Opinion
Nos. 9802013395 98020127783.
Submitted: March 31, 2000.
Decided: April 5, 2000.
Letter Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Transfer Charges to Family Court for Sentencing — MOTION DENIED
Stuart E. Sklut, Esquire, Maria T. Knoll, Esquire Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street, Wilmington, DE. 19801.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1130 Wilmington, DE. 19801.
Thomas A. Foley, Esquire 1326 King Street, Wilmington, DE. 19801.
Dear Counsel:
This is the Court's Letter Opinion and Order on Defendants Galen Collins and Dion Oliver's Motion to Transfer Charges to Family Court for Sentencing. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Transfer is DENIED.
FACTS
Collins and Oliver were charged and convicted of events that occurred on February 17, 1998. Both men were convicted of trafficking cocaine (more than 100 grams), possession with the intent to deliver cocaine, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and resisting arrest. Oliver was also convicted of reckless endangering first degree, reckless endangering second degree. possession with intent to deliver marijuana, use of a vehicle for keeping controlled substances, driving without a license, and no proof of insurance.
The Defendants were both 17 years old when the offenses were committed on February 17, 1998. Normally, as Defendants under the age of 18, Collins and Oliver would have been tried as juveniles and been under the jurisdiction of the Family Court. 10 Del. C. § 921 (16), however, states that:
Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, charges of delinquency based upon an alleged violation of any provision of Title 11, 16, or 21 of this Code which would otherwise be within the original civil jurisdiction of Family Court shall instead be within the original criminal jurisdiction of Superior Court if said charges may be joined properly with a felony pending against the same child in Superior Court, as determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Superior Court.
In this case, the trial was held in Superior Court because 11 Del. C. § 1447A(e) provides that a person tried under this section (Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony) over the age of 15 shall be tried as an adult. See State v. Anderson, Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 379 (1997). The companion charges were properly joined with the firearms charge, and, under the statute, the companion charges were within the jurisdiction of Superior Court. There was no application for a reverse amenability hearing prior to trial. Thus, the Defendants here do not dispute that the companion offenses were properly joined with the weapons charges in Superior Court for trial.
The Defendants now argue that under the recent Anderson case, 10 Del. C. § 921 (16) does not, standing alone, empower this Court to sentence the Defendants as adults for the companion offenses. The Defendants claim they are entitled to a reverse amenability hearing prior to sentencing. The Defendants argue that if the State wanted to "try" the Defendants as adults on the companion charges, the State should have moved to have the Defendants found non-amenable to the Family Court process under 10 Del. C. § 1010, and that procedure was not invoked in this case.
DECISION
This State allows limited reverse amenability hearings with respect to companion charges when the statutory requirements of 10 Del. C. § 1011 are met. This State does not, however, allow reverse amenability hearings with respect to juveniles over the age of 15 when charged with violation of 11 Del. C. § 1447A(e). See Anderson, 697 A.2d at 385. The procedure for a reverse amenability hearing is codified by 10 Del. C. § 1011. That statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) In any case in which the Superior Court has jurisdiction over a child, the Attorney General may transfer the case to the Family Court for trial and disposition if, in the Attorney General's opinion, the interests of justice would be best served.
(b) Upon application of the defendant in any case where the Superior Court has original jurisdiction over a child, the Court may transfer the case to the Family Court for trial and disposition if, in the opinion of the Court, the interests of justice would be best served by such transfer. . . .
(c)(1) The hearing described in subsection (b) of this section shall be held by the Superior Court only upon timely application of the defendant. Such application shall be deemed timely if made within 30 days of arraignment. No enlargement of said time period shall be permitted. Failure of the defendant to make application within the 30 day period shall constitute a waiver of his or her rights under this section.
Id.
Thus, under the statute, the Attorney General can transfer the case to the Family Court "for trial and disposition." Defendants, however, must make an application for a reverse amenability hearing within 30 days of arraignment. If the Defendants do not make the application within 30 days of arraignment, their rights are deemed waived. The statute is clear that there is. no enlargement of time allowed.
Here, the Defendants are asking for a reverse amenability hearing after trial and before sentencing. The statute prohibits Defendants from moving for and receiving a reverse amenability hearing at this late stage of the proceedings. The Defendants have not filed for the amenability hearing within the statutorily prescribed time period. Therefore, their Motion to Transfer Charges to Family Court for Sentencing must be DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely, __________________ William T. Quillen
WTQ/mw, caj oc: Prothonotary