Opinion
ID No. 0103017776 (R-2).
Submitted: March 18, 2008.
April 9, 2008.
Charles O. Conner, DE.
Dear Mr. Conner:
Pending before the Court is the second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61")which defendant Charles O. Conner ("defendant") has filed. This is my decision denying the motion.
On August 8, 2001, defendant pled guilty to a charge of rape in the third degree. After being placed under oath, defendant affirmed that he was satisfied with trial counsel's legal representation and he had no complaints about that representation. A review of the plea colloquy makes clear that defendant freely and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement.
The Court imposed the recommended sentence on August 8, 2001. Defendant did not appeal.
Defendant previously has filed numerous requests for modification of his sentence, all of which were denied. He also previously filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective. One of the grounds he asserted in support of this contention was that trial counsel failed to investigate the location of the crime, and defendant stated that it did not occur in Delaware. As this Court ruled, a review of the plea colloquy shows that defendant, in affirming he committed the crime as alleged in the indictment, acknowledged the crime did occur in Delaware. State v. Conner, Del. Super., Def. ID# 0103017776, Stokes, J. (April 15, 2002)at 3. The Court ruled defendant was bound by his representations under oath and ruled that this claim failed. Id.
The affidavit of probable cause sets forth that the victim stated she had sexual intercourse with the defendant at least twice at her residence in Seaford, Delaware. That information was the basis for the indictment charging defendant with rape in the third degree "in the County of Sussex, State of Delaware."
Defendant has filed his second Rule 61 motion. He asserts, again, that the crime did not occur in Delaware. He argues that the interest of justice exception set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4)overcomes the procedural bars to his claim.
This claim is procedurally barred pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1)(time-barred) and (4) (formerly adjudicated). Defendant's time for filing any motions for postconviction relief expired on August 8, 2004. This Court previously considered defendant's claim regarding the territorial jurisdiction issue within the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court previously held that defendant acknowledged the crime occurred in Delaware. There is no requirement that the Court reconsider this claim and defendant has not established how reconsideration is required in the interest of justice. Wooten v. State, Del. Supr., No. 319, 1991, Christie, C.J. (Oct. 18, 1991). Furthermore, defendant has not established that the exceptions to the bars contained in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) apply. Defendant's claim fails.
The applicable version of Rule 61(i)provided as follows:
Bars to relief. (1) Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.
(2) Repetitive motion. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim in warranted in the interest of justice.
(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows
(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and
(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.
(4) Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(5) Bars inapplicable. The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's second Rule 61 motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.