Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 18-0033
05-02-2019
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DOMONIQUE CRAWFORD, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Jana Zinman Counsel for Appellee Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR201601013
The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Jana Zinman
Counsel for Appellee
Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
PERKINS, Judge:
¶1 Domonique Crawford appeals the denial of her motion to suppress evidence which ultimately led to her convictions on various drug-related charges. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On review from the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view those facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, 12, ¶ 2 (App. 2000).
¶3 On July 17, 2016, Crawford was traveling on an interstate highway through Arizona as a passenger in a rented car. The driver ("Driver") failed to change lanes to make room for a police officer who had pulled another driver over on the shoulder, even after the officer motioned for Driver to change lanes. The highway patrol officer ("Trooper") testified he "concluded the traffic stop" he was conducting and "went and chased down [Driver's vehicle]." The Trooper pulled over Driver, asked her to exit the car, and informed her he intended to issue her a warning for failing to move over for a stopped emergency vehicle. The Trooper talked with Driver about her travel plans as he wrote out the traffic warning. The Trooper also checked the vehicle identification number on the car, and, while doing so, opened the passenger side door and questioned Crawford about her travel plans.
¶4 As the Trooper handed the warning to Driver along with her driver's license and the rental car agreement, he asked Driver whether there was anything illegal in the car. In response, Driver said there was nothing illegal in her car and that the Trooper could search the vehicle if he wished. The Trooper then handed Driver a "consent to search form," which Driver read and refused to sign, stating that she did not believe the Trooper had a reason to search her car. The Trooper then asked if Driver would be willing to wait for a police dog to sniff the exterior of the car for narcotics "and [Driver] agreed."
¶5 While waiting for the police dog, the Trooper asked Driver whether there were drugs in the car or in her possession. Driver eventually admitted she had marijuana in her purse and, after further questioning, admitted there were other drugs in the car. Driver told the Trooper she was being paid to transport narcotics, but she didn't know what drugs were in the car. The Trooper then detained Driver and Crawford before he searched the car.
¶6 The State charged Crawford with multiple counts of transportation and possession of narcotics related to the drugs found during the Trooper's search of the vehicle. Crawford and her co-defendant, Driver, jointly moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the search. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Trooper and another officer testified. The court denied the motion to suppress. A jury convicted Crawford of transportation of narcotics for sale, possession of narcotics for sale, transportation of methamphetamine for sale, possession of dangerous drugs for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The superior court sentenced Crawford to concurrent terms of imprisonment for each conviction, the longest of which was 10 years. Crawford now appeals the denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop.
DISCUSSION
¶7 We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, but review questions of law and constitutional issues de novo. State v. Snyder, 240 Ariz. 551, 554-55, ¶ 8 (App. 2016). After the suppression hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress based on its finding that the continued encounter between Driver and the Trooper was consensual following the completion of the traffic stop.
¶8 On appeal, Crawford argues that the Trooper unlawfully extended the traffic stop and thereby violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The State, relying on Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), argues Crawford lacks standing to challenge the detention of her co-defendant, Driver, and the subsequent search of the vehicle. In Rakas, the United States Supreme Court held that a passenger in a vehicle cannot challenge a search of the vehicle's interior because the passenger, unlike the driver, does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle's glove box or underneath the seat. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49. While it is true that Crawford lacks standing to challenge the ultimate search of the vehicle, Crawford has standing to challenge her alleged unlawful detention in accordance with Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). See also State v. Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, 62, ¶¶ 5-7 (App. 2000) (quoting State v. Carter, 630 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ohio 1994)) (noting that while passengers cannot challenge the search of a
vehicle, they may challenge the stop of a vehicle because they are "equally seized" by the stop).
¶9 The United States Supreme Court has held that police officers cannot extend a traffic stop "beyond the time reasonably required" to complete the ordinary components of a traffic stop absent independent reasonable suspicion. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). See also State v. Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. 319, 322-23, ¶¶ 10-14 (App. 2016) (discussing Rodriguez); State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)) (noting that traffic stops must "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"). Thus, the question under Rodriguez is whether the officer unreasonably prolonged the stop before the detention became consensual.
¶10 Here, the Trooper asked Driver whether there was anything illegal in the car as he returned her license. Driver responded there was not and invited the Trooper to search the vehicle. Ultimately, Driver declined to sign a written consent form, asserting that the Trooper had no reason to search the vehicle, but thereafter agreed to wait for a police dog to sniff the outside of the vehicle. Crawford asserts that because the Trooper unlawfully extended the stop by continuing to ask questions after handing the driver back her license, the trial court erred in finding Driver's continued contacts with the Trooper consensual. This court has previously held, in Driver's appeal, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Driver and Crawford's joint motion to suppress after finding that Driver's "brief, post-citation encounter with the trooper was consensual." State v. McCoy, 1 CA-CR 18-0029, 2018 WL 6791924 at *3, ¶ 16 (citing State v. Acinelli, 191 Ariz. 66, 69-70 (App. 1997)).
¶11 Police officers who lack reasonable suspicion may ask an individual questions without violating the Fourth Amendment so long as the encounter is consensual. State v. Serna, 235 Ariz. 270, 272, ¶ 8 (2014) (citation omitted). An encounter with police is consensual so "long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991).
¶12 Consent must be voluntary, in light of the totality of the circumstances, in order to take a detention or search outside the Fourth Amendment's protections. State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 305-06, ¶ 21 (2016). Here, the Trooper asked whether there were drugs in Driver's car and Driver, of her own volition, invited the Trooper to search the vehicle. Driver then withdrew consent when presented with a written consent form, noting that she did not believe the Trooper had reason to search the vehicle.
However, Driver ultimately agreed to wait for a police dog to sniff the outside of her vehicle. Nothing in this exchange indicates Driver believed she was not free to leave or was required to agree to wait for a police dog.
¶13 The Trooper's continued interactions with Driver, and Crawford's continued presence, were the result of a single question the Trooper asked Driver as he handed her back her license. See Serna, 235 Ariz. at 272-73, ¶¶ 3, 10-12. As in Valenzuela, the Trooper's continued questioning of Driver was subsequent to an assertion of lawful authority, albeit to detain rather than search, and nothing in the record indicates the Trooper demanded Driver remain at the scene after returning her license. Neither does the record indicate that the Trooper induced Driver to suggest he search her car or that he coerced her to wait for a police dog as prohibited by Rodriguez. Instead, the record indicates Driver first invited a search, and then agreed to wait for a police dog. Accordingly, deferring to the trial court's factual determinations and credibility assessments, as we must, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Trooper's continued interaction with Driver was consensual. See Wyman, 197 Ariz. at 12, ¶ 2; Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17, n. 1. Moreover, while we recognize that the detention of Driver on an empty stretch of interstate highway necessarily constitutes the detention of Crawford, as her passenger, Driver's voluntary consent to remain at the scene does not create a Fourth Amendment violation as to Crawford. Cf. Gomez, 198 Ariz. at 62, ¶¶ 5-7 (passengers and drivers are "equally seized" by the stop of a motor vehicle).
CONCLUSION
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Crawford's motion to suppress.