intended to extend Crecy's community supervision for one year-through March 3, 2011, as Crecy contends-or for one year and one day, through March 4, 2011, as the State contends. And a determinative factor in construing a court order is the intention of the court. See Harper v. Welchem, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). The State is asking that we overrule a trial court's interpretation of its own order-that is, to overrule a court's determination of its own intentions. We are instructed as appellate courts to give great deference to a trial court's ruling. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7. And a trial court has broad discretion in carrying out its duty to interpret and enforce its judgments. See, e.g., In re Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 252 S.W.3d 480, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (referencing trial court's discretion and duty to interpret its judgments in context of order enforcing arbitration award). In conducting our review, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112. The trial court stated in its June 4, 2009 order that Crecy's community supervision was extended "for a period of one year." From this, the trial court reasonably could determine that it extended Crecy's community supervision for only one year and, under Nesbit, that period ended on March 3, 2011.
Conclusion
Giving great deference to the trial court's interpretation of its own order, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Crecy a new trial. We affirm the trial court's order.
MARY MURPHY
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
111003F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
JEFFERY DALE CRECY, Appellee
No. 05-11-01003-CR
Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court of Kaufman County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 22888-86).
Opinion delivered by Justice Murphy, Justices FitzGerald and Fillmore participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered June 12, 2012.
MARY MURPHY
JUSTICE