Opinion
No. 8019SC1003
Filed 5 May 1981
Criminal Law 89.7; Witnesses 1 — refusal to order psychiatric examination of rape victim In this prosecution for second degree rape of a mentally retarded female, the trial court did not have the authority to grant defendant's motion to require a psychiatric examination of the alleged victim. Even if the trial court had the inherent authority to require the alleged victim to submit to a psychiatric examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of defendant's motion where an expert witness who testified for the State gave testimony which supported defendant's contentions and was damaging to the credibility and reliability of the alleged victim.
APPEAL by defendant from Albright, Judge. Judgment entered 15 May 1980 in Superior Court, CABARRUS County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 March 1981.
Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General J. Chris Prather, for the State.
Cecil R. Jenkins, Jr., for defendant appellant.
Judge BECTON dissenting.
Defendant was tried on a bill of indictment charging him with second degree rape in that he did
feloniously rape, ravish, carnally know, and engage in vaginal intercourse with Donna Safrit by force and against her will while the said Donna Safrit was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated and physically helpless and while the said Raymond Clontz knew and should reasonably have known that Donna Safrit was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated and physically helpless.
The State offered evidence tending to show that defendant forced a 20-year-old mentally retarded female to engage in intercourse with him against her will. The State also offered evidence tending to show that she had an I.Q. of less than 60, lived in a household of conflicts, was afraid of men and displayed a tendency to project blame on others. She also suffers from the afflictions of cerebral palsy.
Defendant did not testify but did offer evidence tending to show that he did not engage in intercourse with the alleged victim.
Defendant was found guilty as charged, and judgment imposing a prison sentence was entered.
Defendant first argues that he was not given enough time for discovery after the return of the bill upon which he was tried. Although we do not concede that defendant is correct in this, the question is relevant here only if he is correct in his second argument: that the judge should have granted his motion to require the victim of the alleged rape to submit to a psychiatric examination. We conclude that the judge correctly denied the motion, and, since that was the only additional discovery contemplated, there was no error in the denial of defendant's motion for continuance of the case.
In denying defendant's motion for a compulsory psychiatric examination of the State's principal witness, the trial judge followed, as must we, the decision of our Supreme Court in State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978), where the Court, after a thorough review of cases from other jurisdictions concluded:
To require a witness to submit to a psychiatric examination, by a psychiatrist not selected by the witness, is much more than a handicap to the party proposing to offer him or her. It is a drastic invasion of the witness' own right of privacy. To be ordered by a court to submit to such an examination is, in itself, humiliating and potentially damaging to the reputation and career of the witness.
. . . .
. . . To require the alleged victim, especially in a sex offense case, to submit to such an inquisition into her most personal and private relations and past history, as a condition precedent to permitting her to testify against her alleged assailant would certainly discourage the honest, innocent victim of a genuine assault from going to the authorities with a complaint. This is not in the public interest. A zealous concern for the accused is not justification for a grueling and harassing trial of the victim as a condition precedent to bringing the accused to trial.
. . . .
In our opinion, the possible benefits to an innocent defendant, flowing from such a court ordered examination of the witness, are outweighed by the resulting invasion of the witness' right to privacy and the danger to the public interest from discouraging victims of crime to report such offenses and other potential witnesses from disclosing their knowledge of them.
We think that so drastic a change in the criminal trial procedure of this State, if needed, should be brought about, as was done in Massachusetts, by a carefully considered and drafted statute, not by our pronouncement leaving the matter to the unguided discretion of the trial judge.
294 N.C. at 26-28, 240 S.E.2d at 626-27.
We also hold that this case falls within the secondary position taken by Justice Lake for the majority and the position taken by Justice Exum in his concurring opinion. Even if the trial judge should be said to have the power to order an unwilling witness for the State to submit to a psychiatric examination, the case at bar is not one of those rare instances in which it should be exercised. Among other things, we note that defendant would have been hard pressed to have found expert testimony more friendly to his contentions and more damaging to the credibility and reliability of the alleged victim than that offered by the doctor who testified for the State. The record fails to show any compelling need for further psychiatric examination.
Defendant's remaining assignments of error have been considered. No prejudicial error has been shown.
No error.
Judge WELLS concurs.
Judge BECTON dissents.