Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 14-0446
04-21-2015
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. SAMUEL ANTONIO CLARK, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Andrew Reilly Counsel for Appellee Law Offices of Mary Elizabeth Perez, San Diego, CA By Mary E. Perez Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400CR2013301407
The Honorable Stephen J. Rouff, Judge Pro Tem
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Andrew Reilly
Counsel for Appellee
Law Offices of Mary Elizabeth Perez, San Diego, CA
By Mary E. Perez
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
DOWNIE, Judge:
¶1 Samuel Antonio Clark filed a notice of appeal from his criminal convictions and sentences, though he argues only that his conviction and sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia should be set aside. For the following reasons, we affirm Clark's convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDUAL HISTORY
¶2 Officer Sanchez responded to a call about suspicious persons looking into vehicles in a Yuma neighborhood. She saw Clark and another man walking out of the neighborhood, and they appeared to match the description provided. As the officer approached in her police car, she saw the men "stuffing stuff inside their pockets." She spoke with Clark, who was clenching his jaw, sweating, and balling up his fists. Officer Sanchez instructed Clark to keep his hands out of his pockets and asked if he had anything in them. Clark responded affirmatively. She then asked if he had a weapon or anything that could poke her. Clark responded that he had a syringe. Officer Sanchez repeatedly instructed Clark to keep his hands out of his pockets, but Clark did not comply.
¶3 Officer Sanchez ordered Clark to place his hands on a wall and asked if he had anything other than the syringe. Clark said he had "crystal" — a shorthand term for methamphetamine — and marijuana. Officer Sanchez patted Clark down, discovered the syringe, and placed Clark under arrest. When asked what was in the syringe, Clark responded it was "crystal." Officer Sanchez also found two small plastic bags on Clark's person — one containing a white, powdery substance and the other containing a green, leafy substance. Testing confirmed the substance in the syringe was methamphetamine. The substances in the plastic bags were not tested.
¶4 Clark was indicted on three counts: count one, possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine); count two, possession of drug
paraphernalia involving methamphetamine (plastic bag), and count three, possession of marijuana. At trial, after the State rested its case, Clark moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20. He focused on count two, arguing no evidence established that the substance in the baggie was methamphetamine. The court denied the motion.
¶5 The jury found Clark guilty on all three counts. Clark timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 Clark argues the court erred by denying his Rule 20 motion regarding count two because there was "no evidence whatsoever indicating that the substance inside the plastic bag was actually methamphetamine." He suggests the trial evidence established the syringe was drug paraphernalia, but not the plastic bag — the object specified in count two of the indictment.
¶7 "A judgment of acquittal is appropriate only when there is no substantial evidence to prove each element of the offense and support the conviction." State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, 573, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 931, 937 (App. 2007). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4, 859 P.2d 111, 114 (1993).
¶8 As charged here, the State was required to prove that Clark used or possessed with intent to use drug paraphernalia to "pack, repack, store, [or] contain" methamphetamine. A.R.S. § 13-3415(A). The definition of drug paraphernalia includes "envelopes and other containers used . . . in packaging small quantities of drugs" as well as "[c]ontainers and other objects used . . . in storing or concealing drugs." A.R.S. § 13-3415(F)(2)(i)-(j).
¶9 Clark admitted possessing "crystal," and Officer Sanchez testified that Clark was behaving as if he were under the influence of methamphetamine. The officer found the plastic bag in Clark's pocket — in close proximity to a syringe filled with methamphetamine. Officer Sanchez testified that the bag contained a white powdery substance and was tied in the shape of a bindle — a common method of carrying methamphetamine.
¶10 "Evidence may be direct or circumstantial." Landrigan, 176 Ariz. at 4, 859 P.2d at 114. If "reasonable minds can differ on inferences" to be drawn from the evidence presented, "the case must be submitted to the jury," and the superior court "has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal." Id. Although the substance in the bag was not scientifically tested, A.R.S. § 13-3415(E) directs the trier of fact to consider all "logically relevant factors" in determining whether a given object is drug paraphernalia. These factors include statements "by anyone in control of the object concerning its use," the "proximity of the object to drugs," and "[t]he existence of any residue of drugs on the object." Id. Scientific proof that the bag contained methamphetamine was not required, though the absence of such evidence was a factor the jury could consider. Based on the circumstantial evidence presented, reasonable jurors could conclude that the plastic bag was in fact used to store methamphetamine. As such, the superior court properly denied Clark's Rule 20 motion.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Clark's convictions and sentences.