Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0006-PR
04-18-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. EDGAR CONTRERAS, Petitioner.
Edgar Contreras, Buckeye In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2002004635
The Honorable Teresa Sanders, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Edgar Contreras, Buckeye
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
BREARCLIFFE, Judge:
¶1 Edgar Contreras seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his successive and untimely notice of post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that order unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Contreras has not shown such abuse here.
¶2 In 2002, Contreras pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison "with the possibility of parole after 25 years." He was a juvenile at the time he murdered the victim. He filed an untimely notice of post-conviction relief in 2003, asserting his defense counsel had not explained his right to seek post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed that notice. He filed another notice in November 2016, asserting he was not guilty of murder, which the court also summarily dismissed. Contreras did not seek review of either dismissal.
¶3 In June 2017, Contreras filed a notice of post-conviction relief arguing his sentence was illegal because "Arizona abolished parole in 1993," and asserting he "would not have ple[]d guilty if [he] had known that [he] could not see a parole board." In his form petition, he checked boxes indicating there was newly discovered evidence and a significant change in the law entitling him to relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the notice, observing that his arguments were precluded to the extent he was raising them pursuant to Rule 32.1(a) and (c), and that he had identified neither a change in the law or new evidence entitling him to relief. The court noted, however, that Contreras was parole-eligible pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-716. The court thus ordered the Arizona Department of Corrections to "set a specific date for parole eligibility" for Contreras and dismissed the notice. This petition for review followed.
¶4 On review, Contreras repeats and expands on his claims, his essential argument being that he was unaware until recently that his sentence was illegal and, thus, he should now be entitled to challenge the
validity of his sentence and plea. In this untimely proceeding, Contreras is only permitted to raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(A). He has identified two such claims—a claim there has been a significant change in the law pursuant to Rule 32.1(g) and a claim of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 32.1(e). But he has identified no relevant change in the law since his conviction and sentence, and a claim of newly discovered material facts does not encompass newly discovered legal theories or authority. See generally State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487, ¶ 7 (App. 2000) (to establish claim of newly discovered evidence, defendant must show "that the evidence was discovered after trial although it existed before trial; that it could not have been discovered and produced at trial through reasonable diligence; that it is neither cumulative nor impeaching; that it is material; and that it probably would have changed the verdict"). The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing Contreras's notice of post-conviction relief.
¶5 We grant review but deny relief.